India: The Years of Indira Gandhi

edited by Yogendra Kumar Malik, Dhirendra Kumar Vajpeyi
WHEN WESTERNERS THINK OF INDIA, they frequently think of too many people and too little food. This stereotype of an over-populated nation struggling to feed itself is—like all stereotypes—overly simplistic and misleading. However,—again like all stereotypes—there is a grain of truth to it. In 1947, the population of India was 344 million. In 1985, the population was slightly over 762 million, more than doubling since Independence. A population increase of this magnitude poses serious problems for a nation attempting to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Indeed, M. S. Patwardin commenting on the Seventh Five-Year Plan, claimed that "population management. ...is the Achilles heel of our economy" (1984:93). Is this in fact true? Just how serious is the population problem of India, and how effective has the family planning campaign been?

Background Malthus' famous dictum that population, when unchecked, increases geometrically while susbsistence increases only arithmetically was not totally accurate (Tierney 1986). Nevertheless, it is true that population and sub- sistence are intimately related and that if population increases more rapidly
In general, population size is a result of a mixture of fertility, mortality and migration. There is little doubt that India's current situation is due primarily to a significant decrease in mortality rather than a major increase in fertility (migration has played a minimal role for India as a whole, but has been a factor in some regions, notably Kerala and Punjab). In 1911, the crude birth rate and the crude death rate were nearly identical with the birth rate number- ing 49.2 births per thousand while the death rate was 42.6 deaths per thou- sand. However, the ratio is no longer similar. In 1983, the crude birth rate was 34 per thousand, whereas the crude death rate had declined dramatically to only 13 per thousand indicating a significant difference between fertility and mortality. Census figures reflect the results of this process. In 1941, the population of Indi h oulatio oorte a a
However accurate the figures are, it remains obvious that India has experienced rapid population growth. It is entirely likely that the death rate in India will continue to decline thereby itensifying the pressures on the available food supply unless it is matched by a similar decline in the birth rate or a significant increase in the food supply. India has done remarkably well toward her goals of economic self-sufficiency and industrial development. Nevertheless, "to the extent that the rapid population growth is likely to hinder India's development efforts, the success of economic development in India is intimately connected with her success in controlling population growth through reduction in fertility to catch up with the declining mortality" (Rele 1978:79). In short, to most observers, successful family planning efforts appear to be essential to the welfare of the Indian nation. The negative relationship between a large population size and develop- ment has long been recognized in India. It was the belief that India's popula- tion growth was endangering her ability to feed herself—and thus, her ability to pursue efforts at development—that led to the adoption of the nation's first family planning efforts. In 1952 India became the first nation in the world to adopt an official program designed to reduce fertility. The initial attempts to control fertility were tentative at best. The first Five-Year Plan allocated only six and a half million rupees to family planning (0.03% of the total allocation for development) and less than one and a half million rupees were actually spent (Visaria and Visaria, 1981:36).  Most of the funds were spent doing surveys, training analysts and family planning workers and opening approximately two thousand clinics throughout India. The efforts directed specifically at reducing fertility were primarily aimed at providing advice on the rhythm method. From this modest beginning, the budgetary allocations specified for family planning programs have been steadily increased (Table 1). However, even though the total amount of rupees allocated to family planning has been increased during each planning period, the importance of family planning to the overall development efforts of India is reflected in the fact that the Percentage allocation has actually been decreased during the past decade and a half. Jain (1985:184) points out that 2.0 percent of the public sector outlay was provided for family planning during the Fourth Five-Year Plan. This was reduced to 1.3 percent during the Fifth Five-Year Plan, and again to 1.0 percent during the Sixth Plan. Similarl Dutt concludes that although the budget for famil la


Such activities—introduced as they were shortly after Mrs. Gandhi became Prime Minister—give the appearance that with all of the other prob- lems she had to face, Mrs. Gandhi still dedicated considerable effort toward reducing population. As attractive as this scenario is for her supporters, most of her detractors present an entirely different picture. It is probably the case that Mrs. Gandhi was not directly responsible for many (if any) of the family planning programs begun during her early years in office. Critics of India's family planning efforts during the mid-sixties and early seventies put the blame squarely on the shoulders of Indira Gandhi for her failure to show .a suffi- ciently constant, dynamic out-front kind of urgency in behalf of family plan- ning. It was usually remarked that she had nothing like the same record on this subject, for example, as had President Ayub in Pakistan" (Lewis 1970:22). Charges that Mrs, Gandhi failed to give adequate attention to family planning are supported by the fact that family planning was not even listed as a political objective of the Congress party until its Chandigarh session in 1975 (Gulati 1978:426).

