Social psychology in our time: from ‘fun and games’ to grown-up scienceMiles Hewstone
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228768.003.0011
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter analyses developments in social psychology during the past fifty years. It discusses progress in the 1960s which expanded the discipline to include the study of basic processes, the application of insights from fundamental social psychology to problems outside the laboratory, and the inclusion of games. It considers five major changes in social psychology including the rise of European social psychology; developments in theory, methods, and statistics; and the perceived relationship between basic and applied research.
Introduction
Social psychology in our lifetimes has encompassed the period since the end of the 1960s in which the discipline blossomed, investigating basic processes and applying insights from fundamental social psychology to problems outside the laboratory. In the following sections we consider specifically five changes in our lifetimes: the rise of European social psychology, developments in theory, methods, and statistics, and the perceived relationship between basic and applied research. Finally, we draw some conclusions, looking forward as well as back.
The content of social psychology: continuity and change
Topics studied within social psychology range from construction of the social world (e.g. attitudes and attributions), through social interaction (e.g. attraction and relationships), to social groups (e.g. group dynamics and intergroup relations), and applied social psychology (e.g. health and organizational psychology). Three new perspectives emerged in our lifetimes: the appearance of social cognition, evolutionary social psychology, and social neuroscience.
Social cognition research is an application of principles of cognitive psychology to the area of social psychology (see Devine et al. 1994). Social psychology has always placed strong emphasis on how individuals internally represent their social environments. Many of our theories have been labelled ‘cognitive’ (e.g. cognitive dissonance), and central concepts of social psychology (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, intentions) are cognitive constructs; social psychologists have also borrowed methods from cognitive psychology to study how social information is encoded and how the information is stored and retrieved from memory. This perspective led to major changes in theory and research on, inter alia, causal attribution, attitudes, and stereotyping.
(p.138) Evolutionary social psychology (e.g. Burnstein and Branigan 2001; Buss and Kenrick 1998) applies evolutionary theory to social psychology. Evolutionary theory explains human behaviours from their reproductive value, that is, in producing offspring during our evolutionary history. Evolutionary psychology makes the basic assumption that if a given behaviour is (a) at least partly genetically determined and (b) increases the probability that an individual will produce offspring, the genes that determine this behaviour will become more prevalent in the gene pool of future generations. Evolutionary social psychologists have made important contributions to the study of interpersonal attraction, helping and cooperation, and aggression.
Social neuroscience studies the neural correlates of social-psychological phenomena (e.g. Cacioppo and Berntson 2005; Ochsner and Lieberman 2001). Such research studies participants' brains with non-invasive techniques while they are processing social information. Experiments have used such techniques to further our understanding of prejudice, for example the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while people are shown race-relevant stimuli under different conditions. Such research has shown that there is a link between social categorization and the amygdala, a structure in the limbic system that has a role in response to stimuli that signal danger or threat. It is important to stress that involvement of biological processes does not imply something fundamental and unchangeable. In fact, social neuroscience emphasizes that social variables can influence biological processes.
The coming of age of European social psychology
Until the beginning of our working lifetimes the dominant approach to social psychology had been the individualistic American approach. Yet, even if some writers have exaggerated the extent to which social psychology is predominantly a North American phenomenon (e.g. Jones 1985; Worchel et al. 1988), the development of social psychology in Europe has been a significant phenomenon. The European perspective is most evident in what Henri Tajfel (1981) called ‘the social dimension’, with a focus on the large-scale social processes and events that shape, and are shaped by, human psychological functioning.
During our careers, scientific development in social psychology has changed from being a one-sided enterprise, with American ideas being adopted in Europe, to a mutual exchange, in which European ideas have also been taken up enthusiastically in the USA. The two most salient examples of European ideas influencing social psychology in the USA are research on intergroup behaviour and on minority influence.
