psycomythology.part 1

GREAT MYTHS OF POPULAR PSYCHOLOGY Shattering Widespread Misconceptions about Human Behavior Scott O. Lilienfeld Steven Jay Lynn John Ruscio Barry L. Beyerstein

About the Authors Scott O. Lilienfeld is a Professor of Psychology at Emory University in Atlanta. Author of over 200 journal articles, chapters, and books, he is a recipient of the 1998 David Shakow Early Career Award for Distinguished Contributions to Clinical Psychology from Division 12 (Society for Clinical Psychology) of the American Psychological Association (APA). He is a past president of the Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology and a Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science. He is editor of die Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice. Dr. Lilienfeld principal areas of research are personality disorders, psychiatric classification and diagnosis, pseudoscience in mental health, and the teaching of psychology. Steven Jay Lynn is a Professor of Psychology and Director of the Psychological Clinic at the State University of New York at Binghamton. Dr. Lynn serves on 11 editorial boards. and he has 270 scholarly publications, including 16 books. He is past President of APA's Division of Psychological Hypnosis, and he has been the recipient of the Chancellor's Award of the State University of New York for Scholarship and Creative Activities. He is a fellow of the APA and the Association for Psychological Science, and his research has been funded by the National Institute of Mental Health. His major areas of research include hypnosis, memory, fantasy, and dissociation. John Ruscio is an Associate Professor of Psychology at The College of New Jersey. His scholarly interests include quantitative methods for psychological research and the characteristics of pseudoscience that distinguish subjects within and beyond the fringes of psychological science. He has published more than 50 articles, chapters, and books, including Critical Thinking in Psychology: Separating Sense from Nonsense; serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Psychological Assessment; and is an associate editor at die Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice. The late Barry L. Beyerstein was Professor of Psychology at Simon Fraser University and chair of the British Columbia Skeptics Society. He was co-editor of The Write Stuff (1992), Associate Editor of the Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine, and co-authored many articles in the Skeptical Inquirer and professional journals. Dr. Beyerstein was a member of the Advisory Board of the Drug Policy Foundation (Washington, DC) and a founding board member of the Canadian Foundation for Drug Policy (Ottawa, Ontario).


PREFACE Psychology is all around us. Youth and old age, forgetting and remember ing, sleeping and dreaming, love and hate, happiness and sadness, mental illness and psychotherapy for good, bad, and often both, this is the stuff of our daily lives. Virtually every day, the news media, television shows and films, and the Internet bombard us with claims regarding a host of psychological topics—brain functioning, psychics, out-of-body experiences, recovered memories, polygraph testing, romantic relation ships, parenting, child sexual abuse, mental disorders, real crime, and psychotherapy, to name merely a few. Even a casual stroll through our neighborhood bookstore reveals at least dozens, and often hundreds, of self-help, relationship, recovery, and addiction books that serve up generous portions of advice for steering our path along life's rocky road. Of course, for those who prefer their psychological advice for free, there' s no end of it on the Web. In countless ways, the popular psychology indus ry shapes the landscape of the early 21st century world. Yet to a surprising extent, much of what we believe to be true about psychology isn't. Although scores of popular psychology sources are readily available in bookstores and at our fingertips online, they're rife with myths and misconceptions. Indeed, in today's fast-paced world of information overload, misinformation about psychology is at least as widespread as accurate information. Unfortunately, precious few books are available to assist us with the challenging task of distinguishing fact from fiction in popular psychology. As a consequence, we often find ourselves at the mercy of self-help gurus, television talk show hosts, and radio self-proclaimed mental health experts, many of whom dispense psychological advice that's a confusing mix of truths, half-truths, and outright falsehoods. Without a dependable tour guide for sorting out psychological myth from reality, we're at risk for becoming lost in a jungle of misconceptions. Many of the great myths of popular psychology not only mislead us about human nature, but can also lead us to make unwise decisions in our everyday lives. Those of us who believe erroneously that people typically repress the memories of painful experiences (see Myth #13) may spend much of our lives in a fruitless attempt to dredge up memories of childhood traumatic events that never happened; those of us who believe that happiness is determined mostly by our external circumstances (see Myth #24) may focus exclusively outside rather than inside of ourselves to find the perfect "formula" for long-term satisfaction; and those of us who believe erroneously that opposites attract in romantic relationships (see Myth #27) may spend years searching for a soulmate whose per sonalities and values differ sharply from ours—only to discover too late that such "matches" seldom work well. Myths matter. As science educator David Hammer (1996) noted, scientific miscon ceptions possess four major properties. They (1) are stable and often strongly held beliefs about the world, (2) are contradicted by well-established evidence, (3) influence how people understand the world, and (4) must be corrected to achieve accurate knowledge (Stover & Saunders, 2000). For our purposes, the last point is especially crucial. In our view, mythbusting should be an essential component of psychology education, because deeply entrenched beliefs in psychological miscon ceptions can impede students' understanding of human nature. There are numerous dictionary definitions of the word "myth," but the ones that best suit  our purposes derive from the American Heritage Dictionary (OAO(_)): ' 'é popular [but false] belief or story that has become associated with a person, institution, or occurrence" or "a fiction or half-truth, especially one that part of an



There are numerous dictionary definitions of the word "myth," but the ones that best suit our purposes derive from the American Heritage Dictionary (2000): popular [but false] belief or story that has become associated with a person, institution, or occurrence" or "a fiction or half-truth, especially one that forms part of ar ideology." Most of the myths we present in this book are widely held beliefs that blatantly contradict psychological research. Others are exaggerations or distortion: of claims that contain a kernel of truth. Either way, most of the myths we address in this book can seem so compelling because they fit into a broader view of h nature that many people find plausible. For example, the false belief that we use only of our brain power (see Myth #1) dovetails with the belief that many o us haven' t fully realized our intellectual potential; and the false belief that low self-esteem is a major cause of maladjustment (see Myth #33) fits with the belief tha we can achieve just about anything if we believe in ourselves. Many psychological myths are also understandable efforts to make sense out of our worlds. As German sociologist and philosopher of science Klaus Manhar (2005) observed, throughout history myths have served a central function: attempting to explain the otherwise inexplicable. Indeed, many of the myths we discuss 11 this book, like the belief that dreams have been shown to possess symbolic meaning (see Myth #20), are efforts to grapple with some of life's perennial mysteries, 11 this case the under lying significance of our nighttime mental worlds. Our book is the first to survey the full landscape of modern popular psychology, and to place common psychological misconceptions under the microscope o scientific evidence. By doing so, we hope to both dis pel prevalent but false beliefs and arm readers with accurate knowledge that they can use to make better real world decisions. Our tone is infor mal, engaging, and at times irreverent. We've made particular efforts to make our book accessible to beginning students anc laypersons, and we presume no formal knowledge of psychology. To do so, we've kept nontechnical language to a minimum. As a consequence, this book can enjoyed equally by specialists and nonspecialists alike. We begin the book by surveying the vast world of popular psychology, the dangers posed by psychological myths, and 10 major sources of these myths. Then, 11 the body of the book, we examine 50 widespread myths of popular psychology. For each myth, we discuss its prevalence in the general population, illustratiu examples from the wide world of popu lar psychology, its potential origins, and the research evidence bearing on it. Although one of our main goals is mythbusting we go well beyond merely debunking myths. For each myth, we also discuss what we know to be true regarding each topic, thereby imparting genuine psychol( gical knowledge that readers can take with them and apply to their every day lives. Several of the 50 myths are accompanied by brief "Mythbusting: A Close Look" boxes that examine a closely allied myth. Each chapter concludes with a set of other myths to explore—250in all along with helpful suggested reference for tracking down these myths. Instructors in psychology classes may find many of these additional myths handy as presentation or term paper topics to assign their students. To drive home the point that psychological truth is often just as fascinating, if not more, than psychological myth, the book's postscript features David Letterman-style "Top Ten LisÜ' of remarkable psychological findings that may seem like myths, but that are in fact true. Finally, the book con eludes with ar Appendix containing recommended Internet resources for exploring various psychological myths. This book, we believe, will appeal to several audiences. Students in introductory psychology and research methods courses, as well as teachers of will find the book to be of particular interest. Many students enter these courses with misconceptions concerning a host of psychological topics, so confippting thesk