During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly apparent that population was a problem incapable of being solved without con- certed effort. Dr. Karan Singh, the Minister of Health and Family Planning from 1973 through March of 1977, claimed, early in his tenure, that it was necessary to launch a crash program for reducing fertility. "l want a breakthrough equivalent to the explosion of the nuclear device" he told Indian scientists during his last few years in office (Halli, 1983:431). Yet the central government, under the direction of Indira Gandhi, remained somewhat hesitant. The state of Kerala, on the other hand, initiated a bold program aimed at reducing fertility within its borders. In 1971, the first mass vasectomy camps—in which those who came in for a vasectomy were paid about Rs. 100—were established. Kerala is internationally famous for its success in lowering fertility (as well as general and infant mortality) in a low-income population. The state's birth rate plunged from an estimated 37 per 1,000 population in 1966 to 25 in 1978 (Visaria and Visaria 1981:23).


jnrant mortantY) tn a low-income popmauo ane state s n rate plung estimated 37 per 1,000 population in 1966 to 25 in 1978 (Visaria and Visaria 1981:23). Although many factors appear responsible for this dramatic decline— including the fact that Kerala had attained nearly universal education—the establishment of mass vasectomy camps had to have contributed to the state's decreased fertility rate. More importantly, the camps were viewed elsewhere in India as a possible "quick fix" to the population problem. Similar camps were established by other states during the next few years and they were even promoted by the central government. The year after Kerala began its experiment with mass vasectomies, the central government passed the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act. With this act, "abortion was legalized on the grounds of health and contraceptive failure" (Jain 1985:185). Although the government eschewed abortion on

demand and chose rather to emphasize abortion for health reasons, nearly two million abortions were performed in government hospitals and health centers during the next eight years (Government of India, 1980:17). There is little doubt this figure could have been much higher if the government had made a concerted effort to expand the availability of abortions. Because the govern- ment hospitals and the other health centers capable of performing abortions were concentrated almost exclusively in India's cities and large towns, those women living in rural India had little opportunity to avail themselves of the services offered. The tentative nature of the abortion program reflects the political will of the government at this time. It appears that fertility reduction was simply not a major goal of the Gandhi government during the early 1970s. The govern- ment had begun many programs and had promoted a wide array of family planning measures, but had yet to do so vigorously. All measures reflected a degree of timidity. The adoption of the pill is a good case in point: Despite more than a decade of worldwide experience with the pill in developing as well as

Despite more than a decade of worldwide experience with the pill in developing as well as developed countries, the Indian government for a long time forbade and then discouraged its widespread distribution on the grounds that it had not been proved safe for use by Indian women. Until 1974, it was available only in selected centers in pilot projects. In 1974, it became available on doctor's prescription, with the government subsidizing its distribution through postpartum programs and in family planning centers (Landmann 1977:101). Thus, a few cautious strides in dealing with population control were made during Mrs. Gandhi's early years as the political leader of India. However, ten years after Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister, the tentative nature of the family planning program was dramatically overturned. The Emergency Indira Gandhi declared emergency rule on June 25, 1975. The precise reasons for this action are beyond the scope of this article, but there can be little

rule. Many scholars have commented on the relationship between emergency rule and population policy (Cassen, 1978; Hedderson, 1984; and Minkler, 1977). One of the most thorough of these efforts was that of Davidson Gwatkin (1979) who documented an impressive array of policies designed to encourage and compel large-scale sterilization efforts. Following Gwatkin, it is clear that the declaration of the emergency had little to do with population policy. Mrs. Gandhi's comprehensive twenty-point program, announced shortly after the imposition of emergency rule, failed to mention family planning. Rather, it was the rapid rise to power of her son San- jay that provided the sudden burst of activity in the area of sterilization. Sanjay Gandhi's five-point program—although unofficial—was one of the first statements of "national" policy in the emergency period that specifically adressed the need to reduce fertility in India. Although Sanjay was not

