Modi effect 9.0 FROM CAKEWALK TO CONTEST?

FROM CAKEWALK TO CONTEST: INDIA’S 2019 GENERAL ELECTION

MILAN VAISHNAV | APRIL 2018

MILAN VAISHNAV | APRIL 2018
In approximately twelve months, Indian voters from Kanyakumari to Kashmir will go to the polls to select their next parliament. The country’s 2019 general election—like previous contests—will be the largest democratic exercise in world history. More than 850 million voters will be eligible to help determine which political party or alliance will form the government and, in turn, who will serve as prime minister.
FROM CAKEWALK TO CONTEST: INDIA’S 2019 GENERAL ELECTION
Electoral outcomes are notoriously difficult to predict in India’s fragmented, hypercompetitive democracy. But one need not go out on a limb to declare that the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) of Prime Minister Narendra Modi would be the clear favorite if the election were held today.
Following the BJP’s decisive 2014 mandate, many analysts confidently proclaimed that Modi would remain in power for at least two, if not three, terms. Opinion polls reveal that
Modi remains highly popular after four years in office, and the BJP has managed to methodically expand its national footprint in numerous state elections since 2014. The opposition,
comprised of the once-dominant Indian National Congress and a plethora of regional parties, has struggled to counter the BJP onslaught.
Yet the election’s clear front-runner is far from invulnerable,
despite anticipation of a BJP cakewalk in 2019. Althoughthe intricacies of the upcoming race—such as the selection of candidates and the rhetoric of campaigns—remain
unknown one year out, underlying structural conditions suggest far rockier terrain may lie ahead. In particular, four crucial objectives keep BJP strategists up at night: expanding
beyond regional strongholds, recruiting new—and retaining
old—coalition partners, withstanding a disappointing economic performance, and contending with fluctuations in voter mobilization. The party’s performance in the 2019 election
will hinge largely on its ability to address these potential
vulnerabilities and the opposition’s ability to exploit them.