David Letterman-style "Top Ten List" of remarkable psychological findings that may seem like myths, but that are in fact true. Finally, the book con cludes with at Appendix containing recommended Internet resources for exploring various psychological myths. This book, we believe, will appeal to several audiences. Students in intro ductory psychology and research methods courses, as well as teachers of these courses will find the book to be of particular interest. Many students enter these courses with misconceptions concerning a host of psychological topics, so confronting misconceptions is often an essential step toward imparting accurate knowledge. Because we have organized the book around 1 1 domains traditionally covered il intro ductory psychology courses, such as brain functioning and perception, memory, learning and intelligence, emotion and motivation, social psy chology personality, psychopathology, and psychotherapy, this book can serve as either a freestanding textbook or a textbook supplement for these courses. Instructors use this book along with a standard introduc tory psychology textbook can easily assign some or all of the myths in each chapter in conjunction with th accompanying chapter in their textbook. Laypersons interested in learning more about psychology will find the book to be an invaluable and user-friendly resource, as well an enter taining compendiun of psychological knowledge. Practicing psychologists and other mental health professionals (such as psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, counselors, and socia workers), psychology educators, psycho logical researchers, psychology majors, and psychology graduate students should also find the book to be an enjoyabl read, not to mention a valuable reference source. Finally, we modestly believe that this book should be recommended (dare we say required?) reading for all joun alists, writers, educators, and attorneys whose work touches on psycho logical topics. This book should prevent them from falling prey to precisely the kinds o psychological misunderstandings against which we so vigorously caution our readers. This project could never have come to fruition without the assistance of several talented and dedicated individuals. First and foremost, we sincerely thank ou editor at Wiley-Blackwell, Christine Cardone, about whom we cannot say enough good things. Chris has provided invalu able guidance throughout this project, anc we are deeply indebted to her for her support and encouragement. We consider ourselves remark ably fortunate to have worked with someone as competent, kind and patient as Chris. Second, we thank Sean O'Hagen for his gracious assistance with the Reference section and help with the aging myth, Alison Cole for hell with the midlife crisis myth, Otto Wahl for help with the schizophrenia myth, and Fern Pritikin Lynn, Ayelet Meron Ruscio, and Susan Himes for their usefu suggestions on miscellaneous myths. Third, we thank Constance Adler, Hannah Rolls and Annette Abel at Wiley-Blackwell for their editorial assistance and copy eulung. Fourth, we thank the following reviewers of drafts of the book pro spectus and various chapters, whose comments, suggestions, and constructive criticisms wen extraordinarily helpful to us in improving our early drafts. We are especially indebted to the following reviewers for their wise counsel: David R. Barkmeier Northeastern University; Barney Beins, Ithaca College; John Bickford, University of Massachusetts-Amherst; Stephen F. Davis, Morningside College; Sergio Dell Sala, University of Edin burgh; Dana Dunn, Moravian College; Brandon Gaudiano, Brown University; Eric Landrum, Boise State University; Dap Ih.;w• Unive sity of the Free State; Loreto Prieto, Iowa State University; Jeff Ricker, Scottsdale Community College; and the numerous instructors who took our ini suaey. We are honored to dedicate this book to the memory of our dear friend, colleague, and co-author Barry Beyerstein. Although his contribution to this lume wa
sity of the Free State; Loreto Prieto, Iowa State University; Jeff Ricker, Scottsdale Community College; and the numerous instructors who took our initial survey. We are honored to dedicate this book to the memory of our dear friend, colleague, and co-author Barry Beyerstein. Although his contribution to this volume was cut short by his untimely death in 2007 at the age of 60, the manuscript bears the imprint of his keen mind and ability to communicate complex ideas to a wide audience. We know Bary would be extremely proud of this volume, which embodies his mission of educat ing the public about the promise of scientific psychology to increase our knowledge about what it means to be human, and about the pitfalls of pseudoscience. We fondly remember Barry Beyerstein's passion for life and compassion for others, and dedicate this book to him to commemor ate his enduring legacy to the popularization of scientific psychology. As authors, we very much hope you enjoy reading the book as much as we enjoyed writing it. We welcome your feedback on the book, not to mention suggestions for additional myths to discuss in future editions. May the mythbusting begin!