(p.139) Henri Tajfel, at the University of Bristol, developed the ‘minimal group paradigm’ that turned intergroup behaviour into a major research area (see Brown and Brewer 1998; Tajfel et al. 1971). This paradigm offered an easy and economical procedure for the study of intergroup behaviour in the laboratory, and led to the development of the major theory of intergroup relations, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
The second theoretical innovation was research on minority influence. Social influence research in North America had focused exclusively on conformity, that is, on explaining how majorities influence minorities. Serge Moscovici, in Paris, conducted clever studies showing that numerical minorities could influence numerical majorities, and he developed theory to explain why (e.g. Moscovici 1976; Moscovici et al. 1969).
Other notable signs of the maturity of European social psychology included the appearance of the European Journal of Social Psychology in 1970, the European Monographs book series, the European Review of Social Psychology, and textbooks written by Europeans for a specifically European market (e.g. Hewstone et al.2007).
Theoretical developments: continuity, innovation, and lacunae
Pettigrew (1986) contended that, to date, the field has provided only narrow-to middle-range theories that are almost impossible to falsify. These theories, he claimed, lack boldness and hold back the discipline from uncovering new and unexpected facts and problems. Notwithstanding the profusion of mini-theories (illustrated in the index of most textbooks), social psychology has successfully generated broad, substantive theories that have stood the test of time. These include social comparison theory (Festinger 1954), social exchange theory (Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Thibaut and Kelley 1959), and social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979).
One area where work is still needed is the development of broad, integrative, theoretical approaches, as opposed to developing isolated theories each designed to account for a specific and limited topic (see Mackie and Smith 1998). For example, Mackie and Smith stressed that theories and empirical approaches from the domains of attitudes are relevant to the study of intergroup relations, and that theory and research on interpersonal relations can, and should, be integrated with work on intergroup relations.
Notwithstanding theoretical progress and an increasing openness to integration, some potential users of social psychology (e.g. policy-makers) may still be frustrated by our inability to predict exactly when something will happen. (p.140) For example, although theoretical understanding of the causes, correlates, and consequences of intergroup bias has grown impressively (for a review see Hewstone et al. 2002), when asked if we can predict when the next outbreak of, say, genocide or ethnic cleansing, or even inter-racial strife in our cities, will occur we are unable to provide answers. But is this really a cause for embarrassment? According to the philosophers Gorovitz and MacIntyre (1976), we may be asking science, in this case social psychology, to do more than it is capable of, when asking it to move beyond explaining ‘how things generally behave’ to predicting ‘how exactly a particular thing will behave’ (see Gawande 2003). Social psychology should no more be expected precisely to predict outbursts of collective violence than modern medicine should be to say exactly when an individual who is at risk of, say, breast cancer will develop the condition.
Research methods: crisis, what crisis?
According to its critics, social psychology in the 1960s and 1970s had stumbled into a ‘crisis’ about its goals, methods, and accomplishments. Two prominent papers were published in 1967 and 1973.
First, Ring (1967) contrasted the vision of Kurt Lewin (1951) of a social psychology that would contribute to the solution of important social problems with what he called the ‘fun and games’ attitude of the social psychology of his days. He lambasted the overemphasis on ‘clever’ experimentation, ‘exotic’ topics, and ‘zany’ manipulations (Ring 1967, pp. 116–17).
Second, Gergen (1973) questioned the very scientific value of social psychology. His two most important arguments were (1) that knowledge of social-psychological principles could change our behaviour in ways that would negate these principles and (2) that because the basic motives assumed by many of our theories are unlikely to be genetically determined they might be affected by cultural change. Gergen saw these problems as the main reason why, as he claimed, social-psychological research often failed to be replicable, and hence did not result in a body of cumulative knowledge.
How was the crisis overcome? We mention just two developments initiated within mainstream social psychology which, over the years, helped to alleviate some of the problems highlighted by these critics. First, social psychologists began to demonstrate their ability to contribute to the solution of real-life problems by developing several applied areas, which contributed to resolving important societal problems (e.g. social-psychological contributions to health psychology; see Stroebe 2001).