2014 AND BEYOND

To understand the BJP’s position today, one must recall how
unusual India’s 2014 election results were. Between 2004 and
2014, the Congress Party and its allies (known collectively as
the United Progressive Alliance, or UPA) ran the central government
in New Delhi. Although the UPA oversaw record
economic growth during its first term, its second term was
markedly less positive, as a slowing economy, doubts about
its leadership, and an endless parade of corruption scandals
badly dented the Congress-led alliance’s credibility.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Milan Vaishnav is the director and a senior fellow in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is co-editor
(with Devesh Kapur) of the forthcoming book, Costs of Democracy: Political Finance in India (Oxford University Press, 2018).
INDIA ELECTS 2019
2
In an era of fractured political mandates in New Delhi, the
Modi-led BJP achieved what many analysts believed was
unthinkable: it won a clear, single-party majority in the lower
house of the Indian parliament (the Lok Sabha) by capturing
282 of 543 seats (see figure 1). Its political allies—members
of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—netted
another fifty-three seats. Although the BJP campaigned
under the banner of “Mission 272” (a number that represents
the threshold for a parliamentary majority), few Indians
(even within the BJP itself) believed that the party was likely
to meet, let alone surpass, this mark on its own.
The 2014 electoral outcome was historic. No party had
obtained a clear majority of Lok Sabha seats on its own
since 1984 when the Congress did so after the assassination
of former prime minister Indira Gandhi. 2014 was the first
time a non-Congress party had achieved an outright majority
by itself without the need for a large, unwieldy coalition.
Meanwhile, the Congress sank to its lowest total in history—
a paltry forty-four seats. Prior to 2014, the fewest seats the
Congress had won in a general election was 114 in 1999.
In addition, the 2014 election saw record voter turnout: 66.4
percent of eligible voters (or roughly 554 million voters) cast
ballots, a sharp uptick from the 58 percent recorded in the
two previous elections.
With each passing year, the national reach of the BJP has
grown while the reach of the Congress has shrunk. The BJP
and its allies now run twenty-one of India’s twenty-nine
states—home to over 70 percent of the Indian population
(see figure 2). Prior to Modi’s election, the NDA controlled
just eight states. The BJP’s gains have largely come at the
expense of the Congress; whereas the latter ran thirteen states
prior to the last general election, today it governs in just four.
Furthermore, only two of these (Karnataka and Punjab) have
substantial populations (with roughly 90 million residents
between them).
The lion’s share of the credit for the BJP’s resurgence belongs
to Modi, who remains the most popular politician in India.
In May 2014, 36 percent of Indians surveyed named him
as their preferred candidate for prime minister, compared
Figure 1. Distribution of Seats in Lok Sabha Elections, 1984–2014
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Election Commission of India (ECI)
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE | 3
to just 14 percent for Congress President Rahul Gandhi.
Although Modi’s rating might sound low from a comparative
perspective, it is remarkably high for India’s fragmented
political system in which 464 parties contested the 2014
general election. While Gandhi’s rating had risen to 20
percent by January 2018, Modi’s popularity has remained
extremely stable throughout his four years in office (hovering
around 37 percent). Historically, Gandhi’s rating has proven
erratic, in part due to his twin struggles with consistency and
effectiveness.
REIMAGINING THE MAP
Pulling off an encore performance of the BJP’s sweeping
2014 victory will be a tall order; to compensate for potential
losses in its core areas, the party must venture into new territory.
In 2014, the BJP virtually swept areas where it traditionally
enjoys strong support in northern and western India
(see figure 3). Just eight states—Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat,
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and
Uttar Pradesh—accounted for over 75 percent of the BJP’s
Figure 2. BJP’s Expanding Footprint, 2014–2018
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Election Commission of India (ECI)
2014 State Control 2018 State Control
BJP BJP allies
INC INC allies
Other Indeterminate
BJP BJP allies
INC Other
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Election Commission of India (ECI)
Note: The eight states that account for 75 percent of BJP seats are outlined in bold.
Figure 3. BJP’s 2014 Performance in Core States
Non-BJP seat
BJP seat
No data
Note: The maps indicate the partisan control of states in 2014 and 2018, respectively.
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tally in parliament. Collectively, these states account for 273
seats, of which the BJP won 216 (nearly 80 percent).
Running the table in two consecutive elections will be an
uphill battle. Indian voters are legendary for their tendency
to harbor anti-incumbency sentiments; research suggests that
individual members of parliament (MPs) are just as likely
to get thrown out of office at the end of their term as to get
voted back in. There are also state-level anti-incumbency
effects that have negative spillovers on national politics. Parliamentary
candidates representing a given state’s ruling party
enjoy an electoral advantage in national elections, but only
when national elections are held early in the state government’s
term. Once this honeymoon period is over, holding
power in India’s states becomes a liability in general elections.
This poses a problem for the BJP, which serves as the ruling
party in all eight of these core states; in five of them, its
governments are nearing the ends of their terms.
Because Modi and BJP President Amit Shah—a longtime
Modi aide and a savvy campaign strategist—know engineering
another sweep of these eight core states will be difficult,
they have placed great importance on expanding the BJP’s
footprint into parts of the country where it traditionally has
been weak. Hence, the BJP’s painstaking devotion to breaking
into India’s northeast—long considered to be a bastion
of the Congress and smaller regional parties. The northeast is
often seen as inconsequential to the overall electoral picture
given that it accounts for just 3.7 percent of India’s population.
Yet the region boasts twenty-five parliamentary seats, a
tempting prize for a party that covets new territory to compensate
for losses likely to be sustained elsewhere. Thanks
to a series of recent state-level victories, the BJP now sits in
government in seven of these eight states and is building up
organizational and alliance networks across the region; as a
relatively new player in northeastern India, the BJP is less
likely to fall prey to Indian voters’ antipathy for incumbents
there than in the party’s traditional strongholds. Whereas
the Congress retains the capacity to put up a good fight in
the Hindi heartland, its stature in the northeast has rapidly
diminished.
Having established a foothold in northeastern India, the
BJP now aims to increase its strength along India’s eastern
seaboard in major states such as Odisha, Tamil Nadu,
Telangana, and West Bengal. In a fifth state, Andhra Pradesh,
the BJP has worked primarily through a key alliance partner—the
Telugu Desam Party (TDP). The four aforementioned
states serve as a sort of firewall the BJP has struggled
to penetrate in national elections. All told, these five states
collectively account for 144 seats in the parliament. Each is
home to one (or more) powerful parties with strong ties to
linguistic, regional, and cultural identities the BJP
currently lacks.
However, this firewall may be fracturing. In West Bengal, the
BJP trails the ruling Trinamool Congress Party in terms of
statewide appeal. But it views the demise of the two principal
opposition forces—the Left (a coalition of left-leaning parties)
and the Congress—as providing a crucial opening for it
to emerge as the second-largest party. The ruling Biju Janata
Dal of Odisha won twenty of twenty-one parliamentary
seats in 2014, ceding just one to the BJP. But the latter won
one-quarter of the vote and has subsequently performed well
in municipal elections. In Tamil Nadu, the BJP is a bit player
on its own but sees the potential to make inroads through
alliances. Fissures within the state’s ruling party, the All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, have given the BJP hope
that the party system might be ripe for realignment.
COALITION DYNAMICS
Sustaining previous hard-won gains and breaking new
ground in pockets of the country outside BJP strongholds,
however, will require partners. On this score, the BJP’s prognosis
is mixed.
On the one hand, thanks to the widespread sense that the
BJP has the wind at its back, the party has become the
central pole around which politics in India revolves. This
distinguished position once belonged to the Congress, but
its recent electoral stumbles and the BJP’s abundant successes
have decisively changed the equation. In three recent state
elections—in Goa, Manipur, and Meghalaya—the BJP failed
to emerge as the single largest party. Nonetheless, thanks to
its allure as an alliance partner, the BJP formed governments
in all three states by winning over several smaller parties who
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE | 5
decided to join a party gaining momentum rather than one
appearing to lose it. Across states, the BJP, not the Congress,
seems to be the default governing party.
Yet recent events suggest that the BJP’s electoral coalition is
showing signs of strain. Existing BJP allies are voicing concerns
about the party’s methods, raising the possibility that
its electoral coalition could fracture. Two of the BJP’s biggest
allies, the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and the TDP in Andhra
Pradesh, have recently put the BJP on notice that they are
unhappy with its “arrogant” leadership style. The Shiv Sena
announced in January 2018 that it would contest the 2019
elections alone, rather than with the BJP. In March, the TDP
pulled its ministers from the central cabinet in New Delhi to
express disappointment with the Modi government’s failure
to help Andhra Pradesh tap additional central government
funds. When the BJP refused to budge, the TDP announced
its decision to formally exit the alliance. These ruptures,
while not fatal or irreversible, potentially complicate the
BJP’s electoral arithmetic in 2019. If the BJP is successfully
tarred as anti-Andhra, it would be difficult for the party to
notch a pre-poll alliance with any of the major regional parties
there, increasing the likelihood that a sizeable chunk of
the state’s twenty-five seats would be out of the BJP’s reach.
In Maharashtra, provided the opposition coalition remains
intact, the split with the Shiv Sena could create a threeway
race.
Luckily for the BJP, the opposition remains in disarray. The
Congress has been slow to rectify the organizational and
leadership deficiencies laid bare in 2014. As one senior party
leader has mused, the Congress has faced electoral crises
before, but what it faces today is an existential crisis. While
it will likely gain seats in 2019, one Congress leader privately
admitted that a triple-digit figure would be a stretch at
present.1
 Left parties have seen a precipitous decline nearly
everywhere save for the state of Kerala, its last remaining
stronghold. The upstart Aam Aadmi Party, which came to
power in the Delhi state assembly by way of an assertive,
agitational brand of politics, has struggled to extend its reach
beyond the national capital. Moreover, parties opposed to the
BJP have failed to coordinate and pool their votes so as to
keep the BJP out of power.
There have been two notable exceptions where opposition
parties have set aside their differences and forged a degree
of bonhomie. The first was the 2015 state election in Bihar,
where a so-called grand alliance of opposition parties joined
hands to keep the BJP from winning power. The opposition
alliance won a resounding victory, but this short-lived
marriage of convenience ultimately ended when one party
defected. More recently, in March 2018, two rival regional
parties in Uttar Pradesh buried their long-standing differences
to jointly defeat the BJP in a special election. Regional
players could give the BJP a run for its money in their respective
states, but doing so will require them to work cooperatively—something
that does not come naturally to rivals
who bitterly jostle for political space. The effects of the BJP’s
own alliance drama will be mitigated if the opposition proves
unable or unwilling to do business together in 2019.
ECONOMIC ANXIETY
But it is not only allies the BJP must worry about retaining;
many voters who were swayed by Modi’s promise to
usher in acche din (good times) by reenergizing the Indian
economy have also grown restive. In 2014, India was plagued
by slumping growth, ballooning deficits, stalled investments,
and soaring inflation—offering the BJP untold opportunities
to critique the Congress Party’s mismanagement of bread and-butter
issues. Although invocations of Hindu majoritarianism
also populated the BJP’s entreaties, it was the BJP’s
insistence that it would rectify the declining economy that
resonated across the country. Yet as economic progress under
Modi has fallen short of expectations, anxieties about the lack
of job creation have led to massive popular protests in state
after state. While the intensity and scope of voter disaffection
with India’s economy is not certain, there are signs that disquiet
is rising among rural voters who decisively backed the
BJP four years ago. Given that farmers account for roughly
half of India’s labor force, rural economic woes raise alarm
bells for every incumbent politician.
BJP strategists once believed that economic revival would
be the hallmark of the 2019 campaign. Unfortunately for
them, the economy has not experienced a uniform revival
(see figure 4). Growth, while high by international standards,
remains well below the country’s potential. A failure to deal
quickly with a systemic banking crisis has bogged down the
domestic investment cycle. Inflation, which has fallen from
the double-digit levels of the tenure of the Congress, remains
a risk in an election year when the pressure to spend will be
elevated. Furthermore, the Modi government’s decisions to
abruptly remove high-value currency notes from circulation
(“demonetize”) and enact the sweeping Goods and Services
Tax reform have hurt short-term growth, irrespective of
their longer-term merits. More importantly, for the average
Indian, job growth has been anemic. According to the
Reserve Bank of India, total employment actually shrank
between 2014 and 2016. While it appears that nonfarm jobs
grew over this period, farming jobs declined—perhaps as a
result of successive droughts.
The BJP is betting that its flagship welfare schemes might
inoculate it against its patchy economic record. Criticized
for having cozy links to corporate capital, Modi’s administration
has doggedly tried to burnish its pro-poor credentials by
doubling down on major welfare schemes—such as granting
every household a bank account, initiating free cooking gas
connections to families below the poverty line, and ensuring
universal affordable housing.
These efforts notwithstanding, economic travails are especially
apparent in rural India. Although once the bailiwick of the
Congress, many rural voters in 2014 switched their allegiance
to the BJP—a party that has historically performed better
with city-dwellers. The rural shift toward the BJP could easily
swing back to the Congress; for instance, available data
suggests that support for the BJP alliance among farmers
has declined over the past year. Indeed, recent distress in the
farming sector is likely sending chills down the spines of BJP
leaders. Despite Modi’s promises to double agrarian incomes
by 2022, agriculture remains in a state of disrepair. While the
causes of this distress are largely structural, proximate factors
such as the decline in the prices of several agricultural commodities
and shortfalls in farm production have stimulated
outrage among many rural Indians.
A clear warning shot was fired in December 2017 during
elections in Gujarat, a longtime BJP bastion. Although
it retained its majority in the state assembly, the BJP
Figure 4. India’s Quarterly GDP Growth, 2012–2017
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE | 7
encountered serious rural opposition—especially in the key
region of Saurashtra—where the Congress prevailed by capitalizing
on caste politics and the waning fortunes of farmers.
In March 2018, as many as 50,000 farmers in Maharashtra
descended on the state capital of Mumbai to demand the
BJP state government move swiftly to aid them. How wide
this disaffection has spread is unclear. All eyes will be on
upcoming state elections in Karnataka (in May 2018) and
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram, and Rajasthan (in
December 2018) to discern whether this alleged drop-off in
rural locales is sustained.
VOTER MOBILIZATION
A final concern for the BJP in 2019 is voter mobilization. In
2014, the party successfully channeled popular disaffection
with the incumbent Congress Party into record voter turnout
(66.4 percent). Voter turnout had previously peaked at 64
percent in 1984 and fell to between 56 and 62 percent in
subsequent election cycles. As Neelanjan Sircar has pointed
out, there was a strong association between the growth in
voter turnout and the improved fortunes of the BJP in the
2014 election (see figure 5). A key source of strength came
from young voters. Research has demonstrated that states
with the largest increases in the share of young, first-time
voters in 2014 also experienced the biggest gains in BJP vote
share. With the novelty of Modi and BJP rule in New Delhi
wearing thin, there is a risk that voter turnout will return to
ordinary levels, reducing the BJP’s enthusiasm advantage.
One key demographic the BJP believes it can energize in
2019 is women. Although they do not vote as a bloc per se,
the party believes several of its welfare schemes have special
resonance with women and can influence their votes. This is
significant because Indian females are voting in greater numbers
than ever before. In 2014, women voted at higher rates
than men in sixteen of India’s thirty-five states and union
territories. At the state level, female turnout now regularly
surpasses male turnout.

