This is the story of the revolution in Grenada where there was a Medical college. which had about 500+ students from USA who couldn't get in to a US medical college, but still wanted to be doctors.
There was a blood less coup which over threw a kooky, UFO worshiping crazy dictator and Mr Bisop who started a peoples government.
As usual USA never bothered to help the poor people of it's neighborhood . they did not even have maps of the island till a big airstrip was being built.
There was an internal struggle among the revolutionary leadership all the crybabies in the medical school called their rich parents and told them their fears.
USA saw an opportunity to defeat communist regime after getting beaten by one in Vietnam.
So what was started as an operation to evacuate theses medical students ended up being a successful "Bay of Pigs" invasion . But the way it was conducted is worth a keystone cops screen play.
I just wonder "PREZ T" might get us in to such adventures which may have worse results than these .
Mr Bishop's supporters freed him on 19 October and took him to the police headquarters at Fort George as a huge crowd gathered.
But many were forced to flee over the steep walls of the 18th Century garrison to the hospital below as soldiers sent to retake the fort opened fire.
Then the soldiers who had once followed him as commander-in-chief lined Mr Bishop, four cabinet supporters, and six others up against a wall on the top square of the fort and shot them.
The bodies of Maurice Bishop and the ten men killed with him were never found.
In the wake of the murders and the resulting public furor,
General Austin dissolved the civilian government and established
a Revolutionary Military Council with himself as spokesman.
Austin closed the airport, imposed a four-day, 24-hour curfew,
and warned that violators would be shot on sight. These
restrictions prevented the thousand or more US citizens on the
island from leaving, and caused special hardship to the six
hundred American students in the St. George’s School of Medicine.
The students had to violate the curfew to obtain adequate
supplies of food and water.23
Q: OK, but do you want to add anything to what Amnesty International Report has to say?
A: Only this. Judges in all countries of the world that I know about are paid by the month, to hear all cases which come before them. This was true even in Apartheid South Africa and Augusto Pinochet’s Chile. When, however, judges are paid as in our case just to hear one case, and when each is paid one million yes, one million Eastern Caribbean dollars just to hear that one case, you need to ask yourself why. When, on top of this, they demand an additional US $650, 000 to deliver their judgement, you need to do more than simply ask why. If you wish, I can send you the documentary proof regarding these payments, not only from official Grenada government and Parliamentary records, but also from Declassified (Secret) US government documents, released by the US government as a result of a US Federal Court Order under the Freedom Of Information Act.
A: You have to realize that we were tried, convicted, and imprisoned during the final years of the Cold War. United States troops invaded our country; something condemned by the United Nations by a vote of 109 to 2 (or figures close to these). They had to find a way to justify this invasion. They spent US $18 million in propaganda alone, within the Caribbean region including Grenada, demonizing us; ad the several more millions paying for the “trial process” through which we were put. We were tried three years before the Berlin Wall fell; before the collapse of the Eastern Europe regimes allied to the Soviet Union; and five years before the final collapse of the Soviet Union itself! Indeed, the Preliminary Inquiry before a Magistrate, in our case, took place before Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union! United States troops were still doing military maneuvers in Grenada while our “Trial” was taking place; even flying helicopter gun ships over the court house itself while the proceedings were ongoing. This is why Amnesty International suggests, through the title of its Report on our “Trial” and “Appeal”, that we were The Last of the Cold War Prisoners.
In the wake of the murders and the resulting public furor,
General Austin dissolved the civilian government and established
a Revolutionary Military Council with himself as spokesman.
Austin closed the airport, imposed a four-day, 24-hour curfew,
and warned that violators would be shot on sight. These
restrictions prevented the thousand or more US citizens on the
island from leaving, and caused special hardship to the six
hundred American students in the St. George’s School of Medicine.
