How a bunch of wannabe doctors (338 in number ) destroyed Grenada's revolution

 This is the story of  the revolution in Grenada where there was a Medical college. which  had about  500+ students from USA  who couldn't get in to  a US medical college,  but still wanted to be doctors.
There was a blood less coup which over threw a  kooky, UFO worshiping  crazy dictator and  Mr Bisop who started a peoples government.

As usual  USA  never bothered to help the  poor people  of  it's  neighborhood . they  did not even have maps of the island till a big airstrip was being built.
There was an internal struggle  among the  revolutionary leadership all the  crybabies  in the medical school  called their  rich parents  and  told them  their fears.

USA saw an opportunity to  defeat  communist  regime after getting beaten by one in Vietnam.
So  what was started as an operation to evacuate  theses medical students ended up being a successful  "Bay of Pigs" invasion . But the  way it was conducted  is  worth  a keystone cops  screen play.

I just wonder  "PREZ T" might  get us in to such adventures  which may  have  worse results than  these .

Mr Bishop's supporters freed him on 19 October and took him to the police headquarters at Fort George as a huge crowd gathered.

But many were forced to flee over the steep walls of the 18th Century garrison to the hospital below as soldiers sent to retake the fort opened fire.

Then the soldiers who had once followed him as commander-in-chief lined Mr Bishop, four cabinet supporters, and six others up against a wall on the top square of the fort and shot them.

The bodies of Maurice Bishop and the ten men killed with him were never found.

In the wake of the murders and the resulting public furor, General Austin dissolved the civilian government and established a Revolutionary Military Council with himself as spokesman. Austin closed the airport, imposed a four-day, 24-hour curfew, and warned that violators would be shot on sight. These restrictions prevented the thousand or more US citizens on the island from leaving, and caused special hardship to the six hundred American students in the St. George’s School of Medicine. The students had to violate the curfew to obtain adequate supplies of food and water.23

Q: OK, but do you want to add anything to what Amnesty International Report has to say?

A: Only this. Judges in all countries of the world that I know about are paid by the month, to hear all cases which come before them. This was true even in Apartheid South Africa and Augusto Pinochet’s Chile. When, however, judges are paid ­ as in our case ­ just to hear one case, and when each is paid one million ­ yes, one million ­ Eastern Caribbean dollars just to hear that one case, you need to ask yourself why. When, on top of this, they demand an additional US $650, 000 to deliver their judgement, you need to do more than simply ask why. If you wish, I can send you the documentary proof regarding these payments, not only from official Grenada government and Parliamentary records, but also from Declassified (Secret) US government documents, released by the US government as a result of a US Federal Court Order under the Freedom Of Information Act.

A: You have to realize that we were tried, convicted, and imprisoned during the final years of the Cold War. United States troops invaded our country; something condemned by the United Nations by a vote of 109 to 2 (or figures close to these). They had to find a way to justify this invasion. They spent US $18 million in propaganda alone, within the Caribbean region including Grenada, demonizing us; ad the several more millions paying for the “trial process” through which we were put. We were tried three years before the Berlin Wall fell; before the collapse of the Eastern Europe regimes allied to the Soviet Union; and five years before the final collapse of the Soviet Union itself! Indeed, the Preliminary Inquiry before a Magistrate, in our case, took place before Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union! United States troops were still doing military maneuvers in Grenada while our “Trial” was taking place; even flying helicopter gun ships over the court house itself while the proceedings were ongoing. This is why Amnesty International suggests, through the title of its Report on our “Trial” and “Appeal”, that we were The Last of the Cold War Prisoners.