Looking ahead, the BJP’s predicament is how to mobilize
voters as an incumbent party. One possibility is that the
party will choose to invoke the Hindu nationalist card more
expressly and more intensively to rile up its base. Such a
move toward polarization would become even more likely if
the opposition successfully bands together to forge a common
anti-BJP front. Yet such a risky strategy could turn off
as many (or more) voters as it galvanizes.
CONCLUSION
One year in advance, many details of the 2019 race remain
unknown, but its structural drivers are quickly coming into
view. Modi and Shah are wasting no time in recalibrating
their approach to mitigate the BJP’s unexpected challenges.
For instance, the government’s most recent budget was
packed with pro-poor rhetoric and numerous sops meant to
allay rural anger. As existing allies are growing wary of the
BJP’s modus operandi, the party’s high command has stepped
up its outreach to smooth frayed relations. And, concerned
about waning voter enthusiasm, Modi has directed the
party’s elected representatives to redouble efforts to connect
with constituents. In one instance, Modi is reported to
have warned sitting BJP MPs that they must amass at least
300,000 followers on social media or risk losing their
party tickets.
The opposition is making adjustments as well. Gandhi
and the once-dithering Congress appear more focused and
consistent. The opposition, at least rhetorically, is embracing
the need to forge a common anti-BJP front in 2019. Twelve
months is an eternity in politics, but one thing has become
evident: once thought to be a cakewalk for the BJP, the 2019
election is turning into a contest.
NOTES

Modi effect 8.0 "Modi"fication of Social media

 In an unprecedented rise to power Right Wing Bharatiya Janata Party’s candidate, Naredra Modi, now Prime Minister of India, used social media strategies to advance his campaign to the masses. From using 3D holograms at political rallies to caller tunes and SMSs’ Modi and his Media team used social media platforms to keep the buzz alive as he shunted through the country on a whirlwind tour conducting 477 rallies as part of his election campaign. Modi and his men undertook direct interaction with 814 million of the total electorate with close contender Rahul Gandhi clocking only 133 million in comparison. The 3D hologram rallies alone reached 14 million people and SMS WhatsApp and other social media platforms were used to contact 130 million people. At the end of the day with 3.9 million followers on Twitter, 13 million Facebook likes and the same number of YouTube downloads, Social Media drove the Modi campaign to success giving him a clear majority over other rivals in the General Elections 2014

Impact of Social Media in India

 India has more than 160 million Internet users, of which 86 million accesses Internet using their mobile devices.
In the last 3-4 years, the number of users who access the Internet through a 3G connection has grown to round 22 million, to put things in perspective, compare this with the 15 million fixed line broadband connections accrued over the last 17 years.
• There are over 36 million smartphone users as against 60 million PC users.
 • 9% of overall Internet page views in India come from mobile devices.
• Over 40% of searches on Google originate from mobile device.
• 30% of Facebook users in India are mobile-only Internet users and 30% of new registrations are coming through mobile
 • LinkedIn ranks India among its top 4 growth markets for mobile usage

The institutionalization of Modi’s image building may be a more recent phenomenon,

but he had been fascinated with the power of the Internet to increase his popularity for

a long time. As early as 2001 Modi was freely granting interview to internet sites with

his PRO following public reactions to the same says Ramesh Menon who interviewed

him for rediff.com in 2001.

Of late, the Internet, in this context more specifically meant Social media which has

formed an integral part of all of Modi’s PR strategies. Says Harshit Gupta, key

campaigner of Modi’s PR team, “Modi had started using social media from 2009

onwards. I remember having conversations with rival politicians at that time. They

laughed and commented, ‘Are elections won on Facebook? I wonder what they will

say now.”7

Modi’s election strategy too has not been restricted to traditional methods of

canvassing and campaigning. Sources say he has learnt a lot from following the

political strategies adopted by other world leaders, specifically US President Barrack

Obama. Modi was among the first chief ministers in India who understood the power

impact and outreach of social and new media.8 His PR agents stepped up support and

public mobilisation for him through the use of these tools through popular platforms

such as Facebook and twitter. Apart from the multitudes of videos tom-tomming

Modi and his persona on YouTube, he also set up his own website;

www.naredndramodi.in where all his speeches and activities were documented by a

battery of PR agents.

Blogworks, an agency which monitors social networking index of Indian politicians

puts Modi way ahead of others on its list. His competitors grudgingly admit that no

other leader has managed to do with PR, social media and technology what Modi has

accomplished.

Time and again Modi had stressed in internal party meetings that social media would

play a crucial role as a game changer in 2014 elections. In a special India Today

edition to mark the 67th Independence Day of the nation, Modi wrote: “Social media

is an egalitarian medium that has created a level playing field. It is now possible for a

common man to talk to, question and challenge any public figure if they disagree with 

him or her. On social media we are all netizens first and everything later! Social

media has emerged as a great tool for empowerment.”

He was about to be proved absolutely right. He calculated there would be about14

crore mobile Internet users by the time the nation went to polls again. It was not just

propaganda he was looking at.; he wanted to build a new-base among first-time

voters. Who formed 20%of the electorate in 2014. To bring this new , young, urban

voter into the BJP fold., his managers came up with a volunteer mobilization

programme called India 272+, complete with a mobile phone app, the catchphrase

reminding the voter that India needed a party in power with a full majority so that in

government too there would be the easy rhyme of his four-word campaign slogan—

Abki Baar, Modi Sarkar (This time- Modi government)

Modi’s social media campaign was not the work of one man alone but an entire team.

There was a brigade of back-room officials constantly working on him and marketing

him to the country. These included a principal secretary, two additional principal

secretaries, two officers on special duty, one of them to exclusively manage IT and

the other to manage meetings. He had four personal assistants, one public relations

officer and an additional public relations officer in his office. Regular feedback was

provided to him on what people were talking about, audience reaction to his speeches

and what BJP workers were saying about him.

Piyush Gupta (49) Rajya Sabha MP (Member of the Upper House of Indian

Parliament) headed the BJP’s Information and Communication campaign subcommittee

that oversaw all outreach efforts via the web, mobile phones and social

media. The sub-committee in turn helped the party’s IT cell with an alumnus of the

Indian Institute of Technology BHU (Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi) Arvind

Gupta as convenor and a communication cell headed by Anupam Trivedi an MBA

degree holder from the Indian Institute of foreign Trade.

The IT drive included a third arm outside the party for which Modi handpicked two of

the company’s sharpest IT minds, Rajesh Jain (post graduate from Columbia

University in the US and an Internet revolutionary who is credited with

revolutionizing Internet use in India through IndiaWorld web portal—a collection of

India centric websites. The second man on this team was tech-entrepreneur B.G.

Mahesh (post graduate from Alabama University and founder of Greynium

Information technologies private Ltd, the owners of OneIndia, one of India’s finest

regional language news portals. Apart from Goyal, Jain and Mahesh, the fourth

prominent backroom strategists for Modi was K. Kailashanathan, known as K.K a

1979 batch retired bureaucrat and a close confidante of Modi. Last but in no0 way the

least was Modi’s controversial former minister of state for home, Amit Shah, who had

to step down in face of charges of ordering fake encounter killings in Gujarat. He has

been the brain behind the BJP’s Social Media campaign.

Modi has appointed Rajesh Jain and BG Mahesh to orchestrate and drive his social

media campaigns. The Indian internet industry is aware of the success stories of the

two, who are often recalled as “The Original Dotcom poster boys.” Rajesh is well

known for selling IndiaWorld to Sify for Rs. 499 crore and Mahesh has been

successful in founding companies like IndiaInfo and OneIndia. The successful duo are

now making sure that BJP comes into power in next elections and for that they are 

putting together a 100-member content and technology team in Bangalore to drive

Modi’s internet campaign. Modi has also held “virtual rallies” such as the one on

November 18 wherein he addressed rallies simultaneously from four separate stages

across Gujarat—Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Surat and Rajkot at a whopping cost of Rs 40

crore. As per a December 20 online poll 17:15 IST, as of 88% of 39491 surfers had

hit LIKE on Narendra Modi. Whether it is with creating a presence on social networks

or conducting the most successful Hangout by any Indian politician, Modi has done it

successfully. Recently he was again in the news for a statement he made while

interacting with the BJP Maharashtra cell – “Get me 48 lakh social media id’s from

the 48 Lok Sabha seats in the state.” Both Rajesh Jain and BG Mahesh have declined

to comment on the story but it is clear that with the coming elections, political fights

will not happen only in offline spaces but social media too. 9

Together this crack team of IT professionals promoted Modi’s vision and his

developmental model and a blitzkrieg dedicated to portraying how India needed Modi

to stem corruption and bring positive change in an era that would choose development

over dynasty.

His campaigners ensured SMS Whatsapp texts and voice mails were made to over

130 million people. In the last phase 3D rallies were organized, beginning from April

10, one month before the last day of campaigning. Modi’s experiment with 3D

hologram rallies earlier in 2012 Gujarat Assembly elections had bagged him a place

in the Guinness Book of World Records for delivering a speech to 53 locations

simultaneously. The hi-tech campaign had touched 14 million people through such

virtual rallies.

As Lok Sabha Elections 2014 wound down to a historic close, the BJP-led NDA

claimed a landslide victory, making huge gains across the country. As results for all

543 Lok Sabha seats were announced, the NDA looked set to win 336 seats, not only

far ahead of the half-way mark but also relishing a victory whose scale they had not

themselves anticipated. For, incredibly, the BJP crossed the 272 mark comfortably on

its own, without allies, winning 282 seats, a gain of 166.

In the more recent Chhatisgarh and Jammu and Kashmir polls too, BJP made a clean

sweep of the former and delivered an impactful surge in the latter. It is also all set to

sweep away the fight for Delhi where earlier the anti-incumbency wave had brought

dark horse Arvind Kejriwal to power. 