Second, meta-analytic procedures allowing statistical integration of the results of independent studies of the same phenomenon demonstrated the reliability of findings across many independent investigations (see Johnson and Eagly 2000). The increasing use of meta-analysis in social psychology has (p.141) shown that many social-psychological claims have, in fact, been confirmed over multiple studies, often conducted in different countries over many decades. This accumulation of evidence contradicts Gergen's claim.
Although social psychology has done well to slough off the ‘fun-and-games’ tag, the demise of highly involving ‘impact’ experiments is a cause for some regret. Perhaps it is necessary to create high-impact situations to study some important phenomena (Goethals 2003). Generally, there has been a huge increase in the use of ‘judgement experiments’ (Aronson et al. 1985), in which the participant is typically asked to classify, remember, or evaluate stimulus materials of a putative social nature presented by an experimenter.
It is important to emphasize, too, that many of the classic studies that might appear to be ‘fun and games’ were designed specifically to test a theory, had a deeply serious message, stimulated significant theorizing and further research, and/or have yielded applications. Examples include studies of the impact of the mere presence of others on performance (Markus 1978), and of group size on individual performance (e.g. Latané et al. 1979).
Whether in the form of impact or judgement experiments, experimentation remains the dominant research method in social psychology because it is the method best suited to testing theory rather than merely describing the world as it is. It permits researchers a great degree of control over possible random variation and, even more advantageously, allows them to assign research participants at random to experimental conditions. To its proponents, laboratory experimentation, allied to probabilistic statistics, has led to the discovery of reliable, counterintuitive effects, often specified in the form of an interaction between manipulated variables.
This is not to argue, however, that the experiment is the sole method of social psychology. Far from it. In fact, one of the great benefits of social psychology is its rich array of methods, including field studies, natural experiments, field experiments, natural groups in the laboratory, artificial groups in the laboratory, diary studies, and surveys. A frequent criticism of a unique reliance on laboratory experimentation, with undergraduate students as participants (see Sears 1986), is, however, that such research is unlikely to yield generalizable results (see Taylor 1998).1 As Aronson et al. (1985) argued, all experiments should be conducted in a variety of settings, (p.142) and hypotheses should be tested in both the laboratory and the field. They refer to the interplay between laboratory and field experimentation as ‘programmatic research’, a research programme that capitalizes on the advantages of each approach.
This proposed solution is best understood in terms of the distinction between internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to the confidence with which one can draw cause-and-effect conclusions from research results; external validity refers to the extent to which a causal relationship, once identified in a particular setting with particular participants, can be generalized to other times, places, and people. Ideally, it is argued, we should use many different experimental and non-experimental procedures to explore the same conceptual relationship, thus replacing the profusion of single, isolated studies with systematic, conceptual replications.
Although this advice is sound, it is typically based on the assumption that if findings have been replicated with different types of people and different methodologies they can be generalized to all types of people and all types of situation (i.e. have external validity). This assumption is based on murky epistemological reasoning. Our theories usually state that a given causal relationship applies to all people at all times. Yet our experiments test it only under very specific conditions. The notion that external validity can ever be established is an inductivist fallacy (Gadenne 1976)—the fact that the only swans we have ever seen are white does not exclude the possible existence of black swans (Popper 1968). Intersecting evidence from multiple methods, and conducting conceptual replications under a wide variety of conditions, increases our trust in the validity of the general assumptions made by our theories, but we can never be sure. None the less, the pursuit of external validity is a goal to which we should aspire.
Statistical sophistication: distinguishing mediating from moderating variables
An analysis of publication trends in our leading journals some years after the so-called crisis reported that, since 1968, published articles in the flagship Journal of Personality and Social Psychology had, inter alia, become longer, reported research based on more studies, used more participants per study, and used more complex statistical methods (Reis and Stiller 1992; see Berscheid 1992).