The students had to violate the curfew to obtain adequate
supplies of food and water.23
In Washington, State Department and JCS officials feared
that the new regime threatened the lives of the US medical
students and other Americans and would provide the Cubans a base
from which to operate against the Central American mainland. At
a meeting of the Regional Interagency Group (RIG) of the National
Security Council (NSC), on 12 October, Langhorne A. Motley,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
conferred with JCS representative Colonel James W. Connally,
USAF, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Plans and Policy
12
Directorate. Motley advised Connally that it might become
necessary to plan on short notice a military operation in support
of the evacuation of US citizens from Grenada. Noting that it
would take several days to plan and execute such an operation,
Connally promised to alert his superiors at the Pentagon.24
On 14 October, Alphonso Sapia-Bosch, the Latin American desk
officer on the National Security Council, contacted Commander
Michael K. McQuiston, USN, in the Joint Operations Division,
Operations Directorate (J-3/JOD). Sapia-Bosch wanted to know
what military resources could be mustered on short notice to
safeguard evacuation from Grenada. Told of this request,
Lieutenant General Richard L. Prillaman, USA, the Director of
Operations (J-3), activated a response cell in the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) to assess the crisis and formulate
possible courses of action. Organized under the Crisis Action
System, the cell included action officers from the Western
Hemisphere (WHEM) Branch of J-3/Joint Operations Division (JOD),
an officer from the J-5/WHEM, and an officer from the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA).25
The Unified Command Plan assigned primary responsibility for
forces and “normal operations” in the Caribbean to the
USLANTCOM.26 The response cell contacted USCINCLANT’s J-3 on 14
October and requested a list of options for both “show of
force/presence” and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
In the meantime, the intelligence community assessed the likely
response of Grenadians to such US military operations.27
From 14 to 17 October, Milan Bish, the US Ambassador to
Barbados, who also had responsibility for Grenada, learned from
informants in Grenada of growing danger to the US medical
students. Ambassador Bish’s reports prompted a meeting of the
RIG on 17 October. During the meeting, Assistant Secretary
13
Motley asked Lieutenant General Jack N. Merritt, USA, Director of
the Joint Staff, to begin contingency planning for military
operations to rescue the students. The next day, LTG Merrit
asked LTG Prillaman to consult with ADM McDonald at USLANTCOM on
options for evacuating the medical students in various
circumstances ranging from permissive or peaceful to armed
resistance by Grenadians and Cubans.28
Milan bish the Ambassador was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1983 and Parkinson's disease in 1992 and bone cancer in 2000 and died on 11 seven 2001
Richard Brown, Deputy Director of
State’s Office of Caribbean Affairs
Donald Cruz, the US consular officer
Charles A. Gillespie, Executive Assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. From
Barbados, Gillespie dispatched the requests to the State
Department on 21 and 22 October.
The RIG met again on 19 October with Vice Admiral Arthur S.
Moreau, Jr., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, attending the meeting. Richard Brown, Deputy Director of
State’s Office of Caribbean Affairs, briefed the RIG on the
current situation. Noting the presence in Grenada of nearly six
hundred Cubans and two Cuban vessels moored in St. George’s
Harbor, Mr. Brown advised VADM Moreau that the JCS should plan
for the worst scenario, one in which US military forces would
have to evacuate civilians in the face of armed opposition from
Grenadian and Cuban forces. Such an evacuation could begin,
Brown warned, as early as the next day.29
Late in the evening of 19 October, LTG Prillaman sent ADM
McDonald a JCS warning order, signed by General Vessey. By dawn,
McDonald was to submit alternative courses of action for a threeto
five-day noncombatant evacuation operation to include one or
more of the following options: seizure of evacuation points,
show of force, combat operations to defend the evacuation, and
post-evacuation peacekeeping. The warning order designated the
Commanders of the Readiness Command (USCINCRED) and the Military
Airlift Command (USCINCMAC) as supporting commanders and directed
that all press queries about the operation be referred to the
Public Affairs Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.31
USCINCLANT, USCINCRED, and USCINCMAC immediately requested DIA
imagery coverage and daily intelligence summaries on Grenada.32
Blind and deaf US military
After Grenada moved into the orbit of the Soviet Union and
Cuba in 1979, US agencies had few opportunities to collect
intelligence. Admiral McDonald’s staff had inadequate tactical
intelligence concerning Grenada. Aerial photography indicated
numerous sites for landing zones and parachute drops. An old
intelligence estimate calculated Grenadian forces at about twelve
hundred regulars with more than twice that number of militia and
four torpedo boats. Since the precise deployment of Grenadian
forces was unknown, picking the sites to land troops would be a
risky business.36
From 20 to 25 October, planners in the JCS response cell and
USLANTCOM J-3 relied mainly on information gleaned from the OECS
and broadcasts of a Grenadian ham radio operator. DIA did pick
up two significant pieces of information. First, on 6 October
the Cuban vessel Vietnam Heroica had landed an undisclosed number
of Cuban workers presumably to join others already at work on the
runway at Point Salines. Second, on 13 October other Cuban
vessels had delivered a cargo of arms for transit to an
undisclosed location in the interior.37 The presence of a wellarmed
force of Cubans complicated planning.