Modi effect 7.0 New direction to foreign relations

When Modi became prime minister, many Indians hoped that he would give a
new direction to foreign relations at a time when the gap between India and China in
terms of international power and stature was growing significantly. In fact, India’s
influence in its own strategic backyard—including Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh
and the Maldives—has shrunk. Indeed, Bhutan remains India’s sole pocket of strategic
clout in South Asia.
India also confronts the strengthening nexus between its two nuclear-armed
regional adversaries, China and Pakistan, both of which have staked claims to substantial
swaths of Indian territory and continue to collaborate on weapons of mass
destruction. In dealing with these countries, Modi has faced the same dilemma that
has haunted previous Indian governments: the Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministries
are weak actors. The Communist Party and the military shape Chinese foreign
policy, while Pakistan is effectively controlled by its army and intelligence services,
which still use terror groups as proxies. Under Modi, India has faced several daring
terrorist attacks staged from Pakistan, including on Indian military facilities.
One Modi priority after assuming office was restoring momentum to the relationship
with the United States, which, to some extent, had been damaged by
grating diplomatic tensions and trade disputes while his predecessor was in office.
While Modi has been unable to contain cross-border terrorist attacks from Pakistan
or stem Chinese military incursions across the disputed Himalayan frontier, he has
managed to lift the bilateral relationship with the US to a new level of engagement.
He has enjoyed a good personal relationship with US President Donald Trump, like
he had with Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama.
Modi considers close ties with the US as essential to the advancement of India’s
economic and security interests. The US, for its part, sees India as central to its
Indo-Pacific strategy. As the White House’s national security strategy report in
December 2017 put it, “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions
of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which
stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States,
represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world.…We
welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and
defence partner.”5
More broadly, Modi’s various steps and policy moves have helped highlight
the trademarks of his foreign policy—from pragmatism and lucidity to zeal and
showmanship. They have also exemplified his penchant for springing diplomatic
surprises. One example was his announcement during a China visit to grant Chinese
tourists e-visas on arrival, an announcement that caught by surprise even his foreign
secretary, who had just said at a media briefing that there was “no decision” on the
5 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: December
2017), https://goo.gl/CWQf1t.
52Political Change
issue. Another example was in Paris, where Modi announced a surprise decision to
buy 36 French Rafale fighter-jets.
Modi is a realist who loves to play on the grand chessboard of geopolitics. He is
seeking to steer foreign policy in a direction that helps to significantly aid his strategy
to revitalise the country’s economic and military security. At least five things
stand out about his foreign policy.
First, Modi has invested considerable political capital—and time—in highpowered
diplomacy. No other prime minister since the country’s independence
participated in so many bilateral and multilateral summit meetings in his first years
in office. Critics contend that Modi’s busy foreign policy schedule leaves him restricted
time to focus on his most-critical responsibility—domestic issues, which
will define his legacy.
Second, pragmatism is the hallmark of the Modi foreign policy. Nothing better
illustrates this than the priority he accorded, soon after coming to office, to adding
momentum to the relationship with America, despite the US having heaped visa-denial
humiliation on him over nine years. In his first year in office, he also went out
of his way to befriend India’s strategic rival, China, negating the early assumptions
that he would be less accommodating toward Beijing than his predecessor. With
China increasingly assertive and unaccommodating, Modi’s gamble failed to pay
off. Yet, in April 2018, Modi made a fresh effort to “reset” relations with China and
held an informal summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in the central
Chinese city of Wuhan.
Third, Modi has sought to shape a non-doctrinaire foreign-policy approach
powered by ideas. He has taken some of his domestic policy ideas (such as “Make
in India” and “Digital India”) to foreign policy, as if to underscore that his priority
is to revitalise India economically. By simultaneously courting different major
powers, Modi has also sought to demonstrate his ability to forge partnerships with
rival powers and broker cooperative international approaches in a rapidly changing
world.
In fact, Modi’s foreign policy is implicitly attempting to move India from its
long-held nonalignment to a contemporary, globalised practicality. In essence, this
means that India—a founding leader of the nonaligned movement—could become
more multi-aligned and less nonaligned. Building close partnerships with major
powers to pursue a variety of interests in diverse settings will not only enable India
to advance its core priorities but also will help it to preserve strategic autonomy, in
keeping with the country’s longstanding preference for policy independence.
Nonalignment suggests a passive approach, including staying on the sidelines.
Being multi-aligned, on the other hand, permits a proactive approach. Being
pragmatically multi-aligned seems a better option for India than remaining passively
non-aligned. A multi-aligned India is already tilting more toward the major
53The Modi Phenomenon and the Re-Making of India
democracies of the world, as the resurrected Australia-India-Japan-US quadrilateral
(or “quad”) grouping underscores. Still, India’s insistence on charting an independent
course is reflected in its refusal to join America-led financial sanctions against
Russia.
Meanwhile, a Modi-led India has not shied away from building strategic partnerships
with countries around China’s periphery to counter that country’s creeping
strategic encirclement of India. New Delhi’s resolve was apparent when Modi tacitly
criticised China’s military buildup and encroachments in the South China Sea
as evidence of an “18th-century expansionist mindset.” India’s “Look East” policy,
for its part, has graduated to an “Act East” policy, with the original economic logic
of “Look East” giving way to a geopolitical logic. The thrust of the new “Act East”
policy—unveiled with US blessings—is to re-establish historically close ties with
countries to India’s east so as to contribute to building a stable balance of power in
the Indo-Pacific region. As Modi said in an op-ed published in 27 ASEAN newspapers
on 26 January 2018 (the day, in a remarkable diplomatic feat, India hosted the
leaders of all 10 ASEAN states as chief guests at its Republic Day parade), “Indians
have always looked East to see the nurturing sunrise and the light of opportunities.
Now, as before, the East, or the Indo-Pacific region, will be indispensable to India’s
future and our common destiny.”6
Fourth, Modi has a penchant for diplomatic showmanship, reflected not only in
the surprises he has sprung but also in the kinds of big-ticket speeches he has given
abroad, often to chants of “Modi, Modi” from the audience. Like a rock star, he unleashed
Modi-mania among Indian-diaspora audiences by taking the stage at New
York’s storied Madison Square Garden, at Sydney’s sprawling Allphones Arena,
and at Ricoh Coliseum, a hockey arena in downtown Toronto. When permission
was sought for a similar speech event in Shanghai during Modi’s 2015 China visit,
an apprehensive Chinese government, which bars any public rally, relented only on
the condition that the event would be staged in an indoor stadium.
To help propel Indian foreign policy, Modi has also injected a personal touch.
Indeed, Modi has used his personal touch with great effect, addressing leaders
ranging from Obama to Abe by their first name and building an easy relationship
with multiple world leaders. In keeping with his personalised stamp on diplomacy,
Modi has relied on bilateral summits to open new avenues for cooperation and collaboration.
At the same time, underscoring his nimble approach to diplomacy, he
has shown he can think on his feet. The speed with which he rushed aid and rescue
teams to an earthquake-battered Nepal, as well as dispatched Indian forces to
evacuate Indian and foreign nationals from Nepal and conflict-torn Yemen, helped
to raise India’s international profile, highlighting its capacity to respond swiftly to
natural and human-induced disasters.
Fifth, it is scarcely a surprise that, given this background, Modi has put his own
stamp on Indian foreign policy. The paradox is that Modi came to office with little
foreign policy experience, yet he has demonstrated impressive diplomatic acumen,
including taking bold steps and charting a vision for building a greater international
role for India.
The former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright famously said, “The purpose
of foreign policy is to persuade other countries to do what we want or, better
yet, to want what we want.”7
 How has Modi’s foreign policy done when measured
against such a standard of success? One must concede that, in terms of concrete results,
Modi’s record thus far isn’t all that impressive. His supporters, however, would
say that dividends from a new direction in foreign policy flow slowly and that he
has been in office for just four years.To be sure, a long period of strategic drift under
coalition governments undermined India’s strength in its own backyard. Modi, however,
has not yet been able to recoup the country’s losses in its neighbourhood. The
erosion of India’s influence in its backyard holds far-reaching implications for its
security, underscoring the imperative for a more dynamic, forward-looking foreign
policy and a greater focus on its immediate neighbourhood. China’s strategic clout,
for example, is increasingly on display even in countries symbiotically tied to India,
such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. If China established a Djibouti-type
naval base in the Maldives or Pakistan, it would effectively open an Indian Ocean
front against India in the same quiet way that it opened the trans-Himalayan threat
under Mao Zedong by gobbling up Tibet, the historical buffer. China has already
leased several tiny islands in the Maldives and is reportedly working on a naval base
adjacent to Pakistan’s Chinese-built Gwadar port.
To be sure, Modi has injected dynamism and motivation in diplomacy.8
 But he
has also highlighted what has long blighted the country’s foreign policy—ad hoc
and personality-driven actions that confound tactics with strategy. Institutionalised
and integrated policy making is essential for a robust diplomacy that takes a long
view. Without healthy institutionalised processes, policy will tend to be ad hoc and
shifting, with personalities at the helm having an excessive role in shaping thinking,
priorities and objectives. If foreign policy is shaped by the whims and fancies of
personalities who hold the reins of power, there will be a propensity to act in haste
and repent at leisure, as has happened in India repeatedly since the time of Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was in office for 17 years.