There was a time when main effects and interactions were sufficient, perhaps supplemented by internal analysis of simple correlations. But a significant trend is for studies to move—and editors/reviewers insist that authors (p.143) move—a step further and identify the underlying psychological variables that bring about an effect, that is, the mediating variables. Although analyses of mediating variables had also been conducted earlier (e.g. Insko et al. 1973), the practice had been rare and the publication of an important paper by Baron and Kenny (1986) certainly accelerated this trend.
Baron and Kenny (1986) explain that mediator variables address ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions. (For example, how or why does exposure to ‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ arguments produce greater attitude change? Answer: because it increases the number of message-congruent thoughts, which produces the attitude change; see Petty and Cacioppo 1986). With the fairly recent development of structural equation modelling techniques and widely available packages for analyses, the search for mediating variables has also been pursued in correlational-survey, as well as experimental, research.
Baron and Kenny (1986) distinguished between mediator and moderator variables, and demonstrated the importance of this distinction for the field of social psychology. Moderator variables address ‘when’ questions. (For example, when does contact between members of different groups lead to an improvement in outgroup attitudes? Answer: when members of the two groups remain aware of respective group memberships; see Brown and Hewstone 2005). Moderation implies that the level of a third variable can change the relationship between the other two variables—and the explication of moderators has become central to any conclusive meta-analysis; for example, see masterly meta-analyses of the literatures on minority influence and intergroup contact, respectively, by Wood et al. (1994) and Pettigrew and Tropp (2006). In contrast, mediation implies that a third variable (typically a process) can be identified which is responsible for the relationship between two variables. The distinction between mediation and moderation matters, as Baron and Kenny explain, because it has implications for our choice of experimental designs, research options, and planned statistical analyses. We note, too, that it has affected the theories we develop, and has led to far more sophisticated and conclusive tests of theoretical propositions (for more recent developments, see Muller et al. 2005; Wegener and Fabrigar 2000).
To some readers of the social-psychological literature we can imagine that such developments have become a source of frustration. The discovery of a new effect, with all its attendant excitement, has been, to some extent, replaced with the less exciting, but painstaking explication of limiting conditions, perhaps even conditions under which the opposite to the original effect is found, and the sometimes frustrating search for mediators. But we take this development from ‘it is’ to ‘it depends’ as an indicator of the increased methodological sophistication of our discipline.
(p.144) Basic and applied research: from separation to symbiosis
The great mathematician Euclid apparently believed in the search for mathematical truth for its own sake, and did not look for applications in his work. One story tells of a student who questioned him about the use of the mathematics he was learning. Upon completing the lesson, Euclid turned to his slave and said, ‘Give the boy a penny since he desires to profit from all that he learns’ (Singh 1997, p. 49). He then dismissed the student from the class.
We do not wish to argue for the sanctity of basic research, nor indeed that all research must have applications, but the relationship between basic and applied research is critical and our period of review has seen significant changes in it. Notably, reduced funding for basic research and increased funding for research applied to specific social problems (e.g. AIDS, terrorism) has helped to break down ‘the wall between basic and applied research’ (Berscheid 1992, p. 532).
According to Jonas and Lebherz (2007), whereas basic research develops and tests theories that explain relationships between social constructs, applied social psychology centres around a social problem and searches for solutions to this problem, We need, however, sound theories in order to derive sound hypotheses about how to intervene in a real-world problem.