In the wake of the murders and the resulting public furor, General Austin dissolved the civilian government and established a Revolutionary Military Council with himself as spokesman. Austin closed the airport, imposed a four-day, 24-hour curfew, and warned that violators would be shot on sight. These restrictions prevented the thousand or more US citizens on the island from leaving, and caused special hardship to the six hundred American students in the St. George’s School of Medicine. The students had to violate the curfew to obtain adequate supplies of food and water.23 In Washington, State Department and JCS officials feared that the new regime threatened the lives of the US medical students and other Americans and would provide the Cubans a base from which to operate against the Central American mainland. At a meeting of the Regional Interagency Group (RIG) of the National Security Council (NSC), on 12 October, Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, conferred with JCS representative Colonel James W. Connally, USAF, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Plans and Policy 12 Directorate. Motley advised Connally that it might become necessary to plan on short notice a military operation in support of the evacuation of US citizens from Grenada. Noting that it would take several days to plan and execute such an operation, Connally promised to alert his superiors at the Pentagon.24 On 14 October, Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, the Latin American desk officer on the National Security Council, contacted Commander Michael K. McQuiston, USN, in the Joint Operations Division, Operations Directorate (J-3/JOD). Sapia-Bosch wanted to know what military resources could be mustered on short notice to safeguard evacuation from Grenada. Told of this request, Lieutenant General Richard L. Prillaman, USA, the Director of Operations (J-3), activated a response cell in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to assess the crisis and formulate possible courses of action. Organized under the Crisis Action System, the cell included action officers from the Western Hemisphere (WHEM) Branch of J-3/Joint Operations Division (JOD), an officer from the J-5/WHEM, and an officer from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).25 The Unified Command Plan assigned primary responsibility for forces and “normal operations” in the Caribbean to the USLANTCOM.26 The response cell contacted USCINCLANT’s J-3 on 14 October and requested a list of options for both “show of force/presence” and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). In the meantime, the intelligence community assessed the likely response of Grenadians to such US military operations.27 From 14 to 17 October, Milan Bish, the US Ambassador to Barbados, who also had responsibility for Grenada, learned from informants in Grenada of growing danger to the US medical students. Ambassador Bish’s reports prompted a meeting of the RIG on 17 October. During the meeting, Assistant Secretary 13 Motley asked Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt, USA, Director of the Joint Staff, to begin contingency planning for military operations to rescue the students. The next day, LTG Merrit asked LTG Prillaman to consult with ADM McDonald at USLANTCOM on options for evacuating the medical students in various circumstances ranging from permissive or peaceful to armed resistance by Grenadians and Cubans.28

 Milan bish the  Ambassador was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1983 and Parkinson's disease in 1992 and bone cancer in 2000 and died on 11 seven 2001

Richard Brown, Deputy Director of State’s Office of Caribbean Affairs

 Donald Cruz, the US consular officer

 Charles A. Gillespie, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. From Barbados, Gillespie dispatched the requests to the State Department on 21 and 22 October.


The RIG met again on 19 October with Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attending the meeting. Richard Brown, Deputy Director of State’s Office of Caribbean Affairs, briefed the RIG on the current situation. Noting the presence in Grenada of nearly six hundred Cubans and two Cuban vessels moored in St. George’s Harbor, Mr. Brown advised VADM Moreau that the JCS should plan for the worst scenario, one in which US military forces would have to evacuate civilians in the face of armed opposition from Grenadian and Cuban forces. Such an evacuation could begin, Brown warned, as early as the next day.29


Late in the evening of 19 October, LTG Prillaman sent ADM McDonald a JCS warning order, signed by General Vessey. By dawn, McDonald was to submit alternative courses of action for a threeto five-day noncombatant evacuation operation to include one or more of the following options: seizure of evacuation points, show of force, combat operations to defend the evacuation, and post-evacuation peacekeeping. The warning order designated the Commanders of the Readiness Command (USCINCRED) and the Military Airlift Command (USCINCMAC) as supporting commanders and directed that all press queries about the operation be referred to the Public Affairs Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.31 USCINCLANT, USCINCRED, and USCINCMAC immediately requested DIA imagery coverage and daily intelligence summaries on Grenada.32

Blind and deaf  US military

After Grenada moved into the orbit of the Soviet Union and Cuba in 1979, US agencies had few opportunities to collect intelligence. Admiral McDonald’s staff had inadequate tactical intelligence concerning Grenada. Aerial photography indicated numerous sites for landing zones and parachute drops. An old intelligence estimate calculated Grenadian forces at about twelve hundred regulars with more than twice that number of militia and four torpedo boats. Since the precise deployment of Grenadian forces was unknown, picking the sites to land troops would be a risky business.36

From 20 to 25 October, planners in the JCS response cell and USLANTCOM J-3 relied mainly on information gleaned from the OECS and broadcasts of a Grenadian ham radio operator. DIA did pick up two significant pieces of information. First, on 6 October the Cuban vessel Vietnam Heroica had landed an undisclosed number of Cuban workers presumably to join others already at work on the runway at Point Salines. Second, on 13 October other Cuban vessels had delivered a cargo of arms for transit to an undisclosed location in the interior.37 The presence of a wellarmed force of Cubans complicated planning.