India is more culturally diverse than the entire European Union—but with twice as many people. It is remarkable that India’s democracy has thrived despite such diversity. Yet, like the US, India has become politically polarised. And like Trump, Modi draws strong reactions—in support of him or against him. When Modi won the 2014 national election, critics said they feared his strongman tendencies—a fear they still profess. But in office, Modi has been anything but strong or aggressive in his policies. For example, his foreign policy and his domestic policies, especially economic policy, have been cautious and tactful. However, the “strongman” tag that critics have given Modi helps to obscure his failure to improve governance in India. On his watch, for example, India’s trade deficit with China has doubled to almost $5 billion a month. Prudent gradualism, however, remains the hallmark of Modi’s approach in diplomacy and domestic policy. For example, to underpin India’s position as the world’s fastest-growing developing economy, Modi has preferred slow but steady progress on reforms, an approach that Arvind Subramanian, the government’s chief economic adviser, dubbed “creative incrementalism.” Many in India, of course,
would prefer a bolder approach. But as a raucous democracy, India has to pay a
“democracy tax” in the form of slower decision-making and pandering to powerful
electoral constituencies. For example, under Modi, India’s bill for state subsidies has
risen sharply.
A dynamic foreign policy can be built only on the foundation of a strong domestic
policy, a realm where Modi must overcome political obstacles to shape a
transformative legacy. If India is to emerge as a global economic powerhouse, Modi
must make economic growth his first priority. Another imperative is for India to
reduce its spiralling arms imports by developing an indigenous defence industry.
However, Modi’s “Make in India” initiative has yet to take off, with manufacturing’s
share of India’s GDP actually contracting.
As a shrewd politician, Modi has shown an ability to deftly recover from a setback.
For example, he came under withering criticism when, while meeting Obama
in early 2015 in New Delhi, he wore a navy suit with his name monogrammed in
golden stripes all over it. Critics accused him of being narcissistic, while one politician
went to the extent of calling him a “megalomaniac.” But by auctioning off the
suit, Modi quickly cauterised a political liability. The designer suit was auctioned
for charity, fetching INR 43.1 million ($693,234).
To many, Modi seems politically invincible at home, floating above the laws
of political gravity. But, as happens in any democracy, any leader’s time eventually
runs out. Modi suddenly appeared vulnerable in last December’s state elections in
his native state of Gujarat but his party managed to retain power, although with a
reduced majority. Until his political stock starts to irreversibly diminish, Modi will
continue to dominate the Indian political scene, playing an outsize role. At present,
though, there is no apparent successor to Modi.

The tsunami of neoliberalism that began to wreck working-class communities

Cathy: ‘I became really depressed because no matter how much I loved my children or tried to take care of them, I could neither keep the doctor at bay, or the fungus that was destroying everything that it came into contact with . . . I was continually having to throw out mouldy furniture, clothes, and toys and found myself having to choose between feeding my hungry children or hungry fuel meters which kept demanding more and more money. My doctor offered me a course of anti-depressants and it occurred to me that he was only employed to treat the symptoms of our health problems in the same way as our landlord . . . I asked him for a prescription for a warm, dry home and he laughed. I refused the tablets and I joined the city wide anti-dampness campaign instead.’

The more visible aspects of socio-structural violence are to be found embedded in the economic and social policies pursued by the UK government. The rejection of the Black Report recommendations in the 1980s, such as increasing the maternity grant and child benefit as a means to reduce inequalities in health, signalled the start of a harsher, uncompromising government who were determined to cut public expenditure (see Chapters 1 and 2). In a defining moment, seven years later, Margaret Thatcher deregulated the City of London in an enthusiastic embrace of neoliberalism: ‘it was, in every sense a revolution. It was messy and there was blood all over the place. Unlike most revolutions, it was imposed top down’ (Agius 2011).

The tsunami of neoliberalism that began to wreck working-class communities was even more messy and cruel (see also Chapter 9). It was clear that integral to the policies that began to flow from this government was a blatant disregard for the suffering of the poorest section of society. It was our first realization that in order to fulfil her government’s election pledges to reduce taxation, Thatcher was going to be snatching more than milk from children (the policy described as ‘the meanest and most unworthy thing he had seen in twenty years in parliament’, by Edward Short, the Labour education spokesman at the time).

Instead of examining the root causes of health inequality, the increasing emphasis on individual behaviour and personal responsibility shifted the public discourse around social and economic conditions.

17.4 Unemployment
Housing was not the only battleground. On the broader front, neoliberal orthodoxy became increasingly influential (see Chapter 9). Unemployment became acceptable as a deliberate tool of the market economy, breaking from the post-war consensus that it was ‘a scourge’ and should be minimized through government intervention. As unemployment rose to 3 million across the UK in the (p.241) 1990s, it became clear that there would be no intervention to soften the impact of this on people’s lives: ‘rising unemployment and the recession have been the price that we have had to pay to get inflation down. That price is well worth paying’ (Norman Lamont, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1991).

The ‘acceptable price’ that was, apparently, ‘well worth paying’ was the damaging health and social effects of unemployment on individuals, their families, and communities—well documented by research (Fryer 1995; Platt 1984, 1986). The thinking behind the government’s education and economic policies was exemplified by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, in a speech to the IMF in Washington in 1984 when he warned Britain’s workforce that many of the jobs of the future would not be ‘high-tech’ or even ‘low-tech’, but ‘no-tech’. The move towards a low-wage, no-wage economy had begun—with deliberate policies to ensure that profits would rise faster than wages.


Drawing from international and historical data, Stuckler and Basu (2013) conclude that the decisions governments make during financial crises have a critical impact on the poor when policy can become a matter of life and death. Examining case studies from the 1930s Depression in the USA, to Russia and Indonesia in the 1990s, to present-day Greece, Britain, Spain, and the USA, they show how different policies produce vastly different consequences for the population. For example, during the Great Depression in the 1930s, deaths actually plummeted in the USA due to interventions like the New Deal. In recent times, Iceland’s decision not to cripple their welfare state by bailing out private banks, but instead to put money into their social health care systems and increase social (p.242) welfare payments to its poorest citizens, has resulted in a healthy economy and healthy citizens. There has been no rise in suicides or depressive disorders, and today it is ranked as one of the happiest countries in the world. In contrast, the UK government’s programme is (literally) having deadly side effects, with Stuckler citing the UK as ‘one of the clearest expressions of how austerity kills’ (Henley 2013).

Modi effect 6.0 the Gujarat riots "Maut Ka Saudagar "or a 'merchant Of death'

 For Modi the candidate to succeed in 2014, he would have to live down one thing above all: Godhra.

 The events in question — the Gujarat riots — occurred very soon after he finally came Out from 'behind the curtains' and was catapulted into political leadership himself.

About 2,500 people, mostly Muslims, are estimated to have been beaten, stabbed or burned to death in the state in 2002 after suspected Muslims set fire to a train carrying Hindu pilgrims, killing 59 people.

The activists said Modi, who is seeking re-election, gave Hindu mobs a free run for three days after the train fire, encouraged them to riot and prevented police from stopping the violence.

 They put him at Odds with all his allies from his time as an underground defender Of democracy: the left, the Muslims and the liberals.

 They branded him indelibly as an extremist in the eyes of many and led to his exclusion from the United States for allegedly violating religious freedoms.

They were the biggest single impediment to his ambition to become prime minister. And, worst Of all, they resulted in the deaths Of well over a thousand Of the people he was in Office to protect. For Modi the candidate to succeed in 2014, he would have to live down one thing above all: Godhra.


Fortunately for Narendra Modi, the western media don't have a vote in Indian elections and few Of those who do are much influenced by they read in foreign publications. The UK's pro-business, free- market magazine The Economist found much to admire in his platform of development and economic liberalisation and yet it advised its readers in India not to vote for him.Vh,my? Because, it wrote. he was dangerously divisive.By refusing to put Muslim fears to rest, Mr Modi feeds them. By clinging to the anti- Muslim vote, he nurtures it.' The paper concluded that 'it would be wrong for a man has thrived on division to become prime minister of a country as fissile as India He should be judged on his record — which is that of a man who is still associated with sectarian hatred. There is nothing modern, honest or fair about that. India deserves better.' The editorial board Of the New York Times took a similar line. concluding that 'India is a country with multiple religions, more than a dozen major languages and numerous ethnic groups and tribes. Mr Modi cannot hope to lead it effectively if he inspires fear and antipathy among many of its people.' The paper claimed that his rise to power is deeply troubling to many Indians. especially the country's 138 million Muslims and its many Other minorities.



They worry he would exacerbate sectarian tensions that have subsided somewhat in the last decade.' Both publications examined his achievements as chief minister Of Gujarat, but felt that whatever successes he had chalked up in boosting his state's economic development, they could not wipe the slate clean Of the horrific events Of February and March 2002, just a few months after he took office. Fortunately for Narendra Modi. t don't have a vote in Indian election who do are much influenced by foreign publications. The UK's market magazine The E admire in his platform Of development liberalisation and yet it advised not to vote for him.
Why? Because, it wrote. he was dangerously divisive.
'By refusing to put Muslim fears to rest, Mr Modi feeds them. By clinging to the anti- Muslim vote, he nurtures it.' The paper concluded that it would be wrong for a man who has thrived on division to become prime minister of a country as fissile as India He should be judged on his record — which is that of a man who is still associated with sectarian hatred. There is nothing modern, honest or fair about that. India deserves better.'

The editorial board Of the New York Times took a similar line. concluding that •India is a country with multiple religions, more than a dozen major languages and numerous ethnic groups and tribes. Mr Modi cannot hope to lead it effectively if he inspires fear and antipathy among many of its people.' The paper claimed that •his rise to power is deeply troubling to many Indians, especially the country's 138 million Muslims and its many Other minorities. They worry he would exacerbate sectarian tensions that have subsided somewhat in the last decade.