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors and publisher wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material: Figure 1.1 Copyright 1983 from McCloskey, M. (1983). Naive theories of motion. In Genmer, D. & Stevens, A. L. (Eds.), Mental Models. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 299—324. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a divi Sion of Informa plc. Figure 1.2 "Turning the Tables" from Shepard, R. N. (1990). Mind sights. New York: W. H. Freeman, 48. Reproduced by permission of the author. Photos 12/A1amy. Superman #37 Copyright 1945 DC Comics. All rights reserved. Used with permission. Figure 1.2 Reuters/Corbis. George Silkffime Life Pictures/Getty Images. Figure 6.1 Photos 12/A1amy. ReutersNincent West. Genesis song lyrics "Misunderstanding" by Phillip David Charles Collins, copyright T K, by permission ofHa1 Leonard Corporation as agent for EMI April Music Anastasi. Anne & Urbina. Susana (1997). Psychological testing (7th edition), Figure 15-1, p. 413. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. Electronically reproduced by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. Figure 9.1 Courtesy of Zazzle.com. Photo fest. Photo fest. Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permission for the use of copyright materials. The authors and publisher will gladly receive any information enabling them to rectify any error or omission in subsequent editions.
psychological claims. As a general rule, you should consult research evidence, not your intuitions, when deciding whether a scientific claim is correct. Research suggests that snap judgments are often helpful in sizing up people and in forecasting our likes and dislikes (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Lehrer, 2009; Wilson, 2004), but they can be wildly inaccurate when it comes to gauging the accuracy ofpsychological theories or assertions. We'll soon see why. As several science writers, including Lewis Wolpert (1992) and Alan Cromer (1993), have observed, science is uncommon sense. In other words, science requires us to put aside our common sense when evaluating evid ence (Hagel & Gendreau, 2008; Gendreau et al., 2002). To understand science, including psychological science, we must heed the advice of the great American humorist Mark Twain, namely, that we need to unleam old habits of thinking at least as much as leam new ones. In particular, we need to unlearn a tendency that comes naturally to all of us—the tendency to assume that our gut hunches are correct (Beins, 2008). Of course, not all popular psychology wisdom, sometimes called "folk psychology," is wrong. Most people believe that happy employees get more work done on the job than unhappy employees, and psychological research demonstrates that they're right (Kluger & Tikochinsky, 2001). Yet time and time again, scientists— including psychological scientists— have discovered that we can't always rust our common sense (Cacioppo, 2004; Della Sala, 1999, 2007; Gendreau et al., 2002; Osberg, 1991; Uttal, 2003). In part, that's because our raw perceptions can deceive us. For example, for many centuries, humans assumed not only that the earth is flat after all, it sure seems flat when we're walking on it—but that the sun revolves around the earth. This latter "fact" in particular seemed obvious to virtually everyone. After all, each day the sun paints a huge arc across the sky while we remain planted firmly on the ground. But in this case, observers' eyes fooled them. As science historian Daniel Boorstin (1983) noted: Nothing could be more obvious than that the earth is stable and unmov ing, and that we are the center of the universe. Modem Western science takes its beginning from the denial of this commonsense axiom . Common sense, the foundation of everyday life, could no longer serve for the governance of the world. (p. 294) Eig.ure-L.L A diagram from the study by Michael McCloskey (1983). What path will the ball take after exiting the spiral? Source: McCloskey (1983). Help



Myth #34 Most People Who Were Sexually Abused in Childhood Develop_ Severe Personality_ Disturbances in Adulthood Myth #35 People's Responses to Inkblots Tell Us a Great Deal about Their Personalities Myth #36 Our Handwriting Reveals Our Personality Traits 9 SAD, MAD, AND BAD Myth #37 Psychiatric Labels Cause Harm by Stigmatizing People Myth #38 Only Deeply Depressed People Commit Suicide Myth #39 People with Schizophrenia Have Multiple Personalities Myth #40 Adult Children of Alcoholics Display a Distinctive Profile of Symptoms Myth #41 There's Recently Been a Massive Epidemic QI [ulautile Autism Myth #42 Psychiatric Hospital Admissions and Crimes Increase during Full Moons 10 DISORDER IN THE COURT Myth Most Mentally 111 People Are Violent Myth #44 Criminal Profiling Is Helpful in Solving Cases Myth #45 A Large Proportion of Criminals Successfully Use the Insanity Defense Myth #46 Virtually All People Who Confess to a Crime Are Guilty of It
10 DISORDER IN THE COURT Myth Most Mentally 111 People Are Violent Myth
 #44 Criminal Profiling Is Helpful in Solving Cases
 Myth #45 A Large Proportion of Criminals Successfully Use the Insanity Defense 
Myth Virtually All People Who Confess to a Crime Are Guilty of It 
11 SKILLS AND PILLS Myth #47 Expert Judgment and Intuition Are the Best Means of Making Clinical Decisions
 Myth #48 Abstinence Is the Only Realistic Treatment Goal for Alcoholics Alcoholics
 Myth #49 All Effective Psychotherapies Force People to Confront the "Root" Causes of Their Problems in Childhood Myth 

#50 Electroconvulsive ("Shock") Therapy Is a Physically Dangerous and Brutal Treatment 

Postscript


Why Should we Care? Why is it important to know about psychological myths? There are at least three reasons: (1) Psychological myths can be harmful. For example, jurors who believe incorrectly that memory operates like a videotape may vote to convict a defendant on the basis of confidently held, but inaccurate, eyewitness testimony (see Myth #11). In addition, parents who believe incorrectly that punishment is usually an effective means of changing long-term behavior may spank their children whenever they misbehave, only to find that their children's undesirable actions become more frequent over time (see p. 97). (2) Psychological myths can cause indirect damage. Even false beliefs that are themselves harmless can inflict significant indirect harm. Economists use the term opportunin cost to refer to the fact that people who seek out ineffective treatments may forfeit the chance to obtain much-needed help. For example, people who believe mistakenly that subliminal self-help tapes are an effective means of losing weight may invest a great deal of time, money, and effort on a useless intervention (Moore, 1992; see Myth #5). They may also miss out on scientifically based weight loss programs that could prove beneficial. (3) The acceptance of psychological myths can impede our critical think ing in other areas. As astronomer Carl Sagan (1995) noted, our failure to distinguish myth from reality in one domain of scientific knowledge, such as psychology, can easily spill over to a failure to distinguish fact from fiction in other vitally important areas of modem society. These domains include genetic engineering, stem cell research, global warming, pollution, crime prevention, school ing, day care, and overpopulation, to name merely a few. As a consequence, we may find ourselves at the mercy of policy-makers who make unwise and even dangerous decisions about science and technology. As Sir Francis Bacon reminded us, knowledge is power. Ignorance is powerlessness. The 10 Sources of Psychological Myths: Your Mythbusting Kit How do psychological myths and misconceptions arise? We'll try to persuade you that there are 10 major ways in which we can all be fooled by plausible-sounding, but false, psychological claims. It's essential to understand that we're all vulnerable to these 10 sources of error, and that we're all fooled by them from time to time. Learning to think scientifically requires us to become aware of these sources of error and learn to compensate for them. Good scientists are just as prone to these sources of error as the average person (Mahoney & DeMonbreun, 1977). But good scientists have adopted a set of safeguards—called the scientific method for protecting themselves against them. The scientific method is a toolbox of skills designed to prevent scientists from fooling themselves. If you become aware of the 10 major sources of psychomythology, you '11 be far less likely to fall into the trap of accepting erroneous claims regarding human nature. Pay careful attention to these 10 sources of error, because we'll come back to them periodically throughout the book. In addition, you'll be abl these sources of error to evaluate a host of folk psychology claims in your everyday life. Think of them as your lifelong "Mythbust-ing Kit. "