The JCS received the USCINCLANT plan on the morning of 20 October. General Vessey directed the J-3, J-5, and DIA to assess the impact of each of USCINCLANT’s courses of action upon strategic readiness in the Atlantic area. Later that morning, he gave the assessment to the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) of the National Security Council. Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN, the Military Assistant to the NSC, chaired the meeting which included John McMahon, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley, the State Department’s senior action officer during the crisis. The conferees agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue planning a military operation to protect the evacuation of civilians.39


The SSG met at 1645 on 20 October in the Executive Office Building. Since no decision had been made for military action, the crisis was still a diplomatic problem and Secretary Shultz explained plans for evacuation of US citizens from Grenada. As background, Shultz’s staff had provided him a paper on US military operations to protect an evacuation which included a comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of amphibious and airborne operations to support the evacuation. The paper also advocated disarmament of the Grenadian forces. Although disarmament could lead to charges of “gunboat diplomacy,” it would demonstrate the willingness of the United States to fight for its interests in Central America and the Caribbean.


General Vessey also briefed the SSG, focusing on the risks in using US military force and the possibility of third country military intervention on behalf of the Grenadian government. DIA advised that while the ineffectual Grenadian People’s Revolutionary Army would resist attempts to evacuate the US students, neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union were likely to intervene militarily. The Cuban Navy had only a few submarines, guided missile patrol boats, hydrofoil craft, and minesweepers. While the Soviets might take measures elsewhere, they were not in a position to intervene militarily in the Caribbean. However, according to General Vessey, the JCS were determined that Castro and the Soviets get a clear and early message that “This is a US show; hands off!”

Diversion of MARG 1-84 and the USS Independence battle group would extend the deployment of MARG 2-83 in Lebanon and carrier battle groups either in the Mediterranean Sea or the Indian Ocean. Diversion of naval forces would force curtailment or cancellation of US participation in the upcoming exercise with Spain, CRISEX ‘83, which could cause the Spanish government to question American regard for Spain’s importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The SSG decided that, as the danger to the Americans on Grenada increased, the President would probably order intervention. Given the assessment of probable resistance by Grenadian forces, the SSG supported contingency planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and began drafting a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) expanding the original mission to include neutralization of enemy forces and the political reconstruction of Grenada.

To make an expanded operation feasible, the JCS directed diversion of MARG 1-84 to a location to the east of Puerto Rico and the Independence battle group to the vicinity of Dominica--positions within striking range of Grenada. Late in the evening of 20 October, the ships of both forces altered course to move to these new positions.


The possible involvement of Cuban troops fueled the growing consensus that a military operation would be needed to protect the evacuation area or to disarm hostile forces elsewhere on the island.


However, these precautions were too late, for CBS had already learned of the diversion of the warships to Grenada and would break the story on the news later that evening.48 The stringent limits placed on message distribution to the commanders and key personnel at USLANTCOM, MAC, USREDCOM, and JSOC prevented further leaks. But they also excluded from preliminary planning and preparation the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense Mapping Agency, and four Joint Staff organizations: J-4, C3S, the Deputy Directorate for Political-Military Affairs in J-5, and the Public Affairs Office.

The Joint Staff also considered the need to neutralize an enemy force of uncertain strength, intent, or disposition. Intelligence analysts offered planners estimates of 1,000 to 1,200 People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) regulars, 2,000 to 5,000 militiamen, and about 250 armed Cubans.