Both publications examined his achievements as chief minister of Gujarat, but felt that whatever successes he had chalked up in boosting his state's economic development, they could not wipe the slate clean of the horrific events of February and March 2002, just a few months after he took office Modi's first taste of power came not through the ballot box, but by appointment. In 1998 the country's first stable BJP led government took Office in Delhi under the reformist and relatively moderate Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Although it was reliant on a clutch of smaller parties for a majority in parliament, the Vajpayee government survived for over six years. It might have lasted longer, in the view of Vajpayee himself, but for Narendra Modi, Vajpayee was forced to turn to Modi, and later to defend him against his Own better judgement, because the politics Of the time were very different to how they look today. The BJP was more used to electoral defeats than victories and sorely lacked people with the gift Of political alchemy, Towards the end of the twentieth century the BJP was not the disciplined and united party that came to power in 2014. At the risk of over-simplifying some very complex political and personal relationships, it is clear there was a divide between those perceived to be moderates, led by Vajpayee, and the hardliners who looked towards the party president, L. K. Advani;


be moderates, led by Vajpayee, and the hardliners who looked towards the party president. K. Advani; divisions that would surface from time to tirne in public. Advani, more than tvænty years older than Modi and the grandest of the party's grandees, would go on to play a hugely significant role in his future career. and not always a supportive one. At this time. however. Modi was seen to be a disciple Of Advani and in sympathy with his more fundamentalist take on Hindu politics. But in Gujarat at the time the rivalries more to do with personalities than ideologies. Basically, Modi's face didn't fit and — despite having friends in high places — he was effectively excluded from his home state for several years. By 1994. hovæver. the Gujarat party was in such disarray that Advani was able to insist that Modi should be allowed to return to help organise the forthcoming state elections. Modi was quick to repay the trust that had been placed in him. The result, a two-thirds majority for the BJP, was a triumph that only added to his already growing reputation as a back-room genius. In the short term, however, it didn't do him much good as the personality clashes, compounded by a healthy dose of jealousy at hisat mounting popularity, Saw him banished once more, this time to the north-west of the country where he continued to show great organisational prowess, Those skills were too valuable to do without for long, and he was called back to Gujarat again to help the BJP to another victory in 1998, an achievement that this time earned him a major promotion as general secretary in charge Of Organisation for the national party.

The Gujarat government was then battered not so much by the Old rivalries, although they had not gone away, but by natural disasters. First a cyclone, then floods and then a catastrophic earthquake hit the state. There were allegations of corruption and nepotism levelled at the chief minister, Keshubhai Patel, and these, combined with Patel's inept handling of the disaster relief after the earthquake, led Vajpayee to demand his resignation. To fill the vacancy, and to try to avert electoral disaster, the prime minister — on the advice of L. K. Advani — turned once again to Modi. This time it wasn't for a job 'behind the curtains' but very much in front Of them. On 4 October 2001, with the world still reeling from the aftermath of 9/1 1, Modi was made leader of the Gujarat a and interim chief minister even though he wasn't a member Of the state assembly. In global terms, a man nobody had heard of was appointed to a post nobody was interested in, at a time of unprecedented international crisis.

 Less than five months later. hovæver. Gujarat and Narendra Modi would be hitting the headlines for all the wrong reasons.

On the morning Of 27 February 2002. a train carrying over two thousand passengers pulled into the station at Godhra in the east Of the state. Most were Hindu pilgrims returning from the bitterly contested holy city of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Ayodhya is the most sensitive of all religious venues in India. It was the site of the Babri Masjid mosque. built in 1527 on the orders of the first Mughal emperor. Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur. Many Hindus believe Ayodhya was the birthplace Of the Hindu god Ram, gave his name to the Ramayana epic. and that a Hindu temple on the same Spot was demolished so the mosque could be constructed. Recent archaeological evidence suggests that there was a Buddhist temple even

same spot was demolished so the mosque could be constructed. Recent archaeological evidence suggests that there was a Buddhist temple even before that. The centuries-old conflict over Ayodhya had been reignited in 1992 when the mosque was destroyed by a rampaging mob after a march to the site led by nationalist leaders including L. K. Advani. So the people on board the train that made its way towards the Godhra station were not just any passengers. As it slowed down they could see out of the windows a large crowd Of angry Muslims. Soon afterwards burning rags were thrown into one Of the compartments. unable to escape, fifty-nine people, including twenty-six women and twelve children, were burned to death. The attack was horrific, but what followed was on a far bigger and bloodier scale. Over days of rioting across Gujarat, more than a thousand people were killed in inter-racial violence, the overwhelming majority Of them Muslims. The reverberations Of the attacks continue to be felt across Indian politics even today. Modi has consistently maintained that he did everything in his power to contain the rioting and was even-handed in his efforts to help the victims and their families. His critics have accused him Of everything from indifference to the embattled Muslim communities to complicity in the violence itself. Sonia Gandhi referred to Modi as 'Maut Ka Saudagar Or a 'merchant Of death' while campaigning in Gujarat five years after the rioting.

Modi effect 5.0 RSS 'National Volunteer Organisation'. 'one nation, one people and One culture'

To anybody unfamiliar with Indian politics and Hindu culture. the RSS can be hard to relate to, but it is impossible to comprehend Modi without first getting to grips with the organisation. Its own website is not much help. Describing the •Sangh Parivar', as its nu•nbers prefer to call it, it says that, A unique phenomenon in the history of Bharat [India] in the twentieth century is the birth and unceasing growth of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The Sangh's sphere of influence has been spreading far and wide like the radiance of a many splendored diamond.' In 2014 it spread to the prime minister's office in Delhi, although just how much Modi is still guided by its leaders today remains a contentious question and one that he is apparently happy to leave unresolved. Many Of his ministers and closest supporters, who allegiance to the RSS themselves, see no reason to fear its influence. Others who view the organisation from the outside are considerably less sanguine. The literal translation of its name is the 'National Volunteer Organisation'. and the RSS calls itself a movement for those want to make social work their life's mission'. The epithets it attracts from those outside its ranks range from 'extreme Hindu nationalist' to fascist'. One thing they all agree on is that the RSS isn't kidding when it talks about its 'unceasing growth'. Although it doesn't publish figures and there is no formal registration process, estimates for its membership range from between
two and six million people. Even at the lowest end, that makes it the second largest political movement in the world after the Chinese Communist party The word 'political' is not inappropriate, despite the fact that most of its supporters are far more comfortable helping out in their communities than engaging in ideological debate. They perform countless good deeds and do a vast amount of work helping the poorest in society, Often ignorant Of the Organisation's history and heedless of the fact that its leadership is so closely entwined in BJP politics. The RSS was founded in 1925 with the aim Of uniting Hindus and opposing British imperialism. Many Of its early leaders were impatient with the passive resistance espoused by Mahatma Gandhi and, not long after Independence was finally won, the RSS was banned for a year as a direct consequence of Gandhi's assassination by one of its former adherents, Nathuram Godse. The organisation was acquitted of any involvement in the murder and Godse had left because he thought it wasn't militant enough. The 'fascist' tag made more sense in the mid- twentieth century than it does today. While it is purely coincidental that the swastika is an ancient Hindu symbol (it is a familiar emblem in Buddhist and Jain culture, too, and was used by the ancient Greeks and Celts), during the Second World War some of the RSS's leading lights expressed open admiration for Hitler and his dreams Of racial purity.

 Even today, the uniform worn when RSS members corne together every at a shakha, or to perform exercises and recite nationalist slogans, Often while wielding a long stick. is closely on that worn by Mussolini's Blackshirts. In more recent times, however. the RSS leadership has involved itself in democratic politics and bitterly resents any attempt to tarnish the organisation by associating it with fascism. In 1980 it played a key role in establishing the BJP as a vehicle for translating its beliefs into action, and it continues to think of itself as the guardian of Hindu nationalist belief and the ideological conscience of the party. Officially the BJP is independent of the RSS and open to all Indians. but the importance Of the Sangh's vast network Of members cannot be overestimated. It provided many thousands Of the foot soldiers who worked tirelessly at the grassroots level to secure the election Of Modi and his government (see Chapter Twelve). Perhaps the most useful. though incomplete. comparison is the trade union movement in many western democracies.While the unions can cause embarrassment to leaders of the Labour Party in Britain or the Democrats in the United States, for example, especially when they are perceived to be influencing policy, their support is still vital at election time. And, just as with the unions, many outside the ranks of the RSS view it as being a bit of a dinosaur, rather old-fashioned and even irrelevant in the modern world. Worse than that, it is often portrayed as not merely supporting Hindu values. but as being anti-Muslim and anti-Christian. Indeed anti anybody who doesn't believe that all of India should be Hindu. Its defenders, like the journalist Swaminathan Gurumurthy, take a very different view. He believes the RSS has been subjected to endless ignorant abuse and needs to be more objectively assessed. He put it for me like this: 'The RSS is at best an effort to protect Hinduism', In his opinion, Hindu civilisation would be at risk of extinction without it. 'In the world of organised religions and peoples, no unorganised culture or civilisation, or even religion, will survive', he said.


The question as to what degree Narendra Modi still subscribes to the philosophy Of the organisation he grew up vhth took on a new significance when he became prime minister. But the question was not a new one. Another reason why his life story is so important is in order to shed some light on whether India is now governed by a man still committed to an ideology that many of his non-Hindu citizens feel excludes them, or whether he has put it aside in his pursuit of economic development. At the age Of 51, Modi assumed the highest office in his home state, and he soon showed the first signs that he might be ready to distance himself from the ideological dictates Of the Sangh. He presented himself as a thrusting chief minister trying to modernise Gujarat's economy and his own image. But conserving traditional values rather than modernity was the raison d'étre of the RSS and during this period Modi developed something Of a hot and cold relationship with its leadership. As he conceded himself to a recent biographer, 'There are several senior leaders Of the Sangh who are very fond Of me. And there would be some who are less fond.'