) Word-of-Mouth Many incorrect folk psychology beliefs are spread across multiple generations by verbal communication. For example, because the phrase "opposites attract" is catchy and easily remembered, people tend to pass it on to others. Many urban legends work the same way. For example, you may have heard the story about alligators living in the New York City sewer system or about the well-intentioned but foolish woman who placed her wet poodle in a microwave to dry it off, only to have it explode. For many years, the first author of this book relayed a story he'd heard many times, namely the tale of a woman who purchased what she believed was a pet Chihuahua, only to be informed weeks later by a veterinarian that it was actually a gigantic rat. Although these stories may make for juicy dinner table conversation, they're no truer than any of the psychological myths we'll present in this book (Brunvand, 1999). The fact that we've heard a claim repeated over and over again doesn't make it correct. But it can lead us to accept this claim as correct even when it's not, because we can confuse a statement's familiarity with its accuracy (Gigerenzer, 2007). Advertisers who tell us repeatedly that "Seven of eight dentists surveyed recommended Brightshine Toothpaste above all over brands!" capitalize on this principle mercilessly. Furthermore, research shows that hearing one person express an opinion ("Joe Smith is the best qualified person to be President!") 10 times can lead us to assume that this opinion is as widely held as hearing 10 people express this opinion once (Weaver, Garcia, Schwarz, & Miller, 2007). Hearing is often believing, especially when we hear a statement over and over again. (2) Destre Jor Easy Answers and (2tuck Fl.res Let's face it: Everyday life isn't easy, even for the best adjusted of us. Many of us snuggle to find ways to lose weight, get enough sleep, per form well on exams, enjoy our jobs, and find a lifelong romantic partner. It's hardly a surprise that we glom on to techniques that offer foolproof promises of rapid and painless behavior changes. For example, fad diets are immensely popular, even though research demonstrates that the sub stantial majority of people who go on them regain all of their weight within just a few years (Brownell & Rodin, 1994). Equally popular are speed reading courses, many of which promise to increase people's reading speeds from a mere 100 or 200 words per minute to 10,000 or even 25,000 words per minute (Carroll, 2003). Yet researchers have found that none of these courses boost people's reading speeds with out decreasing their reading comprehension (Carver, 1987). What's more, most of the reading speeds advertised by these courses exceed the maximum reading speed of the human eyeball, which is about 300 words per minute (Carroll, 2003). A word to the wise: If something sounds too good to be u•ue, it probably is (Sagan, 1995). (3) Selective Perception and Memory As we've already discovered, we rarely if ever perceive reality exactly as it is. We see it through our own set of distorting lenses. These lenses are by onr biases and expectations, which lead us to interpret the world in accord with our preexisting beliefs. Yet most of us are blissfully unaware of how se beliefs influence our perceptions. Psychologist Lee Ross and others have termed the mistaken assumption that we see the world precisely as it is naiVe realism (Ross &

biases expectauons, which lead us to Interpret the world m accord with our preexlstmg e e b 11 ts. Yet most ot us are bhsstully unaware ot how these behets influence our perceptions. Psychologist Lee Ross and others have termed the mistaken assumption that we see the world precisely as it is naiVe realism (Ross & Ward, 1996). Naive realism not only leaves us vulnerable to psychological myths, but renders us less capable of recognizing them as myths in the first place. A striking example of selective perception and memory is our tendency to focus on "hits" memorable co occurrences—rather than on "misses" the absence of memorable co-occurrences. To understand this point, take a look at Figure 1.3, where you'll see what we call "The Great Fourfold Table of Life." Many scenarios in everyday life can be amanged in a fourfold table like the one here. For example, let's investigate the question of whether full moons are associated with more admissions to psychiatric hospitals, as emergency room physicians and nurses commonly claim (see Myth #42). To answer this question, we need to examine all four cells of the Great Fourfold Table of Life: Cell A, which consists of instances when there's a full moon and a psychiatric hospital admission, Cell B, which consists of instances when there's a full moon but no psychiatric hospital admission, Cell C, which consists of instances when there's no full moon and a psychiatric hospital admis sion, and Cell D, which consists of instances when there's no full moon and no psychiatric hospital admission. Using all four cells allows you to compute the correlation between full moons and the number of psychiatric hospital admissions; a correlation is a statistical measure of how closely these two variables are associated (by the way, a variable is a fancy term for anything that varies, like height, hair color, IQ, or extraversion). Figure 1.3 The Great Fourfold Table of Life. In most cases, we attend too much to the A cell, which can result in illusory correlation. Psychi.trk h.piul aånission p. ychatric hosN "nission No c Here's the problem. In real life, we're often remarkably poor at estimating correlations from the Great Fourfold Table of Life, because we generally pay too much attention to certain cells and not enough to others. In particular, research demonstrates that we typically pay too much attention to the A cell, and not nearly enough to the B cell (Gilovich, 1991). That's understandable, because the A cell is usually more interesting and memorable than the B cell. After all, when there's a full moon and a lot of people end up in a psychiatric hospital, it confirms our initial expectations, so we tend to notice it, remember it, and tell others about iL The A cell is a "hit' a striking co-occurrence. But when there's a full moon and nobody ends up in a psychiatric hospital, we barely notice or remember this "no are we likely to run excitedly to our friends and tell them, "Wow, there was a full moon tonight and guess what happened? Nothing!" The B cell isa rhs absence of a striking co-occurrence.