The JCS received the USCINCLANT plan on the morning of 20
October. General Vessey directed the J-3, J-5, and DIA to assess
the impact of each of USCINCLANT’s courses of action upon
strategic readiness in the Atlantic area. Later that morning, he
gave the assessment to the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) of
the National Security Council. Rear Admiral John M. Poindexter,
USN, the Military Assistant to the NSC, chaired the meeting which
included John McMahon, Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs; and Assistant Secretary
of State Langhorne A. Motley, the State Department’s senior
action officer during the crisis. The conferees agreed that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue planning a military
operation to protect the evacuation of civilians.39
The SSG met at 1645 on 20 October in the Executive Office
Building. Since no decision had been made for military action,
the crisis was still a diplomatic problem and Secretary Shultz
explained plans for evacuation of US citizens from Grenada. As
background, Shultz’s staff had provided him a paper on US
military operations to protect an evacuation which included a
comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
amphibious and airborne operations to support the evacuation.
The paper also advocated disarmament of the Grenadian forces.
Although disarmament could lead to charges of “gunboat
diplomacy,” it would demonstrate the willingness of the United
States to fight for its interests in Central America and the
Caribbean.
General Vessey also briefed the SSG, focusing on the risks
in using US military force and the possibility of third country
military intervention on behalf of the Grenadian government. DIA
advised that while the ineffectual Grenadian People’s
Revolutionary Army would resist attempts to evacuate the US
students, neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union were likely to
intervene militarily. The Cuban Navy had only a few submarines,
guided missile patrol boats, hydrofoil craft, and minesweepers.
While the Soviets might take measures elsewhere, they were not in
a position to intervene militarily in the Caribbean. However,
according to General Vessey, the JCS were determined that Castro
and the Soviets get a clear and early message that “This is a US
show; hands off!”
Diversion of MARG 1-84 and the USS Independence
battle group would extend the deployment of MARG 2-83 in Lebanon
and carrier battle groups either in the Mediterranean Sea or the
Indian Ocean. Diversion of naval forces would force curtailment
or cancellation of US participation in the upcoming exercise with
Spain, CRISEX ‘83, which could cause the Spanish government to
question American regard for Spain’s importance to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The SSG decided that, as the danger to the Americans on
Grenada increased, the President would probably order
intervention. Given the assessment of probable resistance by
Grenadian forces, the SSG supported contingency planning by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and began drafting a National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) expanding the original mission to
include neutralization of enemy forces and the political
reconstruction of Grenada.
To make an expanded operation
feasible, the JCS directed diversion of MARG 1-84 to a location
to the east of Puerto Rico and the Independence battle group to
the vicinity of Dominica--positions within striking range of
Grenada. Late in the evening of 20 October, the ships of both
forces altered course to move to these new positions.
The possible involvement of Cuban
troops fueled the growing consensus that a military operation
would be needed to protect the evacuation area or to disarm
hostile forces elsewhere on the island.
However, these precautions were too late,
for CBS had already learned of the diversion of the warships to
Grenada and would break the story on the news later that
evening.48 The stringent limits placed on message distribution
to the commanders and key personnel at USLANTCOM, MAC, USREDCOM,
and JSOC prevented further leaks. But they also excluded from
preliminary planning and preparation the Strategic Air Command
(SAC), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Defense
Mapping Agency, and four Joint Staff organizations: J-4, C3S, the
Deputy Directorate for Political-Military Affairs in J-5, and the
Public Affairs Office.
The Joint Staff also considered the need to neutralize
an enemy force of uncertain strength, intent, or disposition.
Intelligence analysts offered planners estimates of 1,000 to
1,200 People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA) regulars, 2,000 to 5,000
militiamen, and about 250 armed Cubans.