SSG contacted Secretary Shultz and Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both of whom were vacationing with President Reagan in Atlanta. Shultz and McFarlane informed the President of the two requests, and he called a teleconference with the members of the SSG for 0900 hours. With the addition of the President, the SSG became a National Security Planning Group (NSPG), the highest level in the NSC system.

With two separate requests for intervention in hand, the NSPG jettisoned the idea of a peaceful evacuation.

The Joint Staff estimated that up to four and one half hours would be required to seize control of all objectives. To begin the operation on the night of 25 October, the earliest possible date, a presidential decision would be required by 2000 hours on 22 October

Either option had risks. Landings by Rangers or Marines might prompt the Grenadians or Cubans to kill the students or hold them hostage. The Cuban construction workers might reinforce Grenadian troops and inflict significant casualties upon US forces; the Soviet Union might exert pressure on US forces or those of US allies in Europe or the Middle East. If any of those events occurred, the Reagan administration could expect criticism from Congress, the media, and foreign governments. Some critics would focus on the casualties or hostages; others might accuse the President of disregard for international law.

The Joint Staff concluded that the rewards of a successful operation offset the risks. A swift, precise strike probably 25 would rescue most of the students and avert a hostage situation. Removal of the pro-Cuban junta would eliminate a threat to US strategic interests in the Caribbean. A well-executed display of US military prowess would convey US determination to protect its vital interests. In Western Europe where US willingness to fight for European soil was questioned, such action might inspire confidence in the United States.

The Joint Staff also listed several steps that should be taken to establish a legal foundation for sending an expeditionary force into Grenada. If possible, the President should consult Congress in advance of the operation as required by Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution; if this was not possible, within 48 hours of the invasion he should explain the necessity and the legal grounds for the operation to the lawmakers. In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 5 of the Rio Treaty, the State Department should inform the Security Council of the United Nations and the signatories of the Rio Treaty of the operation and the reasons for it. Since Grenada technically remained a member of the British Commonwealth, the United States should also obtain the assistance or at least the approval of the United Kingdom. Finally, to legitimize continued military occupation after evacuating the US civilians, a request to form an interim Grenadian government would be needed.

State Department experts would later argue that Article 52 of the UN Charter and Article 22 of the Organization of American States (OAS) charter allowed regional bodies such as the OECS to act to preserve local peace and security. Indeed, the OECS charter stated that, in taking lawful collective action, the members could call upon the United States or other friendly nations for assistance. Eugenia Charles, spokesperson for the 26 OECS, had on 21 October made a formal request to the United States for such assistance.57
 the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted “to go in with enough force absolutely to get the job done ...to minimize casualties, both on our side and on theirs. We wanted to intimidate the Cubans.”
Vessey urged McDonald to revise his plan to increase the size of the force “to do the job quickly,” and to request any additional forces needed.6
Admiral McDonald’s plan excluded the untrained OECS constabulary from assault landings. Instead, MAC would fly the three hundred-man force from Jamaica and Barbados to Grenada to work with the US force and the Governor-General to establish the interim government.

The JCS rejected carrying jointness to that extreme and advised McDonald to keep the plan simple and allow the units to operate under their customary organization. Initially, the plan lacked a boundary between Army and Marine areas of operation. In a session with ADM McDonald and the JCS, GEN Vessey drew a boundary dividing Grenada into northern (Marine) and southern (Army) sectors.Despite their approval of the concept of overwhelming the enemy, the JCS stressed the need for strict rules of engagement to limit the use of firepower. Unnecessary casualties and property damage would negate the humanitarian aspects of the rescue operation and damage the economic infrastructure of the island, jeopardizing US efforts to restore popular, democratic government

The Secretary of State was to arrange diplomatic cooperation with the OECS, Jamaica, and Barbados; to inform the Soviet Union and Cuba, at the proper time, of plans to protect and evacuate their nationals; and to prepare a campaign to convince Congress and the public that the operation was truly multilateral, that the current regime threatened US lives, and that the next Grenadian government would be more democratic.
Secretary Shultz envisioned a brief US presence followed by rapid drawdown of military forces and transfer of all peacekeeping duties to the CPF and the interim government.8