Illusory correlations can lead us to "see" a variety of associations that aren't there. For example, many people with arthritis insist that their joints hurt more in rainy than in non-rainy weather. Yet studies demon strate that this association is a figment of their imaginations (Quick, 1999). Presumably, people with arthritis attend too much to theA cell of the Great Fourfold Table of Life instances when it rains and when their joints hurt leading them to perceive a correlation that doesn't exist. Similarly, the early phrenologists "saw" close linkages between damage to specific brain areas and deficits in certain psychological abilities, but they were wildly wrong. Another probable example of illusory correlation is the perception that cases of infantile autism, a severe psychiatric disorder marked by severe language and social deficits, are associated with prior exposure to mercury-based vaccines (see Myth #41). Numerous carefully conducted studies have found no association whatsoever between the incidence of infantile autism and mercury vaccine exposure (Grinker, 2007; Institute of Medicine, 2004; Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, 2007), although tens of thousands of parents of autistic children are convinced otherwise. In all probability, these parents are paying too much attention to the A cell of the fourfold table. They can hardly be blamed for doing so given that they're understandably trying to detect an event, such as a vaccination, that could explain their children's autism. Moreover, these parents may have been fooled by the fact that the initial appearance of autistic symptoms—often shortly after age 2—often coincides with at the age when most children receive vaccinations. (4) Inferring Causation from Correlation It's tempting, but incorrect, to conclude that if two things co occur statistically (that is, if two things are "correlated") then they must be causally related to each other. As psychologists like to say, correlation doesn't mean causation. So, if variables A and B are correlated, there can be three major explanations for this correlation: (a) A may cause B , (b) B may cause A, or (c) a third variable, C, may cause both A and B. This last scenario is known as the third variable problem, because C is a third variable that may contribute to the association between variables A and C. The problem is that the researchers who conducted the study may never have measured C; in fact, they may have never known about C' s existence. Let's take a concrete example. Numerous studies demonstrate that a history of physical abuse in childhood increases one's odds of becom ing an aggressive person in adulthood (Widom, 1989). Many investigators have interpreted this statistical association as implying that childhood physical abuse causes physical aggression in later life; indeed, this inter pretation is called the "cycle of violence" hypothesis. In this case, the investigators are assuming that childhood physical abuse (A) causes adult violence (B). Is this explanation necessarily right? Of course, in this case B can't cause A, because B occurred after A. A basic principle of logic is that causes must precede their effects. Yet we haven't ruled out the possibility that a third variable, C, explains both A and B. One potential third variable in this case is a genetic tendency toward aggressiveness. Pe parents who physically abuse their children harbor a genetic tendency toward aggressiveness, which they pass on to their children. Indeed, there's odsesearch
Another probable example of illusory correlation is the perception that cases of infantile autism, a severe psychiatric disorder marked by severe language and social deficits, are associated with prior exposure to mercury based vaccines (see Myth #41). Numerous carefully conducted studies have found no association whatsoever between the incidence of infantile autism and mercury vaccine exposure (Glinker. 2007; Institute of Medicine, 2004; Lilienfeld & Arkowitz, 2007), although tens of thousands of parents of autistic children are convinced otherv.'ise. In all probability, these parents are paying too much attention to the A cell of the fourfold table. They can hardly be blamed for doing so given that they're understandably trying to detect an event. such as a vaccination, that could explain their children's autism. Moreover. these parents may have been fooled by the fact that the initial appearance of autistic symptoms—often shortly after age 2—often coincides witl at the age when most children receive vaccinations. (4) Inferring Causation from Correlation It's tempting, but incorrect, to conclude that if two things co-occur statistically (ffat is, if two things are "correlated") then they must be causally related to each other. As psychologists like to say, correlation doesn't mean causation. So, if variables A and B are correlated, there can be three major explanations for this correlation: (a) A may cause B, (b) B may cause A, or (c) a third variable, C, may cause boff A and B. This last scenario is known as die third variable problem, because C is a third variable that may contribute to the association between variables A and C. The problem is that the researchers who conducted the study may never have measured C; in fact, they may have never known about C's existence. Let's take a concrete example. Numerous studies demonstrate that a history of physical abuse in childhood increases one's odds of becom ing an aggressive person in adulffood (Widom, 1989). Many investigators have interpreted this statistical association as implying that childhood physical abuse causes physical aggression in later life; indeed. this inter pretation is called the "cycle of violence" hypothesis. In this case, the investigators are assuming that childhood physical abuse (A) causes adult violence (B). Is this explanation necessarily right? Of course, in this case B can't cause A. because B occurred after A. A basic principle of logic is that causes must precede their effects. Yet we haven't ruled out the possibility that a third variable, C, explains both A and B. One potential third variable in this case is a genetic tendency toward aggressiveness. Perhaps most parents who physically abuse their children harbor a genetic tendency toward aggressiveness, which they pass on to their children. Indeed, there's good research evidence that aggressiveness is partly influenced by genes (Krueger. Hicks. & McGue. 2001). This genetic tendency (C) could result in a correlation between a childhood physical abuse history (A) and later aggression in individuals with diis history (B), even though A and B may be causally unrelated to each other (DiLa11a & Gottesman- 1991). Incidentally, there are other potential candidates for C in diis case (can you think of any?). The key point is that when two variables are correlated, we shouldn't necessarily assume a direct causal relationship between them. Competing e possible. 


evidence that aggressiveness is partly influenced by genes (Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001). This genetic tendency (C) could result in a correlation between a childhood physical abuse history (A) and later aggression in individuals with this history (B), even though A and B may be causally unrelated to each other (DiLa11a & Gottesman, 1991). Incidentally, there are other potential candidates for C in this case (can you think of any?). The key point is that when two variables are correlated, we shouldn't necessarily assume a direct causal relationship between them. Competing explanations are possible. (5) Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc Reasoning "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc" means "after this, therefore because of this" in Latin. Many of us leap to the conclusion that because A precedes B, then A must cause B. But many events that occur before other events don 't cause them. For example, the fact that virtually all serial killers ate cereal as children doesn't mean that eating cereal produces serial killers (or even "cereal killers"—we couldn't resist the pun) in adulthood. Or the fact that some people become less depressed soon after taking an herbal remedy doesn't mean that the herbal remedy caused or even contributed to their improvement. These people might have become less depressed even without the herbal remedy, or they might have sought out other effective interventions (like talking to a therapist or even to a supportive friend) at about the same time. Or perhaps taking the herbal remedy inspired a sense of hope in them, resulting in what psychologists call a placebo effect: improvement resulting from the mere expectation of improvement. Even trained scientists can fall prey to post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning. In the journal Medical Hypotheses, Flensmark (2004) observed that the appearance of shoes in the Western world about 1,000 years ago was soon followed by the first appearance of cases of schizo phrenia. From these findings, he proposed that shoes play a role in triggering schizophrenia. But the appearance of shoes could have merely coincided with other changes, such as the growth of modernization or an increase in stressful living conditions, which may have contributed more directly to the emergence of schizophrenia. (6) Exposure to a Biased Sample In the media and many aspects of daily life, we're often exposed to a nonrandom—or what psychologists called a "biased"—sample of people from the general population. For example, television programs portray approximately 75% of severely mentally ill individuals as violent (Wahl, 1997), although the actual rate of violence among the severely mentally ill is considerably lower than that (Teplin, 1985; see Myth #43). Such skewed media coverage may fuel the erroneous impression that most indi viduals with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder (once called manic depres sion), and other serious mental illnesses are physically dangerous. Psychotherapists may be especially prone to this error, because they spend most of their working lives with an unrepresentative group of indi viduals, namely, people in psychological treatment. Here's an example: Many psychotherapists believe it's exceedingly difficult for people to quit smoking on their own. Yet research demonstrates that many, if not most, smokers manage to stop without formal psychological treatment (Schachter, 1982). These psychotherapists are probably falling prey to what statisticians Patricia and Jacob Cohen (1984) termed the clinician's illusion—the tendency for practitioners to over how chronic (long standing) a psychological problem is because of their selective exposure to a chronic sample. That is, because clinicians who treat ciga e smokers