The second group clearly felt he was getting too self-important. But he never burned his boats with them and, crucially. when it mattered most in 2013 and 2014, the RSS top brass were among his strongest supporters. convinced that only he could lead the BJP to victory. TO get a balanced and informed assessment Of the RSS and its influence on Modi and the BJP today, I visited the veteran BBC commentator. Mark Tully, at his home in central Delhi. Tully has been observing and writing about Indian politics since the late 1960s: during all that time he has been trying to translate its intricacies for a western audience. One reason, he told why it's wrong to think Of the RSS as a fascist organisation these days is that it is intrinsically hostile to any kind Of authoritarian leadership. 'There is no Mussolini in the RSS and there never has been. There's no Hitler in them, although some people are glibly calling Modi Hitler.

 It's always been a reasonably corporate type of leadership and suspicious Of anybody who becomes too big. too important. too well known. And that's why some Of them have been suspicious Of Modi. Some Of them would admit that there is unease that Modi is running away with the show.' As for what they stand for. Tully says the tenets Of Hindu nationalism, known as Hindutva, can't be compared to the extreme nationalism we associate with far-right  in the west.

'It is much more to do with culture and a belief that all of Indian culture is Hindu.' Tully is the first to agree, however, that many liberal Hindus, including many of his neighbours in the more comfortable districts of the capital, don't see it that way. To them Hindutva is not an inclusive ideology but one that stirs up hatred against anybody who refuses to accept its precepts During the general election campaign, the BJP did its best to avoid any discussion of Hindutva. it looked as if they were all but certain to win, however, the debate over what relevance it has to the India of today intensified, even if Modi himself refused to get involved.

 Ashutosh Varshney, director Of the India Initiative at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, added an academic perspective. He wrote that, Anyone who has read the basic texts of Hindu nationalism knows that three ideas constitute the thematic core of Hindu nationalist ideology First. Hindus are the primary, or exclusive. owners Of the Indian nation. India is a Hindu rashtra (nation). Second, two minorities  the Christians and have a profoundly especially the Muslims ambivalent relationship with India.

 As Savarkar wrote in Hindutva, a classic text Of Hindu nationalism. Muslims and Christians can call India their pitribhumi (fatherland), but India is not their punyabhumi (holy land).' Most parties carry with them some controversial ideological baggage, so we should not be surprised that Narendra Modi is as reluctant to talk about Hindutva as Labour leaders are to discuss the Marxist and socialist texts that were worshipped by many of their founding fathers.

 Fortunately, not all BJP leaders are so reticent. The party HQ, close to Delhi's government district, is a world away from the calm efficiency of the prime minister's residence. The waiting area here is a crowded room, close to the street, where all manner of people hoping for a meeting jostle for attention. The offices beyond are contained in a sprawl of low- level buildings with a constant swirl of comings and goings and an air of purposeful, if somewhat chaotic, activity. I went there for the first time to see the party's official spokesman, Prakash Javadekar. It was his job to deal with the many and varied demands of the media, so his life was lived very much in the here and now. He clearly thought the party had better things to talk about, but he was more than ready to give me his thoughts on Hindutva, insisting that it posed no threat to minority religions in the country today. 'It is a way Of life in India, how Indians live,' he told me. 'It has nothing to do with theocracy, nothing to do with any one religion. Hindutva is a bigger concept. Hindu is a religion, Muslim or Islam is a religion, Christianity is a religion. But Hindutva is an identity, a cultural civilisation, an ethos of India which is shared by everybody. Because Muslims or Christians here have not come from outside, they are Indians. They share the same history, same ancestors, so there is no issue.'

The party's manifesto in 2014 repeated its support for the Concept Of 'one nation, one people and One culture'. Those who see nothing wrong with this formulation point out that most Muslims and Christians in the country are the descendants of people who converted from Hinduism, hoping, in vain as it turned out, to improve their status in society by embracing Islam or Christianity. As the party's most recent historian, Kingshuk Nag,
Islam or Christianity. As the party's most recent historian, Kingshuk Nag, explained, 'Many found this theory Of the BJP abhorrent because it seemed to convey that India was mono-cultural.' Or as Tully puts it. 'They say. "It's 0K, you can be Muslim, but you have to realise that you come originally from Hindu stock." Obviously the Muslims don't like it. They think, "What you're really saying is that I'm not a Muslim at all, I'm a Hindu" ' Time then to resume Modi's life story where we left off.

He was just eight years old when he attended his first RSS meeting and took the oath to become a bal swayamsevak Or child volunteer.

 It seems fair to assume that the doctrinal niceties Of who was and was not a Hindu were not uppermost in his mind at the time. But signing up to the RSS was no childhood whim, Nor was it just the Indian equivalent of joining the Boy Scouts. He embraced its rigours of 'renunciation, dedication and hard work' with such enthusiasm and conviction that he became estranged even from his own flesh and blood. It is no exaggeration to say that for much Of his adult life the RSS and Hindu nationalism have been his family. On a personal level, Modi has never been known to deviate from the way of life that full-time RSS volunteers and propagandists, known as pracharaks, are expected to adopt, including that trio of supposed virtues: vegetarianism, teetotalism and celibacy. As a teenager, Modi remained wedded to traditional teachings that placed such an emphasis on self- denial and the service of others. He even considered entering the priesthood. It came as something of a shock to him. therefore, when in common with most Indian parents, Modi's mother and father arranged first an engagernent and then a marriage for him. It was only when he came to file his papers as a candidate for the general election that Modi finally confirmed publicly that the wedding had taken place and he was, in fact, still married to a woman by the name Of Jashodaben. Even now, Modi refuses to discuss the marriage, but his brother Sombhai says it was 'only a formal ritual' and was never consummated. Rather than follow his parents' wishes, the teenage Modi left home and started the first Of many long periods Of nomadic wandering across all parts Of India, starting Off with the Himalayas. Mother and all Of us were very worried for him,' Sombhai recalled. 'We had no idea where he had disappeared to. Then, two years later, he just turned up one day.' But when his parents tried to
 bring him together again with his wife, he packed his bag once more and disappeared. By his own account, 'l could fit all my belongings in a small bundle. I kept wandering for forty/forty five years and I spent Over forty years begging for food. This was the non-political side Of an RSS volunteer, seeking spiritual understanding, spreading the word, helping out in communities, and putting 'self last'. In Britain. candidates who have never known a career outside politics are treated with suspicion, and every Once in a while some prominent MP or another will take time off. usually little more than a week or two, to 'listen to the people'. Forty years would seem to be taking that to extremes, but it belies the idea that Modi was convinced from an early age that it was his destiny to drive around in big cars. It's hard to escape the conclusion that there has to be a bit Of spin in play at this stage in his story. He left home at the age of seventeen, and thirty-five years later he was already chief minister, having previously worked as a BJP organiser in both Gujarat and Delhi. The chief minister's residence might have been his first permanent home, and his wanderings
It's hard to escape the conclusion that there has to be a bit Of spin in play at this stage in his Story. He left home at the age of seventeen, and thirty-five years later he was already chief minister. having previously worked as a BJP organiser in both Gujarat and Delhi. The chief minister's residence might have been his first permanent home, and his wanderings and subsequent political work certainly kept him on the move. but it is stretching things more than a little to claim to have been begging for food for forty years or more. Even if allow for a bit Of embellishment, however, it is undoubtedly the case that Modi came to elected politics relatively late in life and that he did so having seen a great deal of the country he would go on to govern, and not from the windows of a speeding motorcade Over this lengthy period of time. Modi proved beyond doubt his dedication to the cause and capacity for self-sacrifice and hard work. Over time that commitment graduated from the mainly social and community work Of the RSS to the political sphere and to the BJP itself. It was here that he showed his true calling as he honed his skills as a party back-room man. skills that he says later helped him plan and execute his own election. until 1978 1 was behind the curtains but over the years I was picking up skills that were required and this made me a master organiser. This meant I had a strong understanding Of what worked and how to plan. While as yet he had no place on the national stage,
 party workers and RSS volunteers from all over the country got to know him or to hear of his reputation, and these people would later be key to his takeover of the leadership. 'Behind the curtains' he might have been, but at one stage he very nearly ended up behind bars. When, following a long period of political unrest, Indira Gandhi suspended democracy in 1975 and declared an Emergency, enabling her to rule by decree, tens of thousands of opposition leaders and activists were imprisoned and the RSS was again banned. Modi narrowly avoided going to jail himself and took to wearing elaborate disguises as he travelled around distributing clandestine propaganda and helping to organise peaceful protests demanding the restoration of democracy. Inevitably it hardened his contempt for Mrs Gandhi and her Congress Party, but it also brought him into contact with activists from other parties outside the narrow world of the Sangh. Writing about his memories of this period on his blog, Modi said: At that time I was a twenty-five-year-old youngster who had recently started working for the RSS but what I witnessed during those dark days remains forever ingrained in my memory. Who can forget the manner in which personal freedom was brutally trampled over?'
That period in his life, he told me, made him more of a democrat. 'l was lucky to work with socialist leaders, I was lucky to work with Islamic organisations, with liberal organisations — so many people. That period was a good period to mould me. Because Of that and the democratic values that I found, it became part Of my DNA. Yes, that was one of the best experiences that I had. I became aware; I understood the constitution, I understood the rights, because before that I was living in a different world,' The Emergency, vfiich lasted for twenty-one months between 1975 and 1977, was the lowest point in Indira Gandhi's career and it taught Modi a great deal about political protest and the essential safeguards of democracy. It pained him greatly that at the lowest point in his own career, a quarter of a century later in 2002, he was accused Of being a demagogue and Of encouraging violent anti-democratic behaviour.