From Barbados, the US defense attaché reported that Grenadian security guards and troops at the Richmond Hill Prison, St. George’s, had received orders to kill all prisoners in the event of invasion.
(How was he able to determine this? )
DIA also had unconfirmed information that British subjects and other foreign businessmen had already been executed. Meanwhile, the Barbadan National Radio spoke of growing dissatisfaction with the Grenadian armed forces over the brutal excesses of the regime and of the failure of militia members to report to their assigned units.
This was full-fledged propaganda


Before its rendezvous with the USS Clifton Sprague near Point Salines, the other SEAL team vanished in unexpectedly rough seas.8

Admiral McDonald refused to alter the operational plan solely due to concerns about a “third rate, lightly armed and poorly trained adversary.”


 Heat proved to be the killer and it took down more soldiers that the Cubans did. We suffered 29 heat casualties. When the 3/325 showed up they had 48 heat casualties. The Battalion aid station used up their entire supply of IVs on these soldiers. We had lost two men killed by the enemy and 12 wounded in the attack. 

One event marred naval air operations against Fort Frederick. Lacking military maps or other means of identifying a building next to the fort as a hospital, Corsair pilots bombed the building at 1535.

The fig leaf or Loin cloth 

Early on 24 October, Crist met with the commanders of the Barbados and Jamaica Defense Forces and the OECS Regional Security Unit. The Jamaica Defense Force contributed a rifle company, an 81-mm mortar section, and a medical section--150 troops; the Barbados Defense Force, a rifle platoon of fifty troops; and the OECS Regional Security Unit, one hundred constabulary, apparently not organized in any particular fashion. Crist persuaded the Caribbean commanders that their entire force should enter Grenada on 25 October and relieve US troops holding Richmond Hill Prison, Radio Free Grenada, police headquarters, and the Government House.

In Washington, President Reagan told Congress and the press of the reasons for US operations in Grenada. Reporting to Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution,106 the President informed Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, Speaker of the House, and Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, that US troops had joined the “OECS collective security forces in assisting the restoration of conditions of law and order...and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States citizens.” Then, in reference to the resolution’s sixty-day limitation upon such intervention without congressional approval, Reagan added, “Our forces will remain only so long as their presence is required.”


With St. George’s in friendly hands, MajGen Crist accompanied the Governor-General from Point Salines to the capital and installed Scoon in a private residence. General Crist then arranged with the JCS and CIA to establish a secret communications link between the Governor-General and the Privy Council in London. Scoon soon received instructions establishing him as the nucleus of an interim regime. The next day the Soviet embassy recognized Scoon’s authority.

Q: OK, but there are those Grenadians who say that it would be a great loss for someone like yourself to leave Grenada permanently; that your training and experience could be invaluable to Grenada. How do you respond to this argument?

A: This is how I respond: the events of 21 years ago have left deep scars on the psyche of Grenadians over thirty years of age. My presence, in my opinion, would hinder rather than assist in the process of healing and achieving closure, which are vital for Grenada and Grenadians. This alone is sufficient reason for me to leave ­ and stay out of ­ Grenada. But there is also the scapegoating phenomena to consider. Were I to remain in Grenada, each time electricity goes when Dr. Mitchell is addressing his supporters, or children play with firecrackers near his car, “Bernard Coard” would be held responsible. At a personal level, I’m tired of being used by others as a scapegoat. If I’m no longer around, people will be forced to either find another person (or group of persons) to use as scapegoat(s), or start taking personal responsibility for their shortcomings and mistakes.

Finally, there is the deeply personal level. I desperately want to resume my family life; to be with my wife and children again ­ and now, grandchildren as well! Even though my contributions to building Grenada (NIS, NCB, GBC, MNIB, House Repair programmes, raising funds for the International Airport, etc) have suffered collective amnesia, I am at peace with myself, knowing that I did my best and played my part in building Grenada. It is now time for others, especially the younger generations, to play their part. I am now retired, and won’t be coming out of retirement!

But what about the execution of Maurice Bishop and Unison Whiteman, among others? Wasn't that a direct order? 