probably falling prey to what statisticians Patricia and Jacob Cohen (1984) termed the clinician's illusion—ffe tendency for practitioners to overestimate how chronic (long standing) a psychological problem is because of their selective exposure to a chronic sample. That is, because clinicians who treat cigarette smokers tend to see only those individuals who can't stop smoking on their own—otherwise, these smokers presumably wouldn't have sought out a clinician in the first place—these clinicians tend to overestimate how difficult smokers find it to quit without treatment. (7) Reasoning by Representativeness We often evaluate the similarity between two things on the basis of their superficial resemblance to each other. Psychologists call this phenomenon the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman. 1974), because we use the extent to which two things are "represent ative" of each other to estimate how similar they are. A "heuristic," by the way, is a mental shortcut or rule of thumb. Most of the time. the representativeness heuristic, like other heuristics, serves us well (Gigerenzer, 2007). If we're walking down the street and see a masked man running out of a bank with a gun, we'll probably ry to get out of the way as quickly as we can. That's because this man is representative of similar to—bank robbers we've seen on television and in motion pictures. Of course, it's possible that he's just pulling a prank or that he's an actor in a Hollywood action movie being filmed ffere, but better safe dian sorry. In diis case, we relied on a mental shortcut, and we were probably smart to do so. Yet we sometimes apply the representativeness heuristic when we shouldn't. Not all things that resemble each other superficially are related to each other, so the representativeness heuristic sometimes leads us astray (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1996). In this case, common sense is correct: We can't always judge a book by its cover. Indeed, many psychological myths probably arise from a misapplication of representativeness. For example, some graphologists (handwriting analysts) claim that people whose handwriting contains many widely spaced letters possess strong needs for interpersonal distance, or that people who cross their "f's and 'f's with whip-like lines tend to be sadistic. In this case, graphologists are assuming that two things that superficially resemble each other, like widely spaced letters and a need for interpersonal space, are statistically associated. Yet there's not a shred of research support for these claims (Beyerstein & Beyerstein, 1992; see Myth #36). Another example comes from human figure drawings, which many clinical psychologists use to detect respondents' personality traits and psychological disorders (Watkins, Campbell. Nieberding, & Hallmark, 1995). Human figure drawing tasks, like the ever popular Draw-A-Person Test, ask people to draw a person (or in some cases. two persons of opposite sexes) in any way they wish. Some clinicians who use these tests claim that respondents who draw people with large eyes are paranoid. that respondents who draw people with large heads are narcissistic (self-centered), and even that respondents who draw people with long ties are excessively preoccupied with sex (a long tie is a favorite Freudian symbol for the male sexual organ). All these claims are based on a surface resemblance between specific human figure drawing "signs" and specific psychological characteristics. Yet research offers no support for these supposed associations (Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000; Motta, Little, & Tobin, 1993). (8) Misleading Film and Media Portrayals Manv osvcholocical Dhenomena- es mental illnesses and treatments for O Help uentlv oortraved inaccuratelv in the entertainment and news media

(8) Misleading Film and Media Portrayals Many psychological phenomena, especially mental illnesses and treatments for them, are frequently portrayed inaccurately in the entertainment and news media (Beins, 2008). More often than not, the media depicts these phenomena as more sensational than they are. For example, some modern films picture electroconvulsive therapy (EC T), known informally as "shock therapy," as a physically brutal and even dangerous treatment (Walter & McDonald, 2004). In some cases, as in the 1999 horror film, House on Haunted Hill, individuals who're strapped to ECT machines in movies experience violent convulsions. Although it's ü•ue that that ECT was once somewhat dangerous, technological advances over the past few decades, such as the administration of a muscle relaxant, have rendered it no more physically hazardous than anesthesia (Glass, 2001; see Myth #50). Moreover, patients who receive modern forms of ECT don't experience observable motor convulsions. To take another example, most Hollywood films depict adults with autism as possessing highly specialized intellectual skills. In the 1988 Academy Award- winning film, Rain Main, Dustin Hoffman portrayed an autistic adult with "savant syndrome." This syndrome is charac terized by remarkable mental abilities, such as "calendar calculation" (the ability to name the day of a week given any year and date), multiplication and division of extremely large numbers, and knowledge of trivia, such as the batting averages of all active major league baseball players. Yet at most of autistic adults are savants (Miller, 1999; see Myth #41) (Figure (9) Exaggeration ofa Kernel of Truth Some psychological myths aren't entirely false. Instead, they're exaggera tions of claims that contain a kernel of ü•uth. For example, it's almost certainly true that many of us don't realize our full intellectual potential. Yet this fact doesn't mean that most of us use only of our brain power, as many people incorrectly believe (Beyerstein, 1999; Della Sala, 1999; see Myth #1). In addition, it's probably true that at least a few differences in interests and personality traits between romantic partners can "spice up" a relationship. That's because sharing your life with someone who agrees with you on everything can make your love life harmonious, but hopelessly boring. Yet this fact doesn't imply that opposites attract (see Myth #27). Still other myths involve an overstate ment of small differences. For example, although men and women tend to differ slightly in their communication styles, some popular psy chologists, especially John Gray, have taken this kernel of truth to an extreme, claiming that "men are from Mars" and "women are from Venus" (see Myth #29). Figure 1.4 Film portrayals of individuals with autistic disorder, like this Academy Award-winning portrayal by actor Dustin Hoffman (left) in the 1 8 Man, often imply that they possess remarkable intellectual capacities. Yet only about of autistic individuals are savants.

Figure 1.4 Film portrayals of individuals with autistic disorder, like this Academy Award-winning portrayal by actor Dustin Hoffman (left) in the 1988 film Rain Man, often imply that they possess remarkable intellectual capacities. Yet only about of autistic individuals are savants. Source: Photos 12„'Ä1amy (10) Terminological Confusion Some psychological terms lend themselves to mistaken inferences. For example, the word "schizophrenia," which Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1911) coined in the early 20th century, literally means "split mind." As a consequence, many people believe incorrectly that people with schizo phrenia possess more than one personality (see Myth #39). Indeed, we'll frequently hear the term "schizophrenic" in everyday language to refer to instances in which a person is of two different minds about an issue ("I'm feeling very schizophrenic about my girlfriend; I'm attracted to her physically but bothered by her personality quirks"). It's therefore hardly surprising that many people confuse schizophrenia with an entirely dif ferent condition called "multiple personality disordef' (known today as "dissociative identity disorder"), which is supposedly characterized by the presence of more than one personality within the same individual (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In fact, schizophrenics possess only one personality that's been shattered. Indeed, Bleuler (1911) intended the term "schizophrenia" to refer to individuals with this condition suffer from a splitting of mental functions, such as thinking and emotion, whereby their thoughts don't correspond to eirftelings. Nevertheless, in the world of popular psychology, Bleuler' s original and more accurate meaning has largely been lost. The misleading stereotype of s hrenics as persons who act like two completely different people on different occasions has become ingrained in modern culture.