SSG contacted Secretary Shultz and
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, both of whom were vacationing with President
Reagan in Atlanta. Shultz and McFarlane informed the President
of the two requests, and he called a teleconference with the
members of the SSG for 0900 hours. With the addition of the
President, the SSG became a National Security Planning Group
(NSPG), the highest level in the NSC system.
With two separate requests for intervention in hand, the
NSPG jettisoned the idea of a peaceful evacuation.
The Joint Staff estimated that up to four and one
half hours would be required to seize control of all objectives.
To begin the operation on the night of 25 October, the earliest
possible date, a presidential decision would be required by 2000
hours on 22 October
Either option had risks. Landings by Rangers or Marines
might prompt the Grenadians or Cubans to kill the students or
hold them hostage. The Cuban construction workers might
reinforce Grenadian troops and inflict significant casualties
upon US forces; the Soviet Union might exert pressure on US
forces or those of US allies in Europe or the Middle East. If
any of those events occurred, the Reagan administration could
expect criticism from Congress, the media, and foreign
governments. Some critics would focus on the casualties or
hostages; others might accuse the President of disregard for
international law.
The Joint Staff concluded that the rewards of a successful
operation offset the risks. A swift, precise strike probably
25
would rescue most of the students and avert a hostage situation.
Removal of the pro-Cuban junta would eliminate a threat to US
strategic interests in the Caribbean. A well-executed display of
US military prowess would convey US determination to protect its
vital interests. In Western Europe where US willingness to fight
for European soil was questioned, such action might inspire
confidence in the United States.
The Joint Staff also listed several steps that should be
taken to establish a legal foundation for sending an
expeditionary force into Grenada. If possible, the President
should consult Congress in advance of the operation as required
by Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution; if this was not
possible, within 48 hours of the invasion he should explain the
necessity and the legal grounds for the operation to the
lawmakers. In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and
Article 5 of the Rio Treaty, the State Department should inform
the Security Council of the United Nations and the signatories of
the Rio Treaty of the operation and the reasons for it. Since
Grenada technically remained a member of the British
Commonwealth, the United States should also obtain the assistance
or at least the approval of the United Kingdom. Finally, to
legitimize continued military occupation after evacuating the US
civilians, a request to form an interim Grenadian government
would be needed.
State Department experts would later argue that Article 52
of the UN Charter and Article 22 of the Organization of American
States (OAS) charter allowed regional bodies such as the OECS to
act to preserve local peace and security. Indeed, the OECS
charter stated that, in taking lawful collective action, the
members could call upon the United States or other friendly
nations for assistance. Eugenia Charles, spokesperson for the
26
OECS, had on 21 October made a formal request to the United
States for such assistance.57
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
wanted “to go in with enough force absolutely to get the job done
...to minimize casualties, both on our side and on theirs. We
wanted to intimidate the Cubans.”
Vessey urged
McDonald to revise his plan to increase the size of the force “to
do the job quickly,” and to request any additional forces
needed.6
Admiral McDonald’s plan excluded the
untrained OECS constabulary from assault landings. Instead, MAC
would fly the three hundred-man force from Jamaica and Barbados
to Grenada to work with the US force and the Governor-General to
establish the interim government.
The JCS rejected carrying jointness to that
extreme and advised McDonald to keep the plan simple and allow
the units to operate under their customary organization.
Initially, the plan lacked a boundary between Army and Marine
areas of operation. In a session with ADM McDonald and the JCS,
GEN Vessey drew a boundary dividing Grenada into northern
(Marine) and southern (Army) sectors.Despite their approval of the concept of overwhelming the
enemy, the JCS stressed the need for strict rules of engagement
to limit the use of firepower. Unnecessary casualties and
property damage would negate the humanitarian aspects of the
rescue operation and damage the economic infrastructure of the
island, jeopardizing US efforts to restore popular, democratic
government
The Secretary of State was
to arrange diplomatic cooperation with the OECS, Jamaica, and
Barbados; to inform the Soviet Union and Cuba, at the proper
time, of plans to protect and evacuate their nationals; and to
prepare a campaign to convince Congress and the public that the
operation was truly multilateral, that the current regime
threatened US lives, and that the next Grenadian government would
be more democratic.