No, no. American soldiers, with hundreds of years of military experience, have run amok in some countries. The British army, with a thousand years of military experience, has done the same thing. We had four and a half years of military experience in Grenada. What happened was vengeance. It was nothing we ordered. And it can never be justified. It was a moment or revenge. Pure and simple. But everyone of us in the leadership take moral and political responsibility for what happened. If we hadn't committed so many errors...we were amateurs, we were arrogant and intolerant and all our mistakes came home to roost..

In Ottawa, spokesmen questioned the need and legal justification for US intervention, especially after the Canadian government had already announced plans to conduct peaceful evacuation of its citizens from Grenada.

Without the helicopters, the paratroopers depended for fire support upon naval aircraft and naval gunfire. Since their radios could not communicate with the ships of the Independence battle group, Army radiomen were forced to send 53 their request for fire support to Fort Bragg which in turn relayed them by satellite to the ships. The requirement to guard new prisoners also slowed the advance of the airborne.120

An incident involving the accidental strafing of friendly troops about a half mile east of Frequente occurred on 27 October. When snipers fired on an airborne battalion near a sugar mill east of the 2d Brigade command post, a nearby Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team called in an air strike by Corsairs from the USS Independence. Although the ANGLICO team had carefully described the source of sniper fire, the team lacked the necessary Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI) to clear the target with the 2d Brigade fire support element. As a result, the Corsairs struck the command post injuring seventeen troops, three of them seriously.1

While sweeping the peninsula of Lance aux Epines near St. George’s, airborne troopers located the last group of 202 US medical students, bringing the number rescued to 564.

Treatment and classification of Cuban prisoners had become a pressing issue. The Army Operations Deputy, Lieutenant General Fred K. Mahaffey, USA, advised the other services’ Operations Deputies that captured Cubans should be reclassified as “prisoners of war” rather than “personnel under protective custody.” Speaking as the DOD’s executive agent for the prisoner of war program, LTG Mahaffey explained that the term “prisoner of war” would accord the Cubans certain rights under the Geneva Convention, for example, the right to communicate with relatives. However, as LTG Merritt later explained, the Operations Deputies decided to retain the original classification to avoid even the slightest hint that the United States might be at war with Cuba.1 

Nearly eight thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines had participated in URGENT FURY along with 353 Caribbean allies of the CPF. US forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded; Cuban forces lost 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 personnel captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358 wounded; at least 24 civilians were killed. On 10 November in recognition that US forces on Grenada had “encountered foreign armed opposition that included heavy small arms, machine guns, and antiaircraft artillery,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff made all military participants in URGENT FURY eligible to receive the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.

During an appearance on “Meet the Press” on 6 November l983, General Vessey candidly summarized URGENT FURY in these words: “We planned the operation in a very short period of time--in about 48 hours. We planned it with insufficient intelligence for the type of operation we wanted to conduct. As a result we probably used more force than we needed to do the job, but the operation went reasonably well. ...Things did go wrong, but generally the operation was a success. The troops did very well.

Navy radios could not communicate with the Vinson secure radio equipment used by the Army units, delaying and complicating requests for naval air and naval gunfire support. Soldiers in sight of warships delayed operations until distant Air Force gunships and Army helicopters could be summoned.

The ultimate  KEYSTONE COP OUT 

Despite deficiencies in planning and intelligence that complicated tactical execution, the Joint Staff termed the operation a success: Guidance and policy were concise and clear as were the orders given by the NCA, the JCS, the CINC, and the JTF Commander to the forces involved. The clearly defined Rules of Engagement permitted mission effectiveness with minimal civilian casualties. … Although time available for planning the operation was constrained, the plan which evolved made the best use of the forces allocated, and their capabilities, training, and readiness. The procedures established for crisis situations generally proved adequate for … highly sensitive and time critical requirements. The military personnel assigned … especially those who had joint tour experience, were very effective. … Lastly, … the NCA and JCS (and their staffs) permitted the chain of intervention … to use their experience, expertise, and familiarity with the situation to accomplish the mission.15

 a youtube  with some more details 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiIET5cSxLU&index=4&list=PLBA944CD1584845F7