Figure 1.4 Film portrayals of individuals with autistic disorder, like this Academy Award-winning portrayal by actor Dustin Hoffman (left) in the 1988 film Rain Man, often imply that they possess remarkable intellectual capacities. Yet only about of autistic individuals are savants. Source: Photos 12„'Ä1amy (10) Terminological Confusion Some psychological terms lend themselves to mistaken inferences. For example, the word "schizophrenia," which Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1911) coined in the early 20th century, literally means "split mind." As a consequence, many people believe incorrectly that people with schizo phrenia possess more than one personality (see Myth #39). Indeed, we'll frequently hear the term "schizophrenic" in everyday language to refer to instances in which a person is of two different minds about an issue ("I'm feeling very schizophrenic about my girlfriend; I'm attracted to her physically but bothered by her personality quirks"). It's therefore hardly surprising that many people confuse schizophrenia with an entirely dif ferent condition called "multiple personality disordef' (known today as "dissociative identity disorder"), which is supposedly characterized by the presence of more than one personality within the same individual (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In fact, schizophrenics possess only one personality that's been shattered. Indeed, Bleuler (1911) intended the term "schizophrenia" to refer to individuals with this condition suffer from a splitting of mental functions, such as thinking and emotion, whereby their thoughts don't correspond to eirftelings. Nevertheless, in the world of popular psychology, Bleuler' s original and more accurate meaning has largely been lost. The misleading stereotype of s hrenics as persons who act like two completely different people on different occasions has become ingrained in modern culture.

Nevertheless, in the world of popular psychology, Bleuler' s original and more accurate meaning has largely been lost. The misleading stereotype of schizophrenics as persons who act like two completely different people on different occasions has become ingrained in modern culture. To take another example, the term "hypnosis" derives from the Greek prefix "hypno," which means sleep (indeed, some early hypnotists believed that hypnosis was a form of sleep). This term may have led many people, including some psychologists, to assume that hypnosis is a sleep-like state. In films, hypnotists often attempt to induce a hypnotic state by telling their clients that "You're getting sleepy." Yet in fact, hypnosis bears no physiological relationship to sleep, because people who are hypnotized remain entirely awake and fully aware of their surroundings (Nash, 2001; see Myth #19). The World of Psychomythology: What Lies Ahead In this book, you'll encounter 50 myths that are commonplace in the world of popular psychology. These myths span much of the broad landscape of modern psychology: brain functioning, perception, development, memory, intelligence, learning, altered states of consciousness, emotion, interpersonal behavior, personality, mental illness, the courtroom, and psychotherapy. You'll leam about the psychological and societal origins of each myth, discover how each myth has shaped society's popular thinking about human behavior, and find out what scientific research has to say about each myth. At the end of each chapter, we'll provide you with a list of additional psychological myths to explore in each domain. In the book's postscript, we'll offer a list of fascinating findings that may appear to be fictional, but that are actually factual, to remind you that genuine psychology is often even more remarkable—and difficult to believe—than psychomythology. Debunking myths comes with its share of risks (Chew, 2004; Landau & Bavaria, 2003). Psychologist Norbert Schwarz and his colleagues (Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007; Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005) showed that correcting a misconception, such as "The side effects of a flu vaccine are often worse than the flu itself," can sometimes backfire by leading people to be more likely to believe this misconception later. That's because people often remember the statement itself but not its "negation tag" that is, the little yellow sticky note in our heads that says "that claim is wrong." Schwarz's work reminds us that merely memorizing a list of misconceptions isn't enough: It's crucial to understand the reasons underlying each misconception. His work also suggests that it's essential for us to understand not merely what's false, but also what's true. Linking up a misconception with the ü•uth is the best means of debunking that misconception (Schwarz et al., 2007). That' s why we'll spend a few pages explaining not only why each of these 50 myths is wrong, but also how each of these 50 myths imparts an underlying tilth about psychology. Fortunately, there's at least some reason to be optimistic. Research shows that psychology students' acceptance of psychological miscon ceptions, like "people use only of their brain's capacity," declines with the total number of psychology classes they've taken (Standing & Huber, 2003). This sam showed that acceptance of these misconceptions is lower among psychology majors than non-majors. Although such research is only correlational ' f •alrt•edy learned that correlation doesn't always mean causation it gives us at least a glimmer of hope that education can reduce people's beliefs in psycomythology.
Fortunately, there's at least some reason to be optimistic. Research shows that psychology students' acceptance of psychological misconceptions, like "people use only of their brain's capacity," declines with the total number of psychology classes they've taken (Standing & Huber, 2003). This same study also showed that acceptance of these misconceptions is lower among psychology majors than non-majors. Although such research is only correlational—we've already learned that correlation doesn't always mean causation—it gives us at least a glimmer of hope that education can reduce people's beliefs in psychomythology. What's more, recent controlled research suggests that explicitly refuting psychological misconceptions in introductory psychology lectures or readings can lead to large—up to 53.7%—decreases in the levels of these misconceptions (Kowalski & Taylor, in press). If we've succeeded in our mission, you should emerge from this book not only with a higher "Psychology IQ," but also a better understand ing of how to distinguish fact from fiction in popular psychology. Per haps most important, you should emerge with the critical thinking tools needed to better evaluate psychological claims in everyday life. As the paleontologist and science writer Stephen Jay Gould (1996) pointed out, "the most erroneous stories are those we think we know best—and therefore never scrutinize or question" (p. 57). In this book, we'll encourage you to never accept psychological stories on faith alone, and to always scrutinize and question the psychological stories you think you know best. So without further ado, let's enter the surprising and often fascinating world of psychomythology.