Jonas and Lebherz argue that tackling real-world problems profits from basic research, because it uses theories, paradigms, and concepts from basic research, as well as its results, to guide the search for solutions. They contend, however, that successful application can also improve basic research and theory. Empirical confirmation in a real-world setting increases our confidence in the predictive power of that theory, whereas disconfirmation often shows us ways to improve the theory and thus promotes theoretical advancement. Improved theories will, in turn, enable us to suggest better solutions for change, when faced with future practical problems. Thus, basic and applied social psychology should not be viewed and implemented separately, but in a way that promotes the advancement of both.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have tried to give a sense of the progress made and to show that social psychology today is an exciting and thriving enterprise, which has made a unique contribution to the social and behavioural sciences. There have been significant developments in both theory and research methodology, and social psychologists are applying the understanding they have gained from their study of fundamental cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes (p.145) to the solution of real-life problems. We are proud of the progress social psychologists have made during our working lifetimes, replacing speculation with sophisticated theory-guided empirical research. Of course, there remains room for improvement. We end by mentioning, briefly, some limitations of the journal publication process, the apparent illegitimacy of social psychology in the eyes of some other psychologists, and the remaining room for improvement in social-psychological research.
As scholars with decades of experience as journal editors we are committed to the peer review process, and happily acknowledge the improvements many reviewers and editors have made to our work. However, even though the quality of published research has improved against objective criteria (Reis and Stiller 1992), there remains room for improvement. Our review process is too slow, too pedantic, and many of our editors rely on too many reviewers' opinions. We are particularly frustrated at the editorial practice of selecting, say, three reviewers for the first version of a paper (based on which the authors then make revisions), and then the addition of some new reviewers (with often quite different opinions) to read the revision. The graph of manuscript improvement against number of revisions is one of diminishing returns; the initial improvements, we submit, are often huge, but the subsequent improvements are often quite minor—if indeed they are improvements. We enjoin editors (ourselves included) to remember that the article before them is written by the author and not the editor, and that the correlation between different reviewers is usually rather small (Daniel 1993). Finally, they should value innovation, ideas, and heuristic value, as well as perfect methodology.
Of course, these multiple revisions also increase the publication lag.2 If we work as we should, at least some of the time, on important social problems, then we should be doing all we can to speed publication. Would we allow papers on new cancer drugs to languish so long in the editorial doldrums? The development of e-first publishing has helped (adopted in our own journal, the European Review of Social Psychology), but we call upon publishers, professional organizations, and editors to work towards leaner, faster dissemination.
What is the contemporary status of social psychology within the discipline as a whole? Berscheid (1992) argued that there had been an increase in status over the past quarter of a century. We agree, but we are not quite so sanguine. There still seems to be the whiff of illegitimacy about social psychology, (p.146) and many of our colleagues in other areas seem to feel it is an area of which they can afford to remain ignorant.
This reaction from other fields of psychology seems all the more remarkable, given what we can contribute to the study of significant social issues and societal problems: aggression and media violence, health promotion and AIDS, defeating the problem of prejudice, and so on. But are we, to some extent, to blame for the way we continue to conduct much of the research in the area? The tendency of social psychologists slavishly to emulate natural science techniques has led to the charge of irrelevance. No less an authority than Gordon Allport concluded that ‘many contemporary studies seem to shed light on nothing more than a narrow phenomenon studied under specific conditions…some current investigations seem to end up in elegantly polished triviality – snippets of empiricism, but nothing more’ (Allport 1968, p. 68). Another sage observer of the field, Dorwin Cartwright, opined that: ‘impressive gains in technical competence have been…something of a mixed blessing, for the fascination with technique seems all too often to have replaced a concern for substantive significance’ (Cartwright 1979, p. 87). These critiques are, sadly, still relevant today, and threaten the potential impact of our research findings.
So, social psychology is still some way from being August Compte's ultimate discipline, the ‘true final science’ beyond sociology (Goethals 2003). To get anywhere close to that goal, social psychology will have to develop even further. Far too much research is still conducted, in Henri Tajfel's (1981) phrase, ‘in a social vacuum’. We need to follow Pettigrew's (1981) vision of a contextual social psychology, paying attention to individual factors in the context of macrostructural factors, using simultaneously individual and social variables in both theory and research.
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