Secretary Shultz envisioned a brief US presence
followed by rapid drawdown of military forces and transfer of all
peacekeeping duties to the CPF and the interim government.8
From Barbados, the US defense attaché
reported that Grenadian security guards and troops at the
Richmond Hill Prison, St. George’s, had received orders to kill
all prisoners in the event of invasion.
(How was he able to determine this? )
DIA also had unconfirmed
information that British subjects and other foreign businessmen
had already been executed. Meanwhile, the Barbadan National
Radio spoke of growing dissatisfaction with the Grenadian armed
forces over the brutal excesses of the regime and of the failure
of militia members to report to their assigned units.
This was full-fledged propaganda
Before its rendezvous with
the USS Clifton Sprague near Point Salines, the other SEAL team
vanished in unexpectedly rough seas.8
Admiral McDonald refused to alter the operational plan solely due
to concerns about a “third rate, lightly armed and poorly trained
adversary.”
Heat proved to be the killer and it took down more soldiers that the Cubans did. We suffered 29 heat casualties. When the 3/325 showed up they had 48 heat casualties. The Battalion aid station used up their entire supply of IVs on these soldiers. We had lost two men killed by the enemy and 12 wounded in the attack.
One event marred naval air operations against Fort
Frederick. Lacking military maps or other means of identifying a
building next to the fort as a hospital, Corsair pilots bombed
the building at 1535.
The fig leaf or Loin cloth
Early on 24 October, Crist met with the
commanders of the Barbados and Jamaica Defense Forces and the
OECS Regional Security Unit. The Jamaica Defense Force
contributed a rifle company, an 81-mm mortar section, and a
medical section--150 troops; the Barbados Defense Force, a rifle
platoon of fifty troops; and the OECS Regional Security Unit, one
hundred constabulary, apparently not organized in any particular
fashion. Crist persuaded the Caribbean commanders that their
entire force should enter Grenada on 25 October and relieve US
troops holding Richmond Hill Prison, Radio Free Grenada, police
headquarters, and the Government House.
In Washington, President Reagan told Congress and the press
of the reasons for US operations in Grenada. Reporting to
Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution,106 the
President informed Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, Speaker of the House,
and Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, that US
troops had joined the “OECS collective security forces in
assisting the restoration of conditions of law and order...and to
facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States
citizens.” Then, in reference to the resolution’s sixty-day
limitation upon such intervention without congressional approval,
Reagan added, “Our forces will remain only so long as their
presence is required.”
With St. George’s in friendly hands, MajGen Crist
accompanied the Governor-General from Point Salines to the
capital and installed Scoon in a private residence. General
Crist then arranged with the JCS and CIA to establish a secret
communications link between the Governor-General and the Privy
Council in London. Scoon soon received instructions establishing
him as the nucleus of an interim regime. The next day the Soviet
embassy recognized Scoon’s authority.
Q: OK, but there are those Grenadians who say that it would be a great loss for someone like yourself to leave Grenada permanently; that your training and experience could be invaluable to Grenada. How do you respond to this argument?
A: This is how I respond: the events of 21 years ago have left deep scars on the psyche of Grenadians over thirty years of age. My presence, in my opinion, would hinder rather than assist in the process of healing and achieving closure, which are vital for Grenada and Grenadians. This alone is sufficient reason for me to leave and stay out of Grenada. But there is also the scapegoating phenomena to consider. Were I to remain in Grenada, each time electricity goes when Dr. Mitchell is addressing his supporters, or children play with firecrackers near his car, “Bernard Coard” would be held responsible. At a personal level, I’m tired of being used by others as a scapegoat. If I’m no longer around, people will be forced to either find another person (or group of persons) to use as scapegoat(s), or start taking personal responsibility for their shortcomings and mistakes.
Finally, there is the deeply personal level. I desperately want to resume my family life; to be with my wife and children again and now, grandchildren as well! Even though my contributions to building Grenada (NIS, NCB, GBC, MNIB, House Repair programmes, raising funds for the International Airport, etc) have suffered collective amnesia, I am at peace with myself, knowing that I did my best and played my part in building Grenada. It is now time for others, especially the younger generations, to play their part. I am now retired, and won’t be coming out of retirement!
But what about the execution of Maurice Bishop and Unison Whiteman, among others? Wasn't that a direct order?