Myths about the Brain and Perception Myth #1 Most People Use Only 10% of Their Brain Power enever those of us who study the brain venture out of the Ivory Tower to give public lectures or media interviews, one of the questions we're most likely to encounter is, "Is it true that we only use of our brains?" The look of disappointment that usually follows when we respond, "Sorry, I'm afraid not," strongly suggests that the myth is one of those hopeful truisms that refuses to die simply because it would be so darn nice if it were true (Della Sala, 1999; Della Sala & Beyerstein, 2007). Indeed, this myth is widespread, even among psychology students and other well-educated people. In one study, when asked "About what percentage of their potential brain power do you think most people use?," a third of psychology majors answered (Higbee & Clay, 1998, p. 471). Fifty-nine percent of a sample of college-educated people in Brazil similarly believe that people use only of their brains (Herculano-Houze1, 2002). Remarkably, that same survey revealed that even 6% of neuroscientists agreed with this claim! Surely, none of us would turn down a hefty hike in brain power if we could achieve it. Not surprisingly, marketers who thrive on the public's fond hopes for a self-improvement breakthrough continue to peddle a never-ending stream of dubious schemes and devices premised on the myth. Always on the lookout for a "feel-good" story, the media has played a big role in keeping this optimistic myth alive. A great deal of advertising copy for legitimate products continues to refer to the myth as fact, usually in the hopes of flattering potential customers who see themselves as having risen above their brain's limitations. For example, in his popular book, How to Be Twice as Smart, Scott Witt (1983) wrote that "If you're like most people, you're using only ten percent of your brainpower" (p. 4). In 1999, an airline tried to entice potential flyers by informing them that "It's been said that we use only of our brain capacity. If, however, you're flying_ (name of company deleted) Airlines, you're using considerably more" (Chudler, 2006). Yet an expert panel convened by the U .S. National Research Council concluded that (alas!), in this, as with other miraculous self-improvement claims, there's no good substitute for hard work when it comes to getting ahead in life (Beyerstein, 1999c; Druckman & Swets, 1988). This unwelcome news has discourage millions who comfort themselves with the belief that the shortcut to their unfulfilled dreams lies in the fact that they just haven 't quite caughCup "lith rhe secret for tapping their vast, allegedly unused cerebral reservoir (Beyerstein, 1999c). That desired promotion, stellar grade point average, or authorship oi khe next bestselling novel is within your grasp, say the sellers of cerebral miracle remedies.
Even more questionable are the offerings of New Age entrepreneurs who propose to hone the psychic skills we allegedly all possess with obscure gizmos for the brain. Self-proclaimed psychic Uri Geller (1996) claimed that "In fact, most of us use only about 10 percent of our brains, if that." Promoters like Geller imply that psychic powers reside in the 90% of the brain that simple folk forced to subsist on the drudge-like 10% haven't yet learned to use. Why would a brain researcher doubt that 90% of the average brain lies silent? There are several reasons. First of all, our brain has been shaped by natural selection. Brain tissue is expensive to grow and operate; at a mere 2—3% of our body weight, it consumes over 20% of the oxygen we breathe. It's implausible that evolution would have permitted the squandering of resources on a scale necessary to build and maintain such a massively underutilized organ. Moreover, if having a bigger brain contributes to the flexibility that promotes survival and reproduction—which are natural selection's "bottom lines"—it's hard to believe that any slight increase in processing power wouldn't be snapped up immediately by existing systems in the brain to enhance the bearer's chances in the continuous struggle to prosper and procreate. Doubts about the figure are also fueled by evidence from clinical neurology and neuropsychology, two disciplines that aim to understand and alleviate the effects of brain damage. Losing far less than 90% of the brain to accident or disease almost always has catastrophic consequences. Look, for instance, at the much- publicized controversy surrounding the nonconscious status and ultimate death of Terri Schiavo, the young Florida woman who lay in a persistent vegetative state for 15 years (Quill, 2005). Oxygen deprivation following a cardiac arrest in 1990 had destroyed about 50% of her cerebrum, the upper part of the brain responsible for conscious awareness. Modern brain science argues that "mind" equals brain function. Therefore, patients like Ms. Schiavo had permanently lost the capacity for thoughts, perceptions, memories, and emotions that are the very essence of being human (Beyerstein, 1987). Although some claimed to see signs of consciousness in Schiavo, most impartial experts found no evidence that any of her higher mental processes had been spared. If of the brain is indeed unnecessary, this shouldn't have been the case. Research also reveals that no area of the brain can be destroyed by strokes or head trauma without leaving patients with serious deficits in functioning (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003; Sacks, 1985). Likewise, electrical stimulation of sites in the brain during neurosurgery has failed to uncover any "silent areas," those in which the person experiences no perception, emotion, or movement after neurosurgeons apply these tiny currents (neurosurgeons can accomplish this feat with conscious patients under local anesthesia because the brain contains no pain receptors). The last century has witnessed the advent of increasingly sophisticated technologies for snooping on the brain's traffic (Rosenzweig, Breedlove, & Watson, 2005). With the aid of brain imaging techniques, such as electroencepholograms (EEGs), positron emission tomography (PET) scanners, and functio resonance imaging (MRI) machines, researchers have succeeded in localizing a vast number of psychological functions to specific brain areas. Wi#l animals, and occasionally with humans undergoing neurological treatment, researchers can insert recording probes into the brain. Despite this detailed hnapping, no
animals, and occasionally with humans undergoing neurological treatment, researchers can insert recording probes into the brain. Despite this detailed mapping, no quiet areas awaiting new assignments have emerged. In fact, even simple tacke generally require contributions of processing areas spread throughout virtually the whole brain. Two other firmly established principles of neuroscience create further problems for the myth. Areas of the brain that are unused because of injuries or disease tend to do one of two things. They either wither away, or "degenerate." as neuroscientists put it, or they're taken over by nearby areas that are on the lookout for unused territory to colonize for their own purposes. Either way, perfectly good, unused brain tissue is unlikely to remain on the sidelines for long. All told, evidence suggests that there's no cerebral spare tire waiting to be mounted with a little help from the self-improvement industry. So, if the myth is so poorly supponed, how did it get started? Attempts to track down this myth's origins haven't uncovered any smoking guns, but a few tantalizing clues have materialized (Beyerstein, 1999c; Chudler, 2006; Geake, 2008). One stream leads back to pioneering American psychologist William James in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In one of his writings for the general public, James said he doubted that average persons achieve more than about of their intellectual potential. James always talked in terms of underdeveloped potential, never relating it to a specific amount of the brain engaged. A slew of "positive thinking" gurus who followed weren't as careful, though, and "10% of our capacity" gradually morphed into "10% of our brain" (Beyerstein, 1999c). Undoubtedly, the biggest boost for the self-help entrepreneurs came when journalist Lowell Thomas attributed the brain claim to William James. Thomas did so in the 1936 preface to one of the bestsellmg self-help books ot all ume, Dale Carnegie's How to VVin Friends and Influence People. 'lhe myth has never lost Its steam smce. The popularity of the myth probably also stems partly from authors' misunderstandings of scientific papers by early brain researchers. In calling a huge percentage of the human cerebral hemispheres "silent cortex," early investigators may have fostered the mistaken impression that what scientists now call "association cortex" had no function. As we now know, association cortex is vitally important for our language, abstract thinking, and performance of intricate sensory-motor tasks. In a similar vein, early researchers' admirably modest admissions that they didn't know what of the brain did probably contributed to the myth that it does nothing. Another possible source of confusion may have been laypersons' misunderstanding of the role of glial cells, brain cells that oumumber the brain's neurons (nerve cells) by a factor of about 10. Although neurons are the scene of the action with respect to thinking and other mental activities, glial cells perform essential support functions for the neurons that do the heavy lifting, psychologically speaking. Finally, those who've searched for the origins of the myth frequently came across the claim that Albert Einstein once explained his own brilliance by reference to the myth. Nevertheless, a careful search by staff at the Albeit Einstein archive on our behalf yielded no record of any such statement on his part. More likely than not, the promoters of the yrh simply seized on Einstein's prestige to further their own endeavors (Beyerstein, 1999c). The myth has surely motivated many people to strive for greater creativity and productivity in their lives, which certainly isn't a bad thing.