authorized to formulate national policy, his position as Mrs. Gandhi's heir apparent in addition to his control of the Indian Youth Congress, endowed him with sufficient political power to influence the establishment of policy, both at the national and state levels. The national platform of the Indian Youth Congress reflected Sanjay's concern with the population problem when it called for " ..no more delay in checking the growth of population since the demographic deluge is already fast closing in on us..." but it was Sanjay's persistence both in numerous public speeches and in influential private conversations with national and regional leaders that Gwatkin sees as providing the pressure to increase sterilization targets and to implement more vigorously existing efforts to reduce fertility. According to Gwatkin, ' 'such behavior constituted a vastly greater emphasis on family planning than ever before demonstrated by a top-level political leader, and it came at a time then the concerns of India's top-level political leaders carried vastly more weight than ever before" (1979:35). Although the government of India never officially approved of the use of coerci

Although the government of India never officially approved of the use of coercion, it was soon apparent that Sanjay's commitment to reduce the rate Of population growth quickly, met with the approval of his mother. His efforts thus became unofficially sanctioned by the highest levels of government, and administrators and civil servants in all lower echelons became aware—at times painfully aware—that Sanjay's word on family planning was law. Suddenly, the need to curb population growth in India became a matter of urgency, and government functionaries at all levels competed with each other to see who could do the most in the shortest possible time. However, since there was little coordinated central leadership, many of these efforts lacked effective methods Of implementation. This frenetic but ineffective state of affairs stimulated the central government to formulate a new population policy. In mid-April, 1976, the Central Ministry of Health and Family Planning issued a formal statement Of national policy that was to transform India from what Gunnar Myrdal called a "soft state" (1968:66) into a nation with an almost single-minded dedication to reduce the

The new policy was designed to reduce poverty, raise the age of marriage, Improve the rate of female literacy, increase the amount of compensation for sterilization and initiate a variety of other measures designed to stimulate state governments to adopt compulsory sterilization legislation. According to Gwatkin (1979:38): State and local bodies were also unprecedentedly active, suggesting and adopting hundreds of relevant measures. The incentives included both the positive (e.g., Andhra Pradesh's decision that government employees undergoing sterilization would get a raise) and the negative (Himachal Pradesh 'swithdrawel of maternity leave for female employees after the first two births). The negative incentives ranged from the seemingly mild (West Bengal's refusal to cover government servants' leave travel costs for more than two children) to the distressingly cruel (Bihar's denial of public food rations to families with three children). Some were directed toward the general public (Orissa's granting of government loans only to sterilized persons or people with small families); others affected only government servants (Rajasthan's rule that no one having more than three children would be eligible for

a government job unless sterilized). Many affected individuals directly; others were on a community basis (Madhya Pradesh 's granting of irrigation water at subsidized rates to all persons from villages producing specified numbers of sterilization patients). Some ordered government servants themselves to be sterilized or lose certain benefits (Uttar Pradesh's order to teachers to be sterilized or forfeit a month's salary); others instructed government employees to have others sterilized or face penalties (Uttar Pradesh's decision to withhold the pay of family planning and health department workers who failed to produce the specified number of acceptors). Most drastic was the legislation enacted by the Maharashtra State government in August 1976, calling for the compulsory sterilization of couples with three or more children. During this same period of time, Mrs. Gandhi's government was able to pass a constitutional amendment which permitted the central government directly to pass population control and family planning laws (prior to this amendment, only the states could pass such laws while the central government financed their implementation). However, as the above citation indicates, many initiatives still emerged from the states. Not all of these policies were 