No, no. American soldiers, with hundreds of years of military experience, have run amok in some countries. The British army, with a thousand years of military experience, has done the same thing. We had four and a half years of military experience in Grenada. What happened was vengeance. It was nothing we ordered. And it can never be justified. It was a moment or revenge. Pure and simple. But everyone of us in the leadership take moral and political responsibility for what happened. If we hadn't committed so many errors...we were amateurs, we were arrogant and intolerant and all our mistakes came home to roost..
In Ottawa, spokesmen questioned the need and legal justification
for US intervention, especially after the Canadian government had
already announced plans to conduct peaceful evacuation of its
citizens from Grenada.
Without the helicopters, the paratroopers
depended for fire support upon naval aircraft and naval gunfire.
Since their radios could not communicate with the ships of the
Independence battle group, Army radiomen were forced to send
53
their request for fire support to Fort Bragg which in turn
relayed them by satellite to the ships. The requirement to guard
new prisoners also slowed the advance of the airborne.120
An incident involving the accidental strafing of friendly
troops about a half mile east of Frequente occurred on 27
October. When snipers fired on an airborne battalion near a
sugar mill east of the 2d Brigade command post, a nearby Air
Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team called in an air
strike by Corsairs from the USS Independence. Although the
ANGLICO team had carefully described the source of sniper fire,
the team lacked the necessary Communications Electronic Operating
Instructions (CEOI) to clear the target with the 2d Brigade fire
support element. As a result, the Corsairs struck the command
post injuring seventeen troops, three of them seriously.1
While
sweeping the peninsula of Lance aux Epines near St. George’s,
airborne troopers located the last group of 202 US medical
students, bringing the number rescued to 564.
Treatment and classification of Cuban prisoners had become a
pressing issue. The Army Operations Deputy, Lieutenant General
Fred K. Mahaffey, USA, advised the other services’ Operations
Deputies that captured Cubans should be reclassified as
“prisoners of war” rather than “personnel under protective
custody.” Speaking as the DOD’s executive agent for the prisoner
of war program, LTG Mahaffey explained that the term “prisoner of
war” would accord the Cubans certain rights under the Geneva
Convention, for example, the right to communicate with relatives.
However, as LTG Merritt later explained, the Operations Deputies
decided to retain the original classification to avoid even the
slightest hint that the United States might be at war with
Cuba.1
Nearly eight thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines
had participated in URGENT FURY along with 353 Caribbean allies
of the CPF. US forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded;
Cuban forces lost 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 personnel
captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358
wounded; at least 24 civilians were killed. On 10 November in
recognition that US forces on Grenada had “encountered foreign
armed opposition that included heavy small arms, machine guns,
and antiaircraft artillery,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff made all
military participants in URGENT FURY eligible to receive the
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.
During an appearance on “Meet the Press” on 6 November l983,
General Vessey candidly summarized URGENT FURY in these words:
“We planned the operation in a very short
period of time--in about 48 hours. We planned it
with insufficient intelligence for the type of
operation we wanted to conduct. As a result we
probably used more force than we needed to do the
job, but the operation went reasonably well.
...Things did go wrong, but generally the operation
was a success. The troops did very well.
Navy radios could not communicate with
the Vinson secure radio equipment used by the Army units,
delaying and complicating requests for naval air and naval
gunfire support. Soldiers in sight of warships delayed
operations until distant Air Force gunships and Army helicopters
could be summoned.
The ultimate KEYSTONE COP OUT
Despite deficiencies in planning and intelligence that
complicated tactical execution, the Joint Staff termed the
operation a success:
Guidance and policy were concise and clear as were
the orders given by the NCA, the JCS, the CINC, and the
JTF Commander to the forces involved. The clearly
defined Rules of Engagement permitted mission
effectiveness with minimal civilian casualties. …
Although time available for planning the operation was
constrained, the plan which evolved made the best use
of the forces allocated, and their capabilities,
training, and readiness. The procedures established
for crisis situations generally proved adequate for …
highly sensitive and time critical requirements. The
military personnel assigned … especially those who had
joint tour experience, were very effective. … Lastly,
… the NCA and JCS (and their staffs) permitted the
chain of intervention … to use their experience,
expertise, and familiarity with the situation to
accomplish the mission.15
a youtube with some more details
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiIET5cSxLU&index=4&list=PLBA944CD1584845F7