Modi effect 4.0 The story of Modi's rise from humble beginnings to the office of prime minister is, in any case, a fascinating one.

The story of Modi's rise from humble beginnings to the office of prime minister is, in any case, a fascinating one.
 It is interwoven with the complex historical and cultural fabric of India of which he, as a nationalist, is so immensely proud. I have done my best to make the story accessible to those outside India who want to understand the man and the political environment in which he operates. I hope Indian readers will bear with me if sometimes my explanations seem obvious or unnecessary. There is nothing more irritating than the tourist who spends all his time comparing what he sees to life back home, but I'm afraid a little of that is essential in explaining the whirlwind that hit India with such force in the months leading up to Modi's historic victory. Vvhile the western media did, of course, report on the campaign, it was covered with none of the minute detail with which American or British elections are dissected.
 The lasting memories for even a fairly attentive television viewer in the west would have been of a crushing defeat for the Gandhis. a new prime minister who was supposed to be a bit of a right-wing extremist and, Oh, wasn't there something about him selling tea as a boy? A chai wala? Yes, that was it.

The narne Bharatiya Janata Party translates simply as the Indian People's Party. Its motto is •country first, party second, self last'. Yet, from the overwhelming volume of photos, images and slogans that drenched the country in the months running up to the general election of 2014. you could have been forgiven for thinking it was now, 'Modi first. Modi second, Modi last'. It was an unashamedly. some might say shamelessly. presidential campaign, and the issue dominating from day One to the announcement Of the results on 16 May was Modi_ And, in common with all presidential campaigns, his record. his character. and even his upbringing were endlessly raked over. He knew this would happen. It was, as we shall see. a very conscious decision on his part to make it a campaign based almost entirely on his personal capacity to lead the nation in a different direction. And yet, while making himself the issue. he did his best to maintain that he was a man without personal ambition. 'l am a person who never dreamt Of becoming anything,' he told a TV audience as the campaign entered its final stage. •You should always dream of doing something.' He carne from such a poor background. he said, that his mother would have given away free sweets in the village if he had
succeeded even in becoming a schoolteacher. 'It's the blessings of people in a democracy that can decide the future of a person. In a democracy, no one can decide his future. Even today, I have dreams Of doing things but not one dream Of becoming anything. ' Modi is India's great communicator, on a par with Ronald Reagan, but when he does 'self-effacing' he is at his least convincing. He is as egotistical as any politician I have ever met, and his conversation is littered with references to himself in the third person. 'In all comers of the country,' he told me, 'they believed Modi was the only hope and wanted to see him win.' The highly personalised campaign profoundly irritated some of the BJP's grandees, They felt sidelined, which is hardly surprising because they had been. And they believed a myth had been created around Modi, turning him into some kind of all-conquering Superman, able to fly without support. In his defence, much of the hype around him was generated by the genuine passion of his supporters, although he certainly did nothing to discourage it, And when it was all over, he thanked them and the many thousands of party foot soldiers for their help in getting him elected. His most persuasive argument for why it had turned into a 'Vote Modi', rather than Vote BJP', campaign was that the country was crying out for leadership

'Past elections have shown that the Indian culture is such that people have tremendous faith and trust in the individual. People wanted clarity about who the leading person will be and I was seeing this question being asked in every meeting I attended and was hearing vociferous chants, of 'Give us a trusted name not a party name".' Both propositions have the merit Of being true.

I have no doubt Modi took great satisfaction in hearing his name chanted by vast crowds day in and day out and in seeing his carefully crafted image whichever way he looked, And, in a country cynical about party campaign promises, it also happened to be good politics to promote one man as the vanguard of change. TO work, however, it had to be the right man with the right story and a record Of achievement that would stand the test Of scrutiny during a long and bitter contest. In that sense, the result speaks for itself. The Modi brand did more than survive the campaign, it came out of it stronger, toughened not weakened by the attacks of its detractors. But it was not always obvious that Narendra Modi would be an asset rather than a liability to his party

 His opponents. including some within his own party, thought they could use his unusual and sometimes controversial life story to undermine him, but they never succeeded in doing SO. The biggest Own goal Of the campaign came in January 2014, when one Of the Congress Party's leaders decided it was a good idea to refer to Modi's childhood days as a chai wala, or tea vendor, in order to humiliate him (see Chapter Nine). The remark rebounded on a party that was already perceived as elitist and run by a family that had never known what it meant to be poor By contrast, Modi's humble beginnings were an important part Of a narrative that used his own transformation through hard work and dedication to tell a story of what India itself could achieve if it chose to do so. His family with no special privileges, and his refusal to use his position of power to benefit them, was a positive asset on the campaign trail. It showed not only that he understood poverty, but also that he was personally incorruptible.

•In my type Of job,' he told 'you dedicate yourself to your work. We grew up in a joint family with shared responsibilities, and learnt from each other how to live simply and with very little. My mother even today lives in a small eight foot by eight foot room.' According to his biographers, when he was six he would help his father sell tea to passengers whenever a train came into the town station. 'After school Narendra would race to his father's tea stall as if working there was the excitement he had been looking forward to all day long and nothing in the world was more fulfilling than serving tea to railway passengers: "l was in the train compartment, the small boy who used to serve tea, and take the money" As a rule, Modi chooses his words with extreme care. 'l come from a poor family. I have seen poverty,' he said in his Red Fort speech on Independence Day. It is of no great value to argue, as some do, that poverty is relative and millions Of Indians grow up with a lot less to eat and in far worse living conditions than the young Narendra Modi. When he told the country that he detested poverty because he had seen it at first hand, he was telling the truth, and no attempt by his opponents to take
that away from him stood the slightest chance of success.

He was born in September 1950 in the small town Of Vadnagar in the north of the present-day state Of Gujarat. India had gained its independence from Britain just three years previously and Mahatma Gandhi, also a native Of Gujarat, had been assassinated the following year, in January 1948 while Gandhi was born into a comfortably off family of India's merchant caste, Modi was an OBC. or 'Other Backward Class'. Officially OBCs are classified as socially and educationally backward' but they are far from being the lowest Stratum Of society. with many castes. including Dalits, previously known better as 'the untouchables', below them. He was the third Of six children and the family lived in a three-room, single-storey house built Of brick and The most bizarre publication to have been produced by Modi's supporters during the campaign was a 45-page comic book called Bal Narendra — Childhood Stories Of Narendra Modi. It was never officially endorsed and soon vent out of print, but nevertheless it caused quite a stir with its catalogue of larger-than-life deeds of heroism and selflessness by the fearless young boy. By this account he really was too good to be true. He rescues a drowning boy and a trapped bird. swims in crocodile-infested waters. stands up to school bullies. dutifully attends the local temple and cares daily for his siblings and parents. His mother must have adored him. 'He was a perfectionist and liked his clothes clean and crispy So he would always fold them carefully once they were dry,' according to one caption. Gandhi described salt as 'the only condiment Of the poor', and much Of the media choose to take the comic book's claims with a very large pinch Of the Mahatma's favourite additive. The publication did, however, encourage journalists to visit Vadnagar and see how the young Modi was actually remembered by those who knew him; the Times Of India turned up Some fascinating insights. 'Modi's childhood friends are certain that he was destined to make history,' the paper reported. 'Once when we were returning from school, we met an astrologer and showed Our palms to him,' according to Nagji Desai, now a local leader of the Congress Party. We were all keen to know what the future held in store for us. While the astrologer did not say anything great for us, he told Narendrabhai that he would either become a revered saint or a big political leader.

We even started poking fun at Narendrabhai by calling him rajneta (politician).' Another school friend, using the same suffix, bhai (brother'), as a mark of respect, told the paper, 'Narendrabhai would also read Our palms and rue the fact that we had such a bleak future while he was destined to move around in big cars.' As for the crocodile-infested waters, the Times of India says they disappeared from the lake close to where Modi was born decades ago. But they were still there when he was a boy. When asked about swimming with them, Modi denied that by doing so he was misbehaving. •l was brave, not naughty. There was a pond in my village and I loved to swim in that pond. I even had to wash my clothes there. So one day I picked up a crocodile baby and took it home, Later on I even took it to school and my teachers were very upset.' Most Of the time, however, it seems his teachers were satisfied with his behaviour and work record. He was not an exceptional student, but in those days he was a voracious reader. There was early evidence of the theatrical side that has stood him in such good stead in his subsequent political career. Prahlad Patel. who
 was his Sanskrit teacher, told one interviewer he was 'only an average student. But he showed keen interest in debates and theatre. I set up the debating club at the school, and I remember Narendra was among the regular students in the club. Although he would eventually complete a master's degree in political science through a correspondence course at Gujarat University at the age of 33, school failed to keep the attention of a boy who was clearly restless and searching for his role in life. His oldest brother, Sombhai Modi, told the magazine The Caravan: 'Narendra always wanted to do something different. Something more than what we did on a daily routine at home and school.' Modi would later join the National Cadet Corps (NCC), but the organisation which gave his life its true purpose and helped define him, for better or worse, for the rest of his life was the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh_ The RSS had a greater impact than anything else on the character of the man and on the politics of the candidate for prime minister more than forty years later. It is worth putting Modi's life-story on hold briefly in order to understand it better.