The results of what has been called "the most aggressive, if short-lived, family planning drive in world history" (Visaria and Visaria 1981:38) were uneven. The sterilization campaign was carried out far more intensely in the northern "Hindi heartland" than elsewhere in India. According to most reports, the primary reason for this was that Sanjay Gandhi had a much stronger political base in this area than elsewhere and was able to bring con- siderable personal pressure to bear on all government agencies. Sterilization became a central concern not only of the Central Ministry of Health and Family Planning, but of departments and agencies never before involved in family planning. As the message filtered down through the various levels of the Indian bureaucracy, nearly every government employee became responsible for meeting the sterilization targets. This was especially true in the Hindi- speaking areas. The vigor with which the sterilization campaign was pursued resulted in several documented cases of coercion, harassment, and forced compliance.
village in Haryana is a case in point. Uttawar's council had led a resistance movement against the sterilization drive and, in an attempt to make an exam- ple of the village: At 3 a.m. on November 6, the villagers were shaken from their sleep by loudspeakers ordering the menfolk—all above 15—to assemble at the bus-stop on the main Nur-HodoI road. When they emerged, they found the whole village surrounded by the police. With the menfolk on the road, the police went into the village to see if anyone was hiding... As the villagers tell it, the men on the road were sorted out into eligible cases. ..and about 400 were taken to various thanas (headquarters towns), most to Palwal. Many had cases registered against them—a large number for alleged possession of illicit arms but most on

Although the events at Uttawar represent an extreme example of coercive sterilization, it is not an isolated example. The Shah Commision of Inquiry later investigated many of the alleged violations and found numerous incidents in which unmarried people were sterilized and identified nearly 2000 deaths which occurred as a direct result of strerilization operations (Visaria and Visaria 1981:39). Other atrocities were also reported (Djurfeldt and Lindberg, 1980 and Banerji, 1980). Certainly, rumors of strong-arm tactics and abuses were more prevalent than were actual cases of atrocities. Whatever the facts, it is true that millions of Indians felt threatened by the aggressive sterilization drive of Mrs. Gandhi's government under emergency rule. Consequently, when Mrs. Gandhi sur- prised the nation by relaxing emergency rule in mid-January 1977 and called for elections, those same millions reacted by voting for the opposition. Although many things contributed to her defeat, there can be no doubt that the sterilization drive—sponsored and aggressively promoted by her son Sanj Mar
The Aftermath of the Emergency When the Janata Party assumed control of the government and installed Moraji Desai as the Prime Minister, its leaders realized that the sterilization drive was—at least in part—responsible for their victory. Thus they turned away from a program based on a high degree of compulsion and began to emphasize voluntarism. They changed the name of the Department of Family Planning to the Department of Family Welfare to emphasize the separation of their policies from those of the Gandhi regime and to stress their concern for "the total welfare of the family. " Partly as a result of government inaction and partly as a result of the popular backlash against the sterilization drive, the number of acceptors of all forms of birth control fell sharply in 1977. As the situation became increasingly critical, Mr. Desai's government increased its efforts to revitalize family planning in India. As a result, there was a gradual increase in the number of acceptors and, by the time the Janata Party lost the next election in January, 1980, the figures had returned to the pre-emergency level

When Indira Gandhi was returned to office, she was, despite her over- whelming margin of victory, naturally hesitant to resume the policies that had contributed to her earlier loss. Hence, she once again approached family plan- ning somewhat tentatively. Although she attempted to revitalize the program by creating a larger force to spread a small-family message throughout the nation and by reinstituting the policy that family planning was to be a central

little and too much political will. As a result, India's population has grown enormously. However, as calamitous as this at first seems, it must be pointed out that during this same period of time, India has gone from being dependent on grain imports, to being self-sufficient in grain productivity, to being a grain exporter. The stereotype of India as an over-populated nation struggling to feed itself is even less accurate now than it was twenty years ago! Table 3 indicates in very broad terms how the growth of India's agricultural productivity has outstripped her population growth.


tility rate for India is slowly, but steadily declining! In 1975, the fertility rate was 5.7; in 1980, it was 4.9; and in 1983, the rate had dropped to 4.8. There is every reason to believe the dual tendency to increase resource availability and decrease fertility will continue in India into the foreseeable future. Does this mean that India has nothing to worry about concerning its still- expanding population? Probably not. It does mean, however, that the picture is less bleak than many of the doomsayers would have us believe. The inchoate family planning policies of Mrs. Gandhi's government were not very effective, but neither did they portend future disaster. There is no escaping the fact that all of the optimistic economic and social indices mentioned above would be far more impressive if the family planning efforts of the Indian government had been more effective. There is also no escaping the fact that the present situation in India is somewhat precarious and may be uset by an expansion of the cur- rent drought or by food shortages similar to those of 1965 and 1967. Never- theless, the simple fact is that more people are living longer and